diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/stable/sysfs-bus-vmbus linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/stable/sysfs-bus-vmbus
index 3fed8fdb873d..c4ffdfc324b4 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/stable/sysfs-bus-vmbus
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/stable/sysfs-bus-vmbus
@@ -81,7 +81,9 @@ What:		/sys/bus/vmbus/devices/<UUID>/channels/<N>/latency
 Date:		September. 2017
 KernelVersion:	4.14
 Contact:	Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>
-Description:	Channel signaling latency
+Description:	Channel signaling latency. This file is available only for
+		performance critical channels (storage, network, etc.) that use
+		the monitor page mechanism.
 Users:		Debugging tools
 
 What:		/sys/bus/vmbus/devices/<UUID>/channels/<N>/out_mask
@@ -95,7 +97,9 @@ What:		/sys/bus/vmbus/devices/<UUID>/channels/<N>/pending
 Date:		September. 2017
 KernelVersion:	4.14
 Contact:	Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>
-Description:	Channel interrupt pending state
+Description:	Channel interrupt pending state. This file is available only for
+		performance critical channels (storage, network, etc.) that use
+		the monitor page mechanism.
 Users:		Debugging tools
 
 What:		/sys/bus/vmbus/devices/<UUID>/channels/<N>/read_avail
@@ -137,7 +141,9 @@ What:		/sys/bus/vmbus/devices/<UUID>/channels/<N>/monitor_id
 Date:		January. 2018
 KernelVersion:	4.16
 Contact:	Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>
-Description:	Monitor bit associated with channel
+Description:	Monitor bit associated with channel. This file is available only
+		for performance critical channels (storage, network, etc.) that
+		use the monitor page mechanism.
 Users:		Debugging tools and userspace drivers
 
 What:		/sys/bus/vmbus/devices/<UUID>/channels/<N>/ring
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
index 201d10319fa1..1df1177df68a 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
@@ -42,8 +42,30 @@ Description:
 		modification of EVM-protected metadata and
 		disable all further modification of policy
 
-		Note that once a key has been loaded, it will no longer be
-		possible to enable metadata modification.
+		Echoing a value is additive, the new value is added to the
+		existing initialization flags.
+
+		For example, after::
+
+		  echo 2 ><securityfs>/evm
+
+		another echo can be performed::
+
+		  echo 1 ><securityfs>/evm
+
+		and the resulting value will be 3.
+
+		Note that once an HMAC key has been loaded, it will no longer
+		be possible to enable metadata modification. Signaling that an
+		HMAC key has been loaded will clear the corresponding flag.
+		For example, if the current value is 6 (2 and 4 set)::
+
+		  echo 1 ><securityfs>/evm
+
+		will set the new value to 3 (4 cleared).
+
+		Loading an HMAC key is the only way to disable metadata
+		modification.
 
 		Until key loading has been signaled EVM can not create
 		or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-ata linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-ata
index 9ab0ef1dd1c7..299e0d1dc161 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-ata
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-ata
@@ -107,13 +107,14 @@ Description:
 				described in ATA8 7.16 and 7.17. Only valid if
 				the device is not a PM.
 
-		pio_mode:	(RO) Transfer modes supported by the device when
-				in PIO mode. Mostly used by PATA device.
+		pio_mode:	(RO) PIO transfer mode used by the device.
+				Mostly used by PATA devices.
 
-		xfer_mode:	(RO) Current transfer mode
+		xfer_mode:	(RO) Current transfer mode. Mostly used by
+				PATA devices.
 
-		dma_mode:	(RO) Transfer modes supported by the device when
-				in DMA mode. Mostly used by PATA device.
+		dma_mode:	(RO) DMA transfer mode used by the device.
+				Mostly used by PATA devices.
 
 		class:		(RO) Device class. Can be "ata" for disk,
 				"atapi" for packet device, "pmp" for PM, or
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio
index a5b4f223641d..b3adbb33a868 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ Description:
 		Raw capacitance measurement from channel Y. Units after
 		application of scale and offset are nanofarads.
 
-What:		/sys/.../iio:deviceX/in_capacitanceY-in_capacitanceZ_raw
+What:		/sys/.../iio:deviceX/in_capacitanceY-capacitanceZ_raw
 KernelVersion:	3.2
 Contact:	linux-iio@vger.kernel.org
 Description:
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ Description:
 
 What:		/sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_positionrelative_x_raw
 What:		/sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_positionrelative_y_raw
-KernelVersion:	4.18
+KernelVersion:	4.19
 Contact:	linux-iio@vger.kernel.org
 Description:
 		Relative position in direction x or y on a pad (may be
@@ -1559,7 +1559,8 @@ What:		/sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_concentrationX_voc_raw
 KernelVersion:	4.3
 Contact:	linux-iio@vger.kernel.org
 Description:
-		Raw (unscaled no offset etc.) percentage reading of a substance.
+		Raw (unscaled no offset etc.) reading of a substance. Units
+		after application of scale and offset are percents.
 
 What:		/sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_resistance_raw
 What:		/sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_resistanceX_raw
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio-vf610 linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio-vf610
index 308a6756d3bf..491ead804488 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio-vf610
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio-vf610
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-What:		/sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/conversion_mode
+What:		/sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_conversion_mode
 KernelVersion:	4.2
 Contact:	linux-iio@vger.kernel.org
 Description:
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-mei linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-mei
index 6bd45346ac7e..3f8701e8fa24 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-mei
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-mei
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ KernelVersion:	3.10
 Contact:	Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
 		linux-mei@linux.intel.com
 Description:	Stores the same MODALIAS value emitted by uevent
-		Format: mei:<mei device name>:<device uuid>:
+		Format: mei:<mei device name>:<device uuid>:<protocol version>
 
 What:		/sys/bus/mei/devices/.../name
 Date:		May 2015
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci-devices-aer_stats linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci-devices-aer_stats
index 4b0318c99507..ff229d71961c 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci-devices-aer_stats
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci-devices-aer_stats
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ errors may be "seen" / reported by the link partner and not the
 problematic endpoint itself (which may report all counters as 0 as it never
 saw any problems).
 
-Where:		/sys/bus/pci/devices/<dev>/aer_dev_correctable
+What:		/sys/bus/pci/devices/<dev>/aer_dev_correctable
 Date:		July 2018
 Kernel Version: 4.19.0
 Contact:	linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, rajatja@google.com
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Header Log Overflow 0
 TOTAL_ERR_COR 2
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-Where:		/sys/bus/pci/devices/<dev>/aer_dev_fatal
+What:		/sys/bus/pci/devices/<dev>/aer_dev_fatal
 Date:		July 2018
 Kernel Version: 4.19.0
 Contact:	linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, rajatja@google.com
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ TLP Prefix Blocked Error 0
 TOTAL_ERR_FATAL 0
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-Where:		/sys/bus/pci/devices/<dev>/aer_dev_nonfatal
+What:		/sys/bus/pci/devices/<dev>/aer_dev_nonfatal
 Date:		July 2018
 Kernel Version: 4.19.0
 Contact:	linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, rajatja@google.com
@@ -103,19 +103,19 @@ collectors) that are AER capable. These indicate the number of error messages as
 device, so these counters include them and are thus cumulative of all the error
 messages on the PCI hierarchy originating at that root port.
 
-Where:		/sys/bus/pci/devices/<dev>/aer_stats/aer_rootport_total_err_cor
+What:		/sys/bus/pci/devices/<dev>/aer_stats/aer_rootport_total_err_cor
 Date:		July 2018
 Kernel Version: 4.19.0
 Contact:	linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, rajatja@google.com
 Description:	Total number of ERR_COR messages reported to rootport.
 
-Where:	    /sys/bus/pci/devices/<dev>/aer_stats/aer_rootport_total_err_fatal
+What:	    /sys/bus/pci/devices/<dev>/aer_stats/aer_rootport_total_err_fatal
 Date:		July 2018
 Kernel Version: 4.19.0
 Contact:	linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, rajatja@google.com
 Description:	Total number of ERR_FATAL messages reported to rootport.
 
-Where:	    /sys/bus/pci/devices/<dev>/aer_stats/aer_rootport_total_err_nonfatal
+What:	    /sys/bus/pci/devices/<dev>/aer_stats/aer_rootport_total_err_nonfatal
 Date:		July 2018
 Kernel Version: 4.19.0
 Contact:	linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, rajatja@google.com
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-devfreq linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-devfreq
index ee39acacf6f8..335595a79866 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-devfreq
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-devfreq
@@ -7,6 +7,13 @@ Description:
 		The name of devfreq object denoted as ... is same as the
 		name of device using devfreq.
 
+What:		/sys/class/devfreq/.../name
+Date:		November 2019
+Contact:	Chanwoo Choi <cw00.choi@samsung.com>
+Description:
+		The /sys/class/devfreq/.../name shows the name of device
+		of the corresponding devfreq object.
+
 What:		/sys/class/devfreq/.../governor
 Date:		September 2011
 Contact:	MyungJoo Ham <myungjoo.ham@samsung.com>
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-qmi linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-qmi
index 7122d6264c49..c310db4ccbc2 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-qmi
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-qmi
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Contact:	Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
 Description:
 		Unsigned integer.
 
-		Write a number ranging from 1 to 127 to add a qmap mux
+		Write a number ranging from 1 to 254 to add a qmap mux
 		based network device, supported by recent Qualcomm based
 		modems.
 
@@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ Contact:	Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
 Description:
 		Unsigned integer.
 
-		Write a number ranging from 1 to 127 to delete a previously
+		Write a number ranging from 1 to 254 to delete a previously
 		created qmap mux based network device.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-queues linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-queues
index 978b76358661..40d5aab8452d 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-queues
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-queues
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/queues/rx-<queue>/rps_cpus
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/queues/rx-<queue>/rps_cpus
 Date:		March 2010
 KernelVersion:	2.6.35
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Description:
 		network device queue. Possible values depend on the number
 		of available CPU(s) in the system.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/queues/rx-<queue>/rps_flow_cnt
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/queues/rx-<queue>/rps_flow_cnt
 Date:		April 2010
 KernelVersion:	2.6.35
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Description:
 		Number of Receive Packet Steering flows being currently
 		processed by this particular network device receive queue.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/queues/tx-<queue>/tx_timeout
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/queues/tx-<queue>/tx_timeout
 Date:		November 2011
 KernelVersion:	3.3
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Description:
 		Indicates the number of transmit timeout events seen by this
 		network interface transmit queue.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/queues/tx-<queue>/tx_maxrate
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/queues/tx-<queue>/tx_maxrate
 Date:		March 2015
 KernelVersion:	4.1
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Description:
 		A Mbps max-rate set for the queue, a value of zero means disabled,
 		default is disabled.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/queues/tx-<queue>/xps_cpus
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/queues/tx-<queue>/xps_cpus
 Date:		November 2010
 KernelVersion:	2.6.38
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Description:
 		network device transmit queue. Possible vaules depend on the
 		number of available CPU(s) in the system.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/queues/tx-<queue>/xps_rxqs
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/queues/tx-<queue>/xps_rxqs
 Date:		June 2018
 KernelVersion:	4.18.0
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Description:
 		number of available receive queue(s) in the network device.
 		Default is disabled.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/queues/tx-<queue>/byte_queue_limits/hold_time
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/queues/tx-<queue>/byte_queue_limits/hold_time
 Date:		November 2011
 KernelVersion:	3.3
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ Description:
 		of this particular network device transmit queue.
 		Default value is 1000.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/queues/tx-<queue>/byte_queue_limits/inflight
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/queues/tx-<queue>/byte_queue_limits/inflight
 Date:		November 2011
 KernelVersion:	3.3
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ Description:
 		Indicates the number of bytes (objects) in flight on this
 		network device transmit queue.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/queues/tx-<queue>/byte_queue_limits/limit
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/queues/tx-<queue>/byte_queue_limits/limit
 Date:		November 2011
 KernelVersion:	3.3
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ Description:
 		on this network device transmit queue. This value is clamped
 		to be within the bounds defined by limit_max and limit_min.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/queues/tx-<queue>/byte_queue_limits/limit_max
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/queues/tx-<queue>/byte_queue_limits/limit_max
 Date:		November 2011
 KernelVersion:	3.3
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ Description:
 		queued on this network device transmit queue. See
 		include/linux/dynamic_queue_limits.h for the default value.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/queues/tx-<queue>/byte_queue_limits/limit_min
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/queues/tx-<queue>/byte_queue_limits/limit_min
 Date:		November 2011
 KernelVersion:	3.3
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-statistics linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-statistics
index 397118de7b5e..53e508c6936a 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-statistics
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-statistics
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/collisions
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/collisions
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Description:
 		Indicates the number of collisions seen by this network device.
 		This value might not be relevant with all MAC layers.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/multicast
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/multicast
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Description:
 		Indicates the number of multicast packets received by this
 		network device.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/rx_bytes
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/rx_bytes
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Description:
 		See the network driver for the exact meaning of when this
 		value is incremented.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/rx_compressed
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/rx_compressed
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Description:
 		network device. This value might only be relevant for interfaces
 		that support packet compression (e.g: PPP).
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/rx_crc_errors
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/rx_crc_errors
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Description:
 		by this network device. Note that the specific meaning might
 		depend on the MAC layer used by the interface.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/rx_dropped
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/rx_dropped
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -51,7 +51,15 @@ Description:
 		packet processing. See the network driver for the exact
 		meaning of this value.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/rx_fifo_errors
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/rx_errors
+Date:		April 2005
+KernelVersion:	2.6.12
+Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
+Description:
+		Indicates the number of receive errors on this network device.
+		See the network driver for the exact meaning of this value.
+
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/rx_fifo_errors
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -60,7 +68,7 @@ Description:
 		network device. See the network driver for the exact
 		meaning of this value.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/rx_frame_errors
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/rx_frame_errors
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -70,7 +78,7 @@ Description:
 		on the MAC layer protocol used. See the network driver for
 		the exact meaning of this value.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/rx_length_errors
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/rx_length_errors
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -79,7 +87,7 @@ Description:
 		error, oversized or undersized. See the network driver for the
 		exact meaning of this value.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/rx_missed_errors
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/rx_missed_errors
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -88,7 +96,15 @@ Description:
 		due to lack of capacity in the receive side. See the network
 		driver for the exact meaning of this value.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/rx_over_errors
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/rx_nohandler
+Date:		February 2016
+KernelVersion:	4.6
+Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
+Description:
+		Indicates the number of received packets that were dropped on
+		an inactive device by the network core.
+
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/rx_over_errors
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -98,7 +114,7 @@ Description:
 		(e.g: larger than MTU). See the network driver for the exact
 		meaning of this value.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/rx_packets
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/rx_packets
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -106,7 +122,7 @@ Description:
 		Indicates the total number of good packets received by this
 		network device.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/tx_aborted_errors
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/tx_aborted_errors
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -116,7 +132,7 @@ Description:
 		a medium collision). See the network driver for the exact
 		meaning of this value.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/tx_bytes
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/tx_bytes
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -127,7 +143,7 @@ Description:
 		transmitted packets or all packets that have been queued for
 		transmission.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/tx_carrier_errors
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/tx_carrier_errors
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -136,7 +152,7 @@ Description:
 		because of carrier errors (e.g: physical link down). See the
 		network driver for the exact meaning of this value.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/tx_compressed
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/tx_compressed
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -145,7 +161,7 @@ Description:
 		this might only be relevant for devices that support
 		compression (e.g: PPP).
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/tx_dropped
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/tx_dropped
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -154,7 +170,7 @@ Description:
 		See the driver for the exact reasons as to why the packets were
 		dropped.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/tx_errors
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/tx_errors
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -163,7 +179,7 @@ Description:
 		a network device. See the driver for the exact reasons as to
 		why the packets were dropped.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/tx_fifo_errors
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/tx_fifo_errors
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -172,7 +188,7 @@ Description:
 		FIFO error. See the driver for the exact reasons as to why the
 		packets were dropped.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/tx_heartbeat_errors
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/tx_heartbeat_errors
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -181,7 +197,7 @@ Description:
 		reported as heartbeat errors. See the driver for the exact
 		reasons as to why the packets were dropped.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/tx_packets
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/tx_packets
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -190,7 +206,7 @@ Description:
 		device. See the driver for whether this reports the number of all
 		attempted or successful transmissions.
 
-What:		/sys/class/<iface>/statistics/tx_window_errors
+What:		/sys/class/net/<iface>/statistics/tx_window_errors
 Date:		April 2005
 KernelVersion:	2.6.12
 Contact:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
index 73318225a368..a531b208902f 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -472,11 +472,17 @@ Description:	information about CPUs heterogeneity.
 		cpu_capacity: capacity of cpu#.
 
 What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
-		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
-		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
@@ -489,8 +495,7 @@ Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
 		"Vulnerable"	  CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
 		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect
 
-		Details about the l1tf file can be found in
-		Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+		See also: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
 
 What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..156cca9dbc96
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+What:		/sys/kernel/oops_count
+Date:		November 2022
+KernelVersion:	6.2.0
+Contact:	Linux Kernel Hardening List <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
+Description:
+		Shows how many times the system has Oopsed since last boot.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..90a029813717
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+What:		/sys/kernel/warn_count
+Date:		November 2022
+KernelVersion:	6.2.0
+Contact:	Linux Kernel Hardening List <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
+Description:
+		Shows how many times the system has Warned since last boot.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt
index 1649117e6087..9cd7926c8781 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt
@@ -2993,10 +2993,10 @@
 		65 = /dev/infiniband/issm1     Second InfiniBand IsSM device
 		  ...
 		127 = /dev/infiniband/issm63    63rd InfiniBand IsSM device
-		128 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs0   First InfiniBand verbs device
-		129 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs1   Second InfiniBand verbs device
+		192 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs0   First InfiniBand verbs device
+		193 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs1   Second InfiniBand verbs device
 		  ...
-		159 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs31  31st InfiniBand verbs device
+		223 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs31  31st InfiniBand verbs device
 
  232 char	Biometric Devices
 		0 = /dev/biometric/sensor0/fingerprint	first fingerprint sensor on first device
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..264bfa937f7d
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+GDS - Gather Data Sampling
+==========================
+
+Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
+speculative access to data which was previously stored in vector registers.
+
+Problem
+-------
+When a gather instruction performs loads from memory, different data elements
+are merged into the destination vector register. However, when a gather
+instruction that is transiently executed encounters a fault, stale data from
+architectural or internal vector registers may get transiently forwarded to the
+destination vector register instead. This will allow a malicious attacker to
+infer stale data using typical side channel techniques like cache timing
+attacks. GDS is a purely sampling-based attack.
+
+The attacker uses gather instructions to infer the stale vector register data.
+The victim does not need to do anything special other than use the vector
+registers. The victim does not need to use gather instructions to be
+vulnerable.
+
+Because the buffers are shared between Hyper-Threads cross Hyper-Thread attacks
+are possible.
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+Without mitigation, GDS can infer stale data across virtually all
+permission boundaries:
+
+	Non-enclaves can infer SGX enclave data
+	Userspace can infer kernel data
+	Guests can infer data from hosts
+	Guest can infer guest from other guests
+	Users can infer data from other users
+
+Because of this, it is important to ensure that the mitigation stays enabled in
+lower-privilege contexts like guests and when running outside SGX enclaves.
+
+The hardware enforces the mitigation for SGX. Likewise, VMMs should  ensure
+that guests are not allowed to disable the GDS mitigation. If a host erred and
+allowed this, a guest could theoretically disable GDS mitigation, mount an
+attack, and re-enable it.
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+--------------------
+This issue is mitigated in microcode. The microcode defines the following new
+bits:
+
+ ================================   ===   ============================
+ IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_CTRL]   R/O   Enumerates GDS vulnerability
+                                          and mitigation support.
+ IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_NO]     R/O   Processor is not vulnerable.
+ IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_DIS]    R/W   Disables the mitigation
+                                          0 by default.
+ IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_LOCK]   R/W   Locks GDS_MITG_DIS=0. Writes
+                                          to GDS_MITG_DIS are ignored
+                                          Can't be cleared once set.
+ ================================   ===   ============================
+
+GDS can also be mitigated on systems that don't have updated microcode by
+disabling AVX. This can be done by setting gather_data_sampling="force" or
+"clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel command-line.
+
+If used, these options will disable AVX use by turning off XSAVE YMM support.
+However, the processor will still enumerate AVX support.  Userspace that
+does not follow proper AVX enumeration to check both AVX *and* XSAVE YMM
+support will break.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The mitigation can be disabled by setting "gather_data_sampling=off" or
+"mitigations=off" on the kernel command line. Not specifying either will default
+to the mitigation being enabled. Specifying "gather_data_sampling=force" will
+use the microcode mitigation when available or disable AVX on affected systems
+where the microcode hasn't been updated to include the mitigation.
+
+GDS System Information
+------------------------
+The kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For
+GDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
+
+The possible values contained in this file are:
+
+ ============================== =============================================
+ Not affected                   Processor not vulnerable.
+ Vulnerable                     Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled.
+ Vulnerable: No microcode       Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
+                                mitigation.
+ Mitigation: AVX disabled,
+ no microcode                   Processor is vulnerable and microcode is missing
+                                mitigation. AVX disabled as mitigation.
+ Mitigation: Microcode          Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+                                effect.
+ Mitigation: Microcode (locked) Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+                                effect and cannot be disabled.
+ Unknown: Dependent on
+ hypervisor status              Running on a virtual guest processor that is
+                                affected but with no way to know if host
+                                processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
+ ============================== =============================================
+
+GDS Default mitigation
+----------------------
+The updated microcode will enable the mitigation by default. The kernel's
+default action is to leave the mitigation enabled.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..245468b0f2be
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+========================
+Hardware vulnerabilities
+========================
+
+This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and provides an overview of the
+possible mitigations along with guidance for selecting mitigations if they
+are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 1
+
+   spectre
+   l1tf
+   mds
+   tsx_async_abort
+   multihit.rst
+   special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
+   processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
+   gather_data_sampling.rst
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
similarity index 99%
rename from Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
rename to Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
index bae52b845de0..31653a9f0e1b 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
@@ -405,6 +405,9 @@ time with the option "l1tf=". The valid arguments for this option are:
 
   off		Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any
 		warnings.
+		It also drops the swap size and available RAM limit restrictions
+		on both hypervisor and bare metal.
+
   ============  =============================================================
 
 The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`.
@@ -442,6 +445,7 @@ The default is 'cond'. If 'l1tf=full,force' is given on the kernel command
 line, then 'always' is enforced and the kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush
 module parameter is ignored and writes to the sysfs file are rejected.
 
+.. _mitigation_selection:
 
 Mitigation selection guide
 --------------------------
@@ -553,7 +557,7 @@ When nested virtualization is in use, three operating systems are involved:
 the bare metal hypervisor, the nested hypervisor and the nested virtual
 machine.  VMENTER operations from the nested hypervisor into the nested
 guest will always be processed by the bare metal hypervisor. If KVM is the
-bare metal hypervisor it wiil:
+bare metal hypervisor it will:
 
  - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested hypervisor to the
    nested virtual machine, so that the nested hypervisor's secrets are not
@@ -576,7 +580,8 @@ Default mitigations
   The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
 
   - PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done
-    unconditionally and cannot be controlled.
+    unconditionally and cannot be controlled. The swap storage is limited
+    to ~16TB.
 
   - L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for
     a guest.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2d19c9f4c1fe
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+MDS - Microarchitectural Data Sampling
+======================================
+
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows
+unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in various CPU
+internal buffers.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
+vulnerability is not present on:
+
+   - Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
+
+   - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
+
+   - Some Atoms (Bonnell, Saltwell, Goldmont, GoldmontPlus)
+
+   - Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO bit set in the
+     IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the MDS
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`mds_sys_info`.
+
+Not all processors are affected by all variants of MDS, but the mitigation
+is identical for all of them so the kernel treats them as a single
+vulnerability.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries are related to the MDS vulnerability:
+
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+   CVE-2018-12126  MSBDS  Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
+   CVE-2018-12130  MFBDS  Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
+   CVE-2018-12127  MLPDS  Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
+   CVE-2019-11091  MDSUM  Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+When performing store, load, L1 refill operations, processors write data
+into temporary microarchitectural structures (buffers). The data in the
+buffer can be forwarded to load operations as an optimization.
+
+Under certain conditions, usually a fault/assist caused by a load
+operation, data unrelated to the load memory address can be speculatively
+forwarded from the buffers. Because the load operation causes a fault or
+assist and its result will be discarded, the forwarded data will not cause
+incorrect program execution or state changes. But a malicious operation
+may be able to forward this speculative data to a disclosure gadget which
+allows in turn to infer the value via a cache side channel attack.
+
+Because the buffers are potentially shared between Hyper-Threads cross
+Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
+
+Deeper technical information is available in the MDS specific x86
+architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/x86/mds.rst <mds>`.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the MDS vulnerabilities can be mounted from malicious non
+priviledged user space applications running on hosts or guest. Malicious
+guest OSes can obviously mount attacks as well.
+
+Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS vulnerability
+does not allow the attacker to control the memory target address. As a
+consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but as demonstrated with
+the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed successfully.
+
+Web-Browsers
+^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  It's unclear whether attacks through Web-Browsers are possible at
+  all. The exploitation through Java-Script is considered very unlikely,
+  but other widely used web technologies like Webassembly could possibly be
+  abused.
+
+
+.. _mds_sys_info:
+
+MDS system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current MDS
+status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  .. list-table::
+
+     * - 'Not affected'
+       - The processor is not vulnerable
+     * - 'Vulnerable'
+       - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
+     * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
+       - The processor is vulnerable but microcode is not updated.
+
+         The mitigation is enabled on a best effort basis. See :ref:`vmwerv`
+     * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
+       - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
+         enabled.
+
+If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended
+to the above information:
+
+    ========================  ============================================
+    'SMT vulnerable'          SMT is enabled
+    'SMT mitigated'           SMT is enabled and mitigated
+    'SMT disabled'            SMT is disabled
+    'SMT Host state unknown'  Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown
+    ========================  ============================================
+
+.. _vmwerv:
+
+Best effort mitigation mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  If the processor is vulnerable, but the availability of the microcode based
+  mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
+  effort mitigation mode.  This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
+  without a guarantee that they clear the CPU buffers.
+
+  This is done to address virtualization scenarios where the host has the
+  microcode update applied, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to expose
+  the CPUID to the guest. If the host has updated microcode the protection
+  takes effect otherwise a few cpu cycles are wasted pointlessly.
+
+  The state in the mds sysfs file reflects this situation accordingly.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+The kernel detects the affected CPUs and the presence of the microcode
+which is required.
+
+If a CPU is affected and the microcode is available, then the kernel
+enables the mitigation by default. The mitigation can be controlled at boot
+time via a kernel command line option. See
+:ref:`mds_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+.. _cpu_buffer_clear:
+
+CPU buffer clearing
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  The mitigation for MDS clears the affected CPU buffers on return to user
+  space and when entering a guest.
+
+  If SMT is enabled it also clears the buffers on idle entry when the CPU
+  is only affected by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant, because the
+  other variants cannot be protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks.
+
+  For CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS the user space, guest and idle
+  transition mitigations are sufficient and SMT is not affected.
+
+.. _virt_mechanism:
+
+Virtualization mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  The protection for host to guest transition depends on the L1TF
+  vulnerability of the CPU:
+
+  - CPU is affected by L1TF:
+
+    If the L1D flush mitigation is enabled and up to date microcode is
+    available, the L1D flush mitigation is automatically protecting the
+    guest transition.
+
+    If the L1D flush mitigation is disabled then the MDS mitigation is
+    invoked explicit when the host MDS mitigation is enabled.
+
+    For details on L1TF and virtualization see:
+    :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln//l1tf.rst <mitigation_control_kvm>`.
+
+  - CPU is not affected by L1TF:
+
+    CPU buffers are flushed before entering the guest when the host MDS
+    mitigation is enabled.
+
+  The resulting MDS protection matrix for the host to guest transition:
+
+  ============ ===== ============= ============ =================
+   L1TF         MDS   VMX-L1FLUSH   Host MDS     MDS-State
+
+   Don't care   No    Don't care    N/A          Not affected
+
+   Yes          Yes   Disabled      Off          Vulnerable
+
+   Yes          Yes   Disabled      Full         Mitigated
+
+   Yes          Yes   Enabled       Don't care   Mitigated
+
+   No           Yes   N/A           Off          Vulnerable
+
+   No           Yes   N/A           Full         Mitigated
+  ============ ===== ============= ============ =================
+
+  This only covers the host to guest transition, i.e. prevents leakage from
+  host to guest, but does not protect the guest internally. Guests need to
+  have their own protections.
+
+.. _xeon_phi:
+
+XEON PHI specific considerations
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  The XEON PHI processor family is affected by MSBDS which can be exploited
+  cross Hyper-Threads when entering idle states. Some XEON PHI variants allow
+  to use MWAIT in user space (Ring 3) which opens an potential attack vector
+  for malicious user space. The exposure can be disabled on the kernel
+  command line with the 'ring3mwait=disable' command line option.
+
+  XEON PHI is not affected by the other MDS variants and MSBDS is mitigated
+  before the CPU enters a idle state. As XEON PHI is not affected by L1TF
+  either disabling SMT is not required for full protection.
+
+.. _mds_smt_control:
+
+SMT control
+^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  All MDS variants except MSBDS can be attacked cross Hyper-Threads. That
+  means on CPUs which are affected by MFBDS or MLPDS it is necessary to
+  disable SMT for full protection. These are most of the affected CPUs; the
+  exception is XEON PHI, see :ref:`xeon_phi`.
+
+  Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but the impact
+  depends on the type of workloads.
+
+  See the relevant chapter in the L1TF mitigation documentation for details:
+  :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst <smt_control>`.
+
+
+.. _mds_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the MDS mitigations at boot
+time with the option "mds=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  full		If the CPU is vulnerable, enable all available mitigations
+		for the MDS vulnerability, CPU buffer clearing on exit to
+		userspace and when entering a VM. Idle transitions are
+		protected as well if SMT is enabled.
+
+		It does not automatically disable SMT.
+
+  full,nosmt	The same as mds=full, with SMT disabled on vulnerable
+		CPUs.  This is the complete mitigation.
+
+  off		Disables MDS mitigations completely.
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "mds=full". For processors
+that are affected by both TAA (TSX Asynchronous Abort) and MDS,
+specifying just "mds=off" without an accompanying "tsx_async_abort=off"
+will have no effect as the same mitigation is used for both
+vulnerabilities.
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If all userspace applications are from a trusted source and do not
+   execute untrusted code which is supplied externally, then the mitigation
+   can be disabled.
+
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The same considerations as above versus trusted user space apply.
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The protection depends on the state of the L1TF mitigations.
+   See :ref:`virt_mechanism`.
+
+   If the MDS mitigation is enabled and SMT is disabled, guest to host and
+   guest to guest attacks are prevented.
+
+.. _mds_default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+  The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
+
+  - Enable CPU buffer clearing
+
+  The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
+  SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted code. The same rationale as
+  for L1TF applies.
+  See :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln//l1tf.rst <default_mitigations>`.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/multihit.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/multihit.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ba9988d8bce5
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/multihit.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+iTLB multihit
+=============
+
+iTLB multihit is an erratum where some processors may incur a machine check
+error, possibly resulting in an unrecoverable CPU lockup, when an
+instruction fetch hits multiple entries in the instruction TLB. This can
+occur when the page size is changed along with either the physical address
+or cache type. A malicious guest running on a virtualized system can
+exploit this erratum to perform a denial of service attack.
+
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+Variations of this erratum are present on most Intel Core and Xeon processor
+models. The erratum is not present on:
+
+   - non-Intel processors
+
+   - Some Atoms (Airmont, Bonnell, Goldmont, GoldmontPlus, Saltwell, Silvermont)
+
+   - Intel processors that have the PSCHANGE_MC_NO bit set in the
+     IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
+
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this issue:
+
+   ==============  =================================================
+   CVE-2018-12207  Machine Check Error Avoidance on Page Size Change
+   ==============  =================================================
+
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+Privileged software, including OS and virtual machine managers (VMM), are in
+charge of memory management. A key component in memory management is the control
+of the page tables. Modern processors use virtual memory, a technique that creates
+the illusion of a very large memory for processors. This virtual space is split
+into pages of a given size. Page tables translate virtual addresses to physical
+addresses.
+
+To reduce latency when performing a virtual to physical address translation,
+processors include a structure, called TLB, that caches recent translations.
+There are separate TLBs for instruction (iTLB) and data (dTLB).
+
+Under this errata, instructions are fetched from a linear address translated
+using a 4 KB translation cached in the iTLB. Privileged software modifies the
+paging structure so that the same linear address using large page size (2 MB, 4
+MB, 1 GB) with a different physical address or memory type.  After the page
+structure modification but before the software invalidates any iTLB entries for
+the linear address, a code fetch that happens on the same linear address may
+cause a machine-check error which can result in a system hang or shutdown.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the iTLB multihit erratum can be mounted from malicious
+guests in a virtualized system.
+
+
+iTLB multihit system information
+--------------------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current iTLB
+multihit status of the system:whether the system is vulnerable and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+     * - Not affected
+       - The processor is not vulnerable.
+     * - KVM: Mitigation: Split huge pages
+       - Software changes mitigate this issue.
+     * - KVM: Vulnerable
+       - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
+
+
+Enumeration of the erratum
+--------------------------------
+
+A new bit has been allocated in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) msr
+and will be set on CPU's which are mitigated against this issue.
+
+   =======================================   ===========   ===============================
+   IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR                Not present   Possibly vulnerable,check model
+   IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[PSCHANGE_MC_NO]    '0'           Likely vulnerable,check model
+   IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[PSCHANGE_MC_NO]    '1'           Not vulnerable
+   =======================================   ===========   ===============================
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+This erratum can be mitigated by restricting the use of large page sizes to
+non-executable pages.  This forces all iTLB entries to be 4K, and removes
+the possibility of multiple hits.
+
+In order to mitigate the vulnerability, KVM initially marks all huge pages
+as non-executable. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages,
+the page is broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
+
+If EPT is disabled or not available on the host, KVM is in control of TLB
+flushes and the problematic situation cannot happen.  However, the shadow
+EPT paging mechanism used by nested virtualization is vulnerable, because
+the nested guest can trigger multiple iTLB hits by modifying its own
+(non-nested) page tables.  For simplicity, KVM will make large pages
+non-executable in all shadow paging modes.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line and KVM - module parameter
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism for marking huge pages as
+non-executable can be controlled with a module parameter "nx_huge_pages=".
+The kernel command line allows to control the iTLB multihit mitigations at
+boot time with the option "kvm.nx_huge_pages=".
+
+The valid arguments for these options are:
+
+  ==========  ================================================================
+  force       Mitigation is enabled. In this case, the mitigation implements
+              non-executable huge pages in Linux kernel KVM module. All huge
+              pages in the EPT are marked as non-executable.
+              If a guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
+              broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
+
+  off	      Mitigation is disabled.
+
+  auto        Enable mitigation only if the platform is affected and the kernel
+              was not booted with the "mitigations=off" command line parameter.
+	      This is the default option.
+  ==========  ================================================================
+
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. No virtualization in use
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The system is protected by the kernel unconditionally and no further
+   action is required.
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If the guest comes from a trusted source, you may assume that the guest will
+   not attempt to maliciously exploit these errata and no further action is
+   required.
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+   If the guest comes from an untrusted source, the guest host kernel will need
+   to apply iTLB multihit mitigation via the kernel command line or kvm
+   module parameter.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c98fd11907cc
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+=========================================
+Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities
+=========================================
+
+Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities are a class of memory-mapped I/O
+(MMIO) vulnerabilities that can expose data. The sequences of operations for
+exposing data range from simple to very complex. Because most of the
+vulnerabilities require the attacker to have access to MMIO, many environments
+are not affected. System environments using virtualization where MMIO access is
+provided to untrusted guests may need mitigation. These vulnerabilities are
+not transient execution attacks. However, these vulnerabilities may propagate
+stale data into core fill buffers where the data can subsequently be inferred
+by an unmitigated transient execution attack. Mitigation for these
+vulnerabilities includes a combination of microcode update and software
+changes, depending on the platform and usage model. Some of these mitigations
+are similar to those used to mitigate Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) or
+those used to mitigate Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS).
+
+Data Propagators
+================
+Propagators are operations that result in stale data being copied or moved from
+one microarchitectural buffer or register to another. Processor MMIO Stale Data
+Vulnerabilities are operations that may result in stale data being directly
+read into an architectural, software-visible state or sampled from a buffer or
+register.
+
+Fill Buffer Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP)
+-----------------------------------------
+Stale data may propagate from fill buffers (FB) into the non-coherent portion
+of the uncore on some non-coherent writes. Fill buffer propagation by itself
+does not make stale data architecturally visible. Stale data must be propagated
+to a location where it is subject to reading or sampling.
+
+Sideband Stale Data Propagator (SSDP)
+-------------------------------------
+The sideband stale data propagator (SSDP) is limited to the client (including
+Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. The sideband response buffer is
+shared by all client cores. For non-coherent reads that go to sideband
+destinations, the uncore logic returns 64 bytes of data to the core, including
+both requested data and unrequested stale data, from a transaction buffer and
+the sideband response buffer. As a result, stale data from the sideband
+response and transaction buffers may now reside in a core fill buffer.
+
+Primary Stale Data Propagator (PSDP)
+------------------------------------
+The primary stale data propagator (PSDP) is limited to the client (including
+Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. Similar to the sideband response
+buffer, the primary response buffer is shared by all client cores. For some
+processors, MMIO primary reads will return 64 bytes of data to the core fill
+buffer including both requested data and unrequested stale data. This is
+similar to the sideband stale data propagator.
+
+Vulnerabilities
+===============
+Device Register Partial Write (DRPW) (CVE-2022-21166)
+-----------------------------------------------------
+Some endpoint MMIO registers incorrectly handle writes that are smaller than
+the register size. Instead of aborting the write or only copying the correct
+subset of bytes (for example, 2 bytes for a 2-byte write), more bytes than
+specified by the write transaction may be written to the register. On
+processors affected by FBSDP, this may expose stale data from the fill buffers
+of the core that created the write transaction.
+
+Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS) (CVE-2022-21125)
+----------------------------------------------------
+After propagators may have moved data around the uncore and copied stale data
+into client core fill buffers, processors affected by MFBDS can leak data from
+the fill buffer. It is limited to the client (including Intel Xeon server E3)
+uncore implementation.
+
+Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR) (CVE-2022-21123)
+------------------------------------------------
+It is similar to Shared Buffer Data Sampling (SBDS) except that the data is
+directly read into the architectural software-visible state. It is limited to
+the client (including Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation.
+
+Affected Processors
+===================
+Not all the CPUs are affected by all the variants. For instance, most
+processors for the server market (excluding Intel Xeon E3 processors) are
+impacted by only Device Register Partial Write (DRPW).
+
+Below is the list of affected Intel processors [#f1]_:
+
+   ===================  ============  =========
+   Common name          Family_Model  Steppings
+   ===================  ============  =========
+   HASWELL_X            06_3FH        2,4
+   SKYLAKE_L            06_4EH        3
+   BROADWELL_X          06_4FH        All
+   SKYLAKE_X            06_55H        3,4,6,7,11
+   BROADWELL_D          06_56H        3,4,5
+   SKYLAKE              06_5EH        3
+   ICELAKE_X            06_6AH        4,5,6
+   ICELAKE_D            06_6CH        1
+   ICELAKE_L            06_7EH        5
+   ATOM_TREMONT_D       06_86H        All
+   LAKEFIELD            06_8AH        1
+   KABYLAKE_L           06_8EH        9 to 12
+   ATOM_TREMONT         06_96H        1
+   ATOM_TREMONT_L       06_9CH        0
+   KABYLAKE             06_9EH        9 to 13
+   COMETLAKE            06_A5H        2,3,5
+   COMETLAKE_L          06_A6H        0,1
+   ROCKETLAKE           06_A7H        1
+   ===================  ============  =========
+
+If a CPU is in the affected processor list, but not affected by a variant, it
+is indicated by new bits in MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. As described in a later
+section, mitigation largely remains the same for all the variants, i.e. to
+clear the CPU fill buffers via VERW instruction.
+
+New bits in MSRs
+================
+Newer processors and microcode update on existing affected processors added new
+bits to IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. These bits can be used to enumerate
+specific variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities and mitigation
+capability.
+
+MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
+--------------------------
+Bit 13 - SBDR_SSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by either the
+	 Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR) vulnerability or the sideband stale
+	 data propagator (SSDP).
+Bit 14 - FBSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by the Fill Buffer
+	 Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP).
+Bit 15 - PSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by Primary Stale Data
+	 Propagator (PSDP).
+Bit 17 - FB_CLEAR - When set, VERW instruction will overwrite CPU fill buffer
+	 values as part of MD_CLEAR operations. Processors that do not
+	 enumerate MDS_NO (meaning they are affected by MDS) but that do
+	 enumerate support for both L1D_FLUSH and MD_CLEAR implicitly enumerate
+	 FB_CLEAR as part of their MD_CLEAR support.
+Bit 18 - FB_CLEAR_CTRL - Processor supports read and write to MSR
+	 IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[FB_CLEAR_DIS]. On such processors, the FB_CLEAR_DIS
+	 bit can be set to cause the VERW instruction to not perform the
+	 FB_CLEAR action. Not all processors that support FB_CLEAR will support
+	 FB_CLEAR_CTRL.
+
+MSR IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL
+---------------------
+Bit 3 - FB_CLEAR_DIS - When set, VERW instruction does not perform the FB_CLEAR
+action. This may be useful to reduce the performance impact of FB_CLEAR in
+cases where system software deems it warranted (for example, when performance
+is more critical, or the untrusted software has no MMIO access). Note that
+FB_CLEAR_DIS has no impact on enumeration (for example, it does not change
+FB_CLEAR or MD_CLEAR enumeration) and it may not be supported on all processors
+that enumerate FB_CLEAR.
+
+Mitigation
+==========
+Like MDS, all variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities  have the
+same mitigation strategy to force the CPU to clear the affected buffers before
+an attacker can extract the secrets.
+
+This is achieved by using the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
+combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears the affected CPU
+buffers when the VERW instruction is executed.
+
+Kernel reuses the MDS function to invoke the buffer clearing:
+
+	mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
+
+On MDS affected CPUs, the kernel already invokes CPU buffer clear on
+kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state (idle) transitions. No
+additional mitigation is needed on such CPUs.
+
+For CPUs not affected by MDS or TAA, mitigation is needed only for the attacker
+with MMIO capability. Therefore, VERW is not required for kernel/userspace. For
+virtualization case, VERW is only needed at VMENTER for a guest with MMIO
+capability.
+
+Mitigation points
+-----------------
+Return to user space
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+Same mitigation as MDS when affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise no mitigation
+needed.
+
+C-State transition
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+Control register writes by CPU during C-state transition can propagate data
+from fill buffer to uncore buffers. Execute VERW before C-state transition to
+clear CPU fill buffers.
+
+Guest entry point
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+Same mitigation as MDS when processor is also affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise
+execute VERW at VMENTER only for MMIO capable guests. On CPUs not affected by
+MDS/TAA, guest without MMIO access cannot extract secrets using Processor MMIO
+Stale Data vulnerabilities, so there is no need to execute VERW for such guests.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The kernel command line allows to control the Processor MMIO Stale Data
+mitigations at boot time with the option "mmio_stale_data=". The valid
+arguments for this option are:
+
+  ==========  =================================================================
+  full        If the CPU is vulnerable, enable mitigation; CPU buffer clearing
+              on exit to userspace and when entering a VM. Idle transitions are
+              protected as well. It does not automatically disable SMT.
+  full,nosmt  Same as full, with SMT disabled on vulnerable CPUs. This is the
+              complete mitigation.
+  off         Disables mitigation completely.
+  ==========  =================================================================
+
+If the CPU is affected and mmio_stale_data=off is not supplied on the kernel
+command line, then the kernel selects the appropriate mitigation.
+
+Mitigation status information
+-----------------------------
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current
+vulnerability status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and
+which mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+	/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  .. list-table::
+
+     * - 'Not affected'
+       - The processor is not vulnerable
+     * - 'Vulnerable'
+       - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
+     * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
+       - The processor is vulnerable, but microcode is not updated. The
+         mitigation is enabled on a best effort basis.
+     * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
+       - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
+         enabled.
+     * - 'Unknown: No mitigations'
+       - The processor vulnerability status is unknown because it is
+	 out of Servicing period. Mitigation is not attempted.
+
+Definitions:
+------------
+
+Servicing period: The process of providing functional and security updates to
+Intel processors or platforms, utilizing the Intel Platform Update (IPU)
+process or other similar mechanisms.
+
+End of Servicing Updates (ESU): ESU is the date at which Intel will no
+longer provide Servicing, such as through IPU or other similar update
+processes. ESU dates will typically be aligned to end of quarter.
+
+If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended to
+the above information:
+
+  ========================  ===========================================
+  'SMT vulnerable'          SMT is enabled
+  'SMT disabled'            SMT is disabled
+  'SMT Host state unknown'  Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown
+  ========================  ===========================================
+
+References
+----------
+.. [#f1] Affected Processors
+   https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..47b1b3afac99
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+SRBDS - Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+=============================================
+
+SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows MDS :doc:`mds` techniques to
+infer values returned from special register accesses.  Special register
+accesses are accesses to off core registers.  According to Intel's evaluation,
+the special register reads that have a security expectation of privacy are
+RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY.
+
+When RDRAND, RDSEED and EGETKEY instructions are used, the data is moved
+to the core through the special register mechanism that is susceptible
+to MDS attacks.
+
+Affected processors
+--------------------
+Core models (desktop, mobile, Xeon-E3) that implement RDRAND and/or RDSEED may
+be affected.
+
+A processor is affected by SRBDS if its Family_Model and stepping is
+in the following list, with the exception of the listed processors
+exporting MDS_NO while Intel TSX is available yet not enabled. The
+latter class of processors are only affected when Intel TSX is enabled
+by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise they are not affected.
+
+  =============  ============  ========
+  common name    Family_Model  Stepping
+  =============  ============  ========
+  IvyBridge      06_3AH        All
+
+  Haswell        06_3CH        All
+  Haswell_L      06_45H        All
+  Haswell_G      06_46H        All
+
+  Broadwell_G    06_47H        All
+  Broadwell      06_3DH        All
+
+  Skylake_L      06_4EH        All
+  Skylake        06_5EH        All
+
+  Kabylake_L     06_8EH        <= 0xC
+  Kabylake       06_9EH        <= 0xD
+  =============  ============  ========
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this SRBDS issue:
+
+    ==============  =====  =====================================
+    CVE-2020-0543   SRBDS  Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+    ==============  =====  =====================================
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+An unprivileged user can extract values returned from RDRAND and RDSEED
+executed on another core or sibling thread using MDS techniques.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------
+Intel will release microcode updates that modify the RDRAND, RDSEED, and
+EGETKEY instructions to overwrite secret special register data in the shared
+staging buffer before the secret data can be accessed by another logical
+processor.
+
+During execution of the RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions, off-core
+accesses from other logical processors will be delayed until the special
+register read is complete and the secret data in the shared staging buffer is
+overwritten.
+
+This has three effects on performance:
+
+#. RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions have higher latency.
+
+#. Executing RDRAND at the same time on multiple logical processors will be
+   serialized, resulting in an overall reduction in the maximum RDRAND
+   bandwidth.
+
+#. Executing RDRAND, RDSEED or EGETKEY will delay memory accesses from other
+   logical processors that miss their core caches, with an impact similar to
+   legacy locked cache-line-split accesses.
+
+The microcode updates provide an opt-out mechanism (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to disable
+the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions executed outside of Intel
+Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) enclaves. On logical processors that
+disable the mitigation using this opt-out mechanism, RDRAND and RDSEED do not
+take longer to execute and do not impact performance of sibling logical
+processors memory accesses. The opt-out mechanism does not affect Intel SGX
+enclaves (including execution of RDRAND or RDSEED inside an enclave, as well
+as EGETKEY execution).
+
+IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR Definition
+--------------------------------
+Along with the mitigation for this issue, Intel added a new thread-scope
+IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR, (address 0x123). The presence of this MSR and
+RNGDS_MITG_DIS (bit 0) is enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0).EDX[SRBDS_CTRL =
+9]==1. This MSR is introduced through the microcode update.
+
+Setting IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[0] (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to 1 for a logical processor
+disables the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED executed outside of an Intel SGX
+enclave on that logical processor. Opting out of the mitigation for a
+particular logical processor does not affect the RDRAND and RDSEED mitigations
+for other logical processors.
+
+Note that inside of an Intel SGX enclave, the mitigation is applied regardless
+of the value of RNGDS_MITG_DS.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The kernel command line allows control over the SRBDS mitigation at boot time
+with the option "srbds=".  The option for this is:
+
+  ============= =============================================================
+  off           This option disables SRBDS mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED on
+                affected platforms.
+  ============= =============================================================
+
+SRBDS System Information
+-----------------------
+The Linux kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs.  For
+SRBDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
+
+The possible values contained in this file are:
+
+ ============================== =============================================
+ Not affected                   Processor not vulnerable
+ Vulnerable                     Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled
+ Vulnerable: No microcode       Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
+                                mitigation
+ Mitigation: Microcode          Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+                                effect.
+ Mitigation: TSX disabled       Processor is only vulnerable when TSX is
+                                enabled while this system was booted with TSX
+                                disabled.
+ Unknown: Dependent on
+ hypervisor status              Running on virtual guest processor that is
+                                affected but with no way to know if host
+                                processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
+ ============================== =============================================
+
+SRBDS Default mitigation
+------------------------
+This new microcode serializes processor access during execution of RDRAND,
+RDSEED ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for
+reuse.  Use the "srbds=off" kernel command line to disable the mitigation for
+RDRAND and RDSEED.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..305600351209
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,808 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Spectre Side Channels
+=====================
+
+Spectre is a class of side channel attacks that exploit branch prediction
+and speculative execution on modern CPUs to read memory, possibly
+bypassing access controls. Speculative execution side channel exploits
+do not modify memory but attempt to infer privileged data in the memory.
+
+This document covers Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+Speculative execution side channel methods affect a wide range of modern
+high performance processors, since most modern high speed processors
+use branch prediction and speculative execution.
+
+The following CPUs are vulnerable:
+
+    - Intel Core, Atom, Pentium, and Xeon processors
+
+    - AMD Phenom, EPYC, and Zen processors
+
+    - IBM POWER and zSeries processors
+
+    - Higher end ARM processors
+
+    - Apple CPUs
+
+    - Higher end MIPS CPUs
+
+    - Likely most other high performance CPUs. Contact your CPU vendor for details.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the Spectre
+vulnerability files in sysfs. See :ref:`spectre_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries describe Spectre variants:
+
+   =============   =======================  ==========================
+   CVE-2017-5753   Bounds check bypass      Spectre variant 1
+   CVE-2017-5715   Branch target injection  Spectre variant 2
+   CVE-2019-1125   Spectre v1 swapgs        Spectre variant 1 (swapgs)
+   =============   =======================  ==========================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+CPUs use speculative operations to improve performance. That may leave
+traces of memory accesses or computations in the processor's caches,
+buffers, and branch predictors. Malicious software may be able to
+influence the speculative execution paths, and then use the side effects
+of the speculative execution in the CPUs' caches and buffers to infer
+privileged data touched during the speculative execution.
+
+Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
+conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
+execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
+See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[6] <spec_ref6>`
+:ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>` :ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
+
+Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
+---------------------------------------
+
+The bounds check bypass attack :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>` takes advantage
+of speculative execution that bypasses conditional branch instructions
+used for memory access bounds check (e.g. checking if the index of an
+array results in memory access within a valid range). This results in
+memory accesses to invalid memory (with out-of-bound index) that are
+done speculatively before validation checks resolve. Such speculative
+memory accesses can leave side effects, creating side channels which
+leak information to the attacker.
+
+There are some extensions of Spectre variant 1 attacks for reading data
+over the network, see :ref:`[12] <spec_ref12>`. However such attacks
+are difficult, low bandwidth, fragile, and are considered low risk.
+
+Note that, despite "Bounds Check Bypass" name, Spectre variant 1 is not
+only about user-controlled array bounds checks.  It can affect any
+conditional checks.  The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI
+handlers all have conditional swapgs checks.  Those may be problematic
+in the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with
+a user GS.
+
+Spectre variant 2 (Branch Target Injection)
+-------------------------------------------
+
+The branch target injection attack takes advantage of speculative
+execution of indirect branches :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>`.  The indirect
+branch predictors inside the processor used to guess the target of
+indirect branches can be influenced by an attacker, causing gadget code
+to be speculatively executed, thus exposing sensitive data touched by
+the victim. The side effects left in the CPU's caches during speculative
+execution can be measured to infer data values.
+
+.. _poison_btb:
+
+In Spectre variant 2 attacks, the attacker can steer speculative indirect
+branches in the victim to gadget code by poisoning the branch target
+buffer of a CPU used for predicting indirect branch addresses. Such
+poisoning could be done by indirect branching into existing code,
+with the address offset of the indirect branch under the attacker's
+control. Since the branch prediction on impacted hardware does not
+fully disambiguate branch address and uses the offset for prediction,
+this could cause privileged code's indirect branch to jump to a gadget
+code with the same offset.
+
+The most useful gadgets take an attacker-controlled input parameter (such
+as a register value) so that the memory read can be controlled. Gadgets
+without input parameters might be possible, but the attacker would have
+very little control over what memory can be read, reducing the risk of
+the attack revealing useful data.
+
+One other variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
+return stack buffer (RSB) :ref:`[13] <spec_ref13>` to cause speculative
+subroutine return instruction execution to go to a gadget.  An attacker's
+imbalanced subroutine call instructions might "poison" entries in the
+return stack buffer which are later consumed by a victim's subroutine
+return instructions.  This attack can be mitigated by flushing the return
+stack buffer on context switch, or virtual machine (VM) exit.
+
+On systems with simultaneous multi-threading (SMT), attacks are possible
+from the sibling thread, as level 1 cache and branch target buffer
+(BTB) may be shared between hardware threads in a CPU core.  A malicious
+program running on the sibling thread may influence its peer's BTB to
+steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the
+speculative execution's side effects left in level 1 cache to infer the
+victim's data.
+
+Yet another variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
+Branch History Buffer (BHB) to speculatively steer an indirect branch
+to a specific Branch Target Buffer (BTB) entry, even if the entry isn't
+associated with the source address of the indirect branch. Specifically,
+the BHB might be shared across privilege levels even in the presence of
+Enhanced IBRS.
+
+Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via
+unprivileged eBPF. Therefore, it's highly recommended to not enable
+unprivileged eBPF, especially when eIBRS is used (without retpolines).
+For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use
+retpolines (or eIBRS combined with retpolines).
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+The following list of attack scenarios have been anticipated, but may
+not cover all possible attack vectors.
+
+1. A user process attacking the kernel
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Spectre variant 1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   The attacker passes a parameter to the kernel via a register or
+   via a known address in memory during a syscall. Such parameter may
+   be used later by the kernel as an index to an array or to derive
+   a pointer for a Spectre variant 1 attack.  The index or pointer
+   is invalid, but bound checks are bypassed in the code branch taken
+   for speculative execution. This could cause privileged memory to be
+   accessed and leaked.
+
+   For kernel code that has been identified where data pointers could
+   potentially be influenced for Spectre attacks, new "nospec" accessor
+   macros are used to prevent speculative loading of data.
+
+Spectre variant 1 (swapgs)
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   An attacker can train the branch predictor to speculatively skip the
+   swapgs path for an interrupt or exception.  If they initialize
+   the GS register to a user-space value, if the swapgs is speculatively
+   skipped, subsequent GS-related percpu accesses in the speculation
+   window will be done with the attacker-controlled GS value.  This
+   could cause privileged memory to be accessed and leaked.
+
+   For example:
+
+   ::
+
+     if (coming from user space)
+         swapgs
+     mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg
+     mov (%reg), %reg1
+
+   When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the
+   swapgs, and then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS
+   value.  So the user can speculatively force a read of any kernel
+   value.  If a gadget exists which uses the percpu value as an address
+   in another load/store, then the contents of the kernel value may
+   become visible via an L1 side channel attack.
+
+   A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space.  The CPU can
+   speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the
+   rest of the speculative window.
+
+Spectre variant 2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   A spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch
+   target buffer (BTB) before issuing syscall to launch an attack.
+   After entering the kernel, the kernel could use the poisoned branch
+   target buffer on indirect jump and jump to gadget code in speculative
+   execution.
+
+   If an attacker tries to control the memory addresses leaked during
+   speculative execution, he would also need to pass a parameter to the
+   gadget, either through a register or a known address in memory. After
+   the gadget has executed, he can measure the side effect.
+
+   The kernel can protect itself against consuming poisoned branch
+   target buffer entries by using return trampolines (also known as
+   "retpoline") :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` for all
+   indirect branches. Return trampolines trap speculative execution paths
+   to prevent jumping to gadget code during speculative execution.
+   x86 CPUs with Enhanced Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation
+   (Enhanced IBRS) available in hardware should use the feature to
+   mitigate Spectre variant 2 instead of retpoline. Enhanced IBRS is
+   more efficient than retpoline.
+
+   There may be gadget code in firmware which could be exploited with
+   Spectre variant 2 attack by a rogue user process. To mitigate such
+   attacks on x86, Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) feature
+   is turned on before the kernel invokes any firmware code.
+
+2. A user process attacking another user process
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   A malicious user process can try to attack another user process,
+   either via a context switch on the same hardware thread, or from the
+   sibling hyperthread sharing a physical processor core on simultaneous
+   multi-threading (SMT) system.
+
+   Spectre variant 1 attacks generally require passing parameters
+   between the processes, which needs a data passing relationship, such
+   as remote procedure calls (RPC).  Those parameters are used in gadget
+   code to derive invalid data pointers accessing privileged memory in
+   the attacked process.
+
+   Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue process by
+   :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer.  This can
+   influence the indirect branch targets for a victim process that either
+   runs later on the same hardware thread, or running concurrently on
+   a sibling hardware thread sharing the same physical core.
+
+   A user process can protect itself against Spectre variant 2 attacks
+   by using the prctl() syscall to disable indirect branch speculation
+   for itself.  An administrator can also cordon off an unsafe process
+   from polluting the branch target buffer by disabling the process's
+   indirect branch speculation. This comes with a performance cost
+   from not using indirect branch speculation and clearing the branch
+   target buffer.  When SMT is enabled on x86, for a process that has
+   indirect branch speculation disabled, Single Threaded Indirect Branch
+   Predictors (STIBP) :ref:`[4] <spec_ref4>` are turned on to prevent the
+   sibling thread from controlling branch target buffer.  In addition,
+   the Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) is issued to clear the
+   branch target buffer when context switching to and from such process.
+
+   On x86, the return stack buffer is stuffed on context switch.
+   This prevents the branch target buffer from being used for branch
+   prediction when the return stack buffer underflows while switching to
+   a deeper call stack. Any poisoned entries in the return stack buffer
+   left by the previous process will also be cleared.
+
+   User programs should use address space randomization to make attacks
+   more difficult (Set /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2).
+
+3. A virtualized guest attacking the host
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The attack mechanism is similar to how user processes attack the
+   kernel.  The kernel is entered via hyper-calls or other virtualization
+   exit paths.
+
+   For Spectre variant 1 attacks, rogue guests can pass parameters
+   (e.g. in registers) via hyper-calls to derive invalid pointers to
+   speculate into privileged memory after entering the kernel.  For places
+   where such kernel code has been identified, nospec accessor macros
+   are used to stop speculative memory access.
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 attacks, rogue guests can :ref:`poison
+   <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or return stack buffer, causing
+   the kernel to jump to gadget code in the speculative execution paths.
+
+   To mitigate variant 2, the host kernel can use return trampolines
+   for indirect branches to bypass the poisoned branch target buffer,
+   and flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit.  This prevents rogue
+   guests from affecting indirect branching in the host kernel.
+
+   To protect host processes from rogue guests, host processes can have
+   indirect branch speculation disabled via prctl().  The branch target
+   buffer is cleared before context switching to such processes.
+
+4. A virtualized guest attacking other guest
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   A rogue guest may attack another guest to get data accessible by the
+   other guest.
+
+   Spectre variant 1 attacks are possible if parameters can be passed
+   between guests.  This may be done via mechanisms such as shared memory
+   or message passing.  Such parameters could be used to derive data
+   pointers to privileged data in guest.  The privileged data could be
+   accessed by gadget code in the victim's speculation paths.
+
+   Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue guest by
+   :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or the return
+   stack buffer. Such poisoned entries could be used to influence
+   speculation execution paths in the victim guest.
+
+   Linux kernel mitigates attacks to other guests running in the same
+   CPU hardware thread by flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit,
+   and clearing the branch target buffer before switching to a new guest.
+
+   If SMT is used, Spectre variant 2 attacks from an untrusted guest
+   in the sibling hyperthread can be mitigated by the administrator,
+   by turning off the unsafe guest's indirect branch speculation via
+   prctl().  A guest can also protect itself by turning on microcode
+   based mitigations (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) within the guest.
+
+.. _spectre_sys_info:
+
+Spectre system information
+--------------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current
+mitigation status of the system for Spectre: whether the system is
+vulnerable, and which mitigations are active.
+
+The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 1 mitigation status is:
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  .. list-table::
+
+     * - 'Not affected'
+       - The processor is not vulnerable.
+     * - 'Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers'
+       - The swapgs protections are disabled; otherwise it has
+         protection in the kernel on a case by case base with explicit
+         pointer sanitation and usercopy LFENCE barriers.
+     * - 'Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization'
+       - Protection in the kernel on a case by case base with explicit
+         pointer sanitation, usercopy LFENCE barriers, and swapgs LFENCE
+         barriers.
+
+However, the protections are put in place on a case by case basis,
+and there is no guarantee that all possible attack vectors for Spectre
+variant 1 are covered.
+
+The spectre_v2 kernel file reports if the kernel has been compiled with
+retpoline mitigation or if the CPU has hardware mitigation, and if the
+CPU has support for additional process-specific mitigation.
+
+This file also reports CPU features enabled by microcode to mitigate
+attack between user processes:
+
+1. Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) to add additional
+   isolation between processes of different users.
+2. Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP) to add additional
+   isolation between CPU threads running on the same core.
+
+These CPU features may impact performance when used and can be enabled
+per process on a case-by-case base.
+
+The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 2 mitigation status is:
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  - Kernel status:
+
+  ========================================  =================================
+  'Not affected'                            The processor is not vulnerable
+  'Mitigation: None'                        Vulnerable, no mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Retpolines'                  Use Retpoline thunks
+  'Mitigation: LFENCE'                      Use LFENCE instructions
+  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS'               Hardware-focused mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines'  Hardware-focused + Retpolines
+  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE'      Hardware-focused + LFENCE
+  ========================================  =================================
+
+  - Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is
+    used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only).
+
+  ========== =============================================================
+  'IBRS_FW'  Protection against user program attacks when calling firmware
+  ========== =============================================================
+
+  - Indirect branch prediction barrier (IBPB) status for protection between
+    processes of different users. This feature can be controlled through
+    prctl() per process, or through kernel command line options. This is
+    an x86 only feature. For more details see below.
+
+  ===================   ========================================================
+  'IBPB: disabled'      IBPB unused
+  'IBPB: always-on'     Use IBPB on all tasks
+  'IBPB: conditional'   Use IBPB on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks
+  ===================   ========================================================
+
+  - Single threaded indirect branch prediction (STIBP) status for protection
+    between different hyper threads. This feature can be controlled through
+    prctl per process, or through kernel command line options. This is x86
+    only feature. For more details see below.
+
+  ====================  ========================================================
+  'STIBP: disabled'     STIBP unused
+  'STIBP: forced'       Use STIBP on all tasks
+  'STIBP: conditional'  Use STIBP on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks
+  ====================  ========================================================
+
+  - Return stack buffer (RSB) protection status:
+
+  =============   ===========================================
+  'RSB filling'   Protection of RSB on context switch enabled
+  =============   ===========================================
+
+  - EIBRS Post-barrier Return Stack Buffer (PBRSB) protection status:
+
+  ===========================  =======================================================
+  'PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence'   CPU is affected and protection of RSB on VMEXIT enabled
+  'PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable'    CPU is vulnerable
+  'PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected'  CPU is not affected by PBRSB
+  ===========================  =======================================================
+
+Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
+vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
+report vulnerability.
+
+Turning on mitigation for Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2
+-----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+1. Kernel mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Spectre variant 1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   For the Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel code (as determined
+   by code audit or scanning tools) is annotated on a case by case
+   basis to use nospec accessor macros for bounds clipping :ref:`[2]
+   <spec_ref2>` to avoid any usable disclosure gadgets. However, it may
+   not cover all attack vectors for Spectre variant 1.
+
+   Copy-from-user code has an LFENCE barrier to prevent the access_ok()
+   check from being mis-speculated.  The barrier is done by the
+   barrier_nospec() macro.
+
+   For the swapgs variant of Spectre variant 1, LFENCE barriers are
+   added to interrupt, exception and NMI entry where needed.  These
+   barriers are done by the FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY and
+   FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY macros.
+
+Spectre variant 2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, the compiler turns indirect calls or
+   jumps in the kernel into equivalent return trampolines (retpolines)
+   :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` to go to the target
+   addresses.  Speculative execution paths under retpolines are trapped
+   in an infinite loop to prevent any speculative execution jumping to
+   a gadget.
+
+   To turn on retpoline mitigation on a vulnerable CPU, the kernel
+   needs to be compiled with a gcc compiler that supports the
+   -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register options.
+   If the kernel is compiled with a Clang compiler, the compiler needs
+   to support -mretpoline-external-thunk option.  The kernel config
+   CONFIG_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs to run with
+   the latest updated microcode.
+
+   On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all,
+   cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details.
+
+   On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. IBRS
+   or enhanced IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time.
+
+   Systems which support enhanced IBRS (eIBRS) enable IBRS protection once at
+   boot, by setting the IBRS bit, and they're automatically protected against
+   Spectre v2 variant attacks.
+
+   On Intel's enhanced IBRS systems, this includes cross-thread branch target
+   injections on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, Intel eIBRS enables
+   STIBP, too.
+
+   AMD Automatic IBRS does not protect userspace, and Legacy IBRS systems clear
+   the IBRS bit on exit to userspace, therefore both explicitly enable STIBP.
+
+   The retpoline mitigation is turned on by default on vulnerable
+   CPUs. It can be forced on or off by the administrator
+   via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+   On x86, indirect branch restricted speculation is turned on by default
+   before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
+   using the firmware.
+
+   Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y
+   and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes
+   attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.
+
+2. User program mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   User programs can mitigate Spectre variant 1 using LFENCE or "bounds
+   clipping". For more details see :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>`.
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, individual user programs
+   can be compiled with return trampolines for indirect branches.
+   This protects them from consuming poisoned entries in the branch
+   target buffer left by malicious software.
+
+   On legacy IBRS systems, at return to userspace, implicit STIBP is disabled
+   because the kernel clears the IBRS bit. In this case, the userspace programs
+   can disable indirect branch speculation via prctl() (See
+   :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+   On x86, this will turn on STIBP to guard against attacks from the
+   sibling thread when the user program is running, and use IBPB to
+   flush the branch target buffer when switching to/from the program.
+
+   Restricting indirect branch speculation on a user program will
+   also prevent the program from launching a variant 2 attack
+   on x86.  All sand-boxed SECCOMP programs have indirect branch
+   speculation restricted by default.  Administrators can change
+   that behavior via the kernel command line and sysfs control files.
+   See :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+   Programs that disable their indirect branch speculation will have
+   more overhead and run slower.
+
+   User programs should use address space randomization
+   (/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2) to make attacks more
+   difficult.
+
+3. VM mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Within the kernel, Spectre variant 1 attacks from rogue guests are
+   mitigated on a case by case basis in VM exit paths. Vulnerable code
+   uses nospec accessor macros for "bounds clipping", to avoid any
+   usable disclosure gadgets.  However, this may not cover all variant
+   1 attack vectors.
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 attacks from rogue guests to the kernel, the
+   Linux kernel uses retpoline or Enhanced IBRS to prevent consumption of
+   poisoned entries in branch target buffer left by rogue guests.  It also
+   flushes the return stack buffer on every VM exit to prevent a return
+   stack buffer underflow so poisoned branch target buffer could be used,
+   or attacker guests leaving poisoned entries in the return stack buffer.
+
+   To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks in the same CPU hardware thread,
+   the branch target buffer is sanitized by flushing before switching
+   to a new guest on a CPU.
+
+   The above mitigations are turned on by default on vulnerable CPUs.
+
+   To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks from sibling thread when SMT is
+   in use, an untrusted guest running in the sibling thread can have
+   its indirect branch speculation disabled by administrator via prctl().
+
+   The kernel also allows guests to use any microcode based mitigation
+   they choose to use (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) to protect themselves.
+
+.. _spectre_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the
+kernel command line.
+
+	nospectre_v1
+
+		[X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
+		(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are
+		possible in the system.
+
+	nospectre_v2
+
+		[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
+		(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
+		allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
+		to spectre_v2=off.
+
+
+        spectre_v2=
+
+		[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+		(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
+		The default operation protects the kernel from
+		user space attacks.
+
+		on
+			unconditionally enable, implies
+			spectre_v2_user=on
+		off
+			unconditionally disable, implies
+		        spectre_v2_user=off
+		auto
+			kernel detects whether your CPU model is
+		        vulnerable
+
+		Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
+		mitigation method at run time according to the
+		CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
+		CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
+		compiler with which the kernel was built.
+
+		Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
+		against user space to user space task attacks.
+
+		Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
+		the user space protections.
+
+		Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
+
+                retpoline               auto pick between generic,lfence
+                retpoline,generic       Retpolines
+                retpoline,lfence        LFENCE; indirect branch
+                retpoline,amd           alias for retpoline,lfence
+                eibrs                   Enhanced/Auto IBRS
+                eibrs,retpoline         Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines
+                eibrs,lfence            Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE
+                ibrs                    use IBRS to protect kernel
+
+		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+		spectre_v2=auto.
+
+For user space mitigation:
+
+        spectre_v2_user=
+
+		[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+		(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between
+		user space tasks
+
+		on
+			Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is
+			enforced by spectre_v2=on
+
+		off
+			Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is
+			enforced by spectre_v2=off
+
+		prctl
+			Indirect branch speculation is enabled,
+			but mitigation can be enabled via prctl
+			per thread. The mitigation control state
+			is inherited on fork.
+
+		prctl,ibpb
+			Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is
+			controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+			always when switching between different user
+			space processes.
+
+		seccomp
+			Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp
+			threads will enable the mitigation unless
+			they explicitly opt out.
+
+		seccomp,ibpb
+			Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is
+			controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+			always when switching between different
+			user space processes.
+
+		auto
+			Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
+			the available CPU features and vulnerability.
+
+		Default mitigation:
+		If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+
+		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+		spectre_v2_user=auto.
+
+		In general the kernel by default selects
+		reasonable mitigations for the current CPU. To
+		disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations, boot with
+		spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
+		cannot be disabled.
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If all userspace applications are from trusted sources and do not
+   execute externally supplied untrusted code, then the mitigations can
+   be disabled.
+
+2. Protect sensitive programs
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   For security-sensitive programs that have secrets (e.g. crypto
+   keys), protection against Spectre variant 2 can be put in place by
+   disabling indirect branch speculation when the program is running
+   (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+
+3. Sandbox untrusted programs
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Untrusted programs that could be a source of attacks can be cordoned
+   off by disabling their indirect branch speculation when they are run
+   (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+   This prevents untrusted programs from polluting the branch target
+   buffer.  All programs running in SECCOMP sandboxes have indirect
+   branch speculation restricted by default. This behavior can be
+   changed via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+3. High security mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   All Spectre variant 2 mitigations can be forced on
+   at boot time for all programs (See the "on" option in
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`).  This will add
+   overhead as indirect branch speculations for all programs will be
+   restricted.
+
+   On x86, branch target buffer will be flushed with IBPB when switching
+   to a new program. STIBP is left on all the time to protect programs
+   against variant 2 attacks originating from programs running on
+   sibling threads.
+
+   Alternatively, STIBP can be used only when running programs
+   whose indirect branch speculation is explicitly disabled,
+   while IBPB is still used all the time when switching to a new
+   program to clear the branch target buffer (See "ibpb" option in
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`).  This "ibpb" option
+   has less performance cost than the "on" option, which leaves STIBP
+   on all the time.
+
+References on Spectre
+---------------------
+
+Intel white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref1:
+
+[1] `Intel analysis of speculative execution side channels <https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/Intel-Analysis-of-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channels.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref2:
+
+[2] `Bounds check bypass <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/bounds-check-bypass>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref3:
+
+[3] `Deep dive: Retpoline: A branch target injection mitigation <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-retpoline-branch-target-injection-mitigation>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref4:
+
+[4] `Deep Dive: Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-single-thread-indirect-branch-predictors>`_.
+
+AMD white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref5:
+
+[5] `AMD64 technology indirect branch control extension <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref6:
+
+[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Managing-Speculation-on-AMD-Processors.pdf>`_.
+
+ARM white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref7:
+
+[7] `Cache speculation side-channels <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/download-the-whitepaper>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref8:
+
+[8] `Cache speculation issues update <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/latest-updates/cache-speculation-issues-update>`_.
+
+Google white paper:
+
+.. _spec_ref9:
+
+[9] `Retpoline: a software construct for preventing branch-target-injection <https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886>`_.
+
+MIPS white paper:
+
+.. _spec_ref10:
+
+[10] `MIPS: response on speculative execution and side channel vulnerabilities <https://www.mips.com/blog/mips-response-on-speculative-execution-and-side-channel-vulnerabilities/>`_.
+
+Academic papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref11:
+
+[11] `Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution <https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref12:
+
+[12] `NetSpectre: Read Arbitrary Memory over Network <https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.10535>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref13:
+
+[13] `Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack Buffer <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot18/woot18-paper-koruyeh.pdf>`_.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..af6865b822d2
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+TAA - TSX Asynchronous Abort
+======================================
+
+TAA is a hardware vulnerability that allows unprivileged speculative access to
+data which is available in various CPU internal buffers by using asynchronous
+aborts within an Intel TSX transactional region.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability only affects Intel processors that support Intel
+Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) when the TAA_NO bit (bit 8)
+is 0 in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.  On processors where the MDS_NO bit
+(bit 5) is 0 in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR, the existing MDS mitigations
+also mitigate against TAA.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the TAA
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`tsx_async_abort_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this TAA issue:
+
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+   CVE-2019-11135  TAA    TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA) condition on some
+                          microprocessors utilizing speculative execution may
+                          allow an authenticated user to potentially enable
+                          information disclosure via a side channel with
+                          local access.
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+When performing store, load or L1 refill operations, processors write
+data into temporary microarchitectural structures (buffers). The data in
+those buffers can be forwarded to load operations as an optimization.
+
+Intel TSX is an extension to the x86 instruction set architecture that adds
+hardware transactional memory support to improve performance of multi-threaded
+software. TSX lets the processor expose and exploit concurrency hidden in an
+application due to dynamically avoiding unnecessary synchronization.
+
+TSX supports atomic memory transactions that are either committed (success) or
+aborted. During an abort, operations that happened within the transactional region
+are rolled back. An asynchronous abort takes place, among other options, when a
+different thread accesses a cache line that is also used within the transactional
+region when that access might lead to a data race.
+
+Immediately after an uncompleted asynchronous abort, certain speculatively
+executed loads may read data from those internal buffers and pass it to dependent
+operations. This can be then used to infer the value via a cache side channel
+attack.
+
+Because the buffers are potentially shared between Hyper-Threads cross
+Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
+
+The victim of a malicious actor does not need to make use of TSX. Only the
+attacker needs to begin a TSX transaction and raise an asynchronous abort
+which in turn potenitally leaks data stored in the buffers.
+
+More detailed technical information is available in the TAA specific x86
+architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst <tsx_async_abort>`.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the TAA vulnerability can be implemented from unprivileged
+applications running on hosts or guests.
+
+As for MDS, the attacker has no control over the memory addresses that can
+be leaked. Only the victim is responsible for bringing data to the CPU. As
+a result, the malicious actor has to sample as much data as possible and
+then postprocess it to try to infer any useful information from it.
+
+A potential attacker only has read access to the data. Also, there is no direct
+privilege escalation by using this technique.
+
+
+.. _tsx_async_abort_sys_info:
+
+TAA system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current TAA status
+of mitigated systems. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+   * - 'Vulnerable'
+     - The CPU is affected by this vulnerability and the microcode and kernel mitigation are not applied.
+   * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
+     - The system tries to clear the buffers but the microcode might not support the operation.
+   * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
+     - The microcode has been updated to clear the buffers. TSX is still enabled.
+   * - 'Mitigation: TSX disabled'
+     - TSX is disabled.
+   * - 'Not affected'
+     - The CPU is not affected by this issue.
+
+.. _ucode_needed:
+
+Best effort mitigation mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If the processor is vulnerable, but the availability of the microcode-based
+mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
+effort mitigation mode.  This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
+without a guarantee that they clear the CPU buffers.
+
+This is done to address virtualization scenarios where the host has the
+microcode update applied, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the
+CPUID to the guest. If the host has updated microcode the protection takes
+effect; otherwise a few CPU cycles are wasted pointlessly.
+
+The state in the tsx_async_abort sysfs file reflects this situation
+accordingly.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+--------------------
+
+The kernel detects the affected CPUs and the presence of the microcode which is
+required. If a CPU is affected and the microcode is available, then the kernel
+enables the mitigation by default.
+
+
+The mitigation can be controlled at boot time via a kernel command line option.
+See :ref:`taa_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+.. _virt_mechanism:
+
+Virtualization mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Affected systems where the host has TAA microcode and TAA is mitigated by
+having disabled TSX previously, are not vulnerable regardless of the status
+of the VMs.
+
+In all other cases, if the host either does not have the TAA microcode or
+the kernel is not mitigated, the system might be vulnerable.
+
+
+.. _taa_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the TAA mitigations at boot time with
+the option "tsx_async_abort=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  off		This option disables the TAA mitigation on affected platforms.
+                If the system has TSX enabled (see next parameter) and the CPU
+                is affected, the system is vulnerable.
+
+  full	        TAA mitigation is enabled. If TSX is enabled, on an affected
+                system it will clear CPU buffers on ring transitions. On
+                systems which are MDS-affected and deploy MDS mitigation,
+                TAA is also mitigated. Specifying this option on those
+                systems will have no effect.
+
+  full,nosmt    The same as tsx_async_abort=full, with SMT disabled on
+                vulnerable CPUs that have TSX enabled. This is the complete
+                mitigation. When TSX is disabled, SMT is not disabled because
+                CPU is not vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx_async_abort=full". For
+processors that are affected by both TAA and MDS, specifying just
+"tsx_async_abort=off" without an accompanying "mds=off" will have no
+effect as the same mitigation is used for both vulnerabilities.
+
+The kernel command line also allows to control the TSX feature using the
+parameter "tsx=" on CPUs which support TSX control. MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is used
+to control the TSX feature and the enumeration of the TSX feature bits (RTM
+and HLE) in CPUID.
+
+The valid options are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  off		Disables TSX on the system.
+
+                Note that this option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are
+                not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1
+                and which get the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode
+                update. This new MSR allows for the reliable deactivation of
+                the TSX functionality.
+
+  on		Enables TSX.
+
+                Although there are mitigations for all known security
+                vulnerabilities, TSX has been known to be an accelerator for
+                several previous speculation-related CVEs, and so there may be
+                unknown security risks associated with leaving it enabled.
+
+  auto		Disables TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present, otherwise enables TSX
+                on the system.
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx=off".
+
+The following combinations of the "tsx_async_abort" and "tsx" are possible. For
+affected platforms tsx=auto is equivalent to tsx=off and the result will be:
+
+  =========  ==========================   =========================================
+  tsx=on     tsx_async_abort=full         The system will use VERW to clear CPU
+                                          buffers. Cross-thread attacks are still
+					  possible on SMT machines.
+  tsx=on     tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt   As above, cross-thread attacks on SMT
+                                          mitigated.
+  tsx=on     tsx_async_abort=off          The system is vulnerable.
+  tsx=off    tsx_async_abort=full         TSX might be disabled if microcode
+                                          provides a TSX control MSR. If so,
+					  system is not vulnerable.
+  tsx=off    tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt   Ditto
+  tsx=off    tsx_async_abort=off          ditto
+  =========  ==========================   =========================================
+
+
+For unaffected platforms "tsx=on" and "tsx_async_abort=full" does not clear CPU
+buffers.  For platforms without TSX control (MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=0)
+"tsx" command line argument has no effect.
+
+For the affected platforms below table indicates the mitigation status for the
+combinations of CPUID bit MD_CLEAR and IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bits MDS_NO
+and TSX_CTRL_MSR.
+
+  =======  =========  =============  ========================================
+  MDS_NO   MD_CLEAR   TSX_CTRL_MSR   Status
+  =======  =========  =============  ========================================
+    0          0            0        Vulnerable (needs microcode)
+    0          1            0        MDS and TAA mitigated via VERW
+    1          1            0        MDS fixed, TAA vulnerable if TSX enabled
+                                     because MD_CLEAR has no meaning and
+                                     VERW is not guaranteed to clear buffers
+    1          X            1        MDS fixed, TAA can be mitigated by
+                                     VERW or TSX_CTRL_MSR
+  =======  =========  =============  ========================================
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace and guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If all user space applications are from a trusted source and do not execute
+untrusted code which is supplied externally, then the mitigation can be
+disabled. The same applies to virtualized environments with trusted guests.
+
+
+2. Untrusted userspace and guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If there are untrusted applications or guests on the system, enabling TSX
+might allow a malicious actor to leak data from the host or from other
+processes running on the same physical core.
+
+If the microcode is available and the TSX is disabled on the host, attacks
+are prevented in a virtualized environment as well, even if the VMs do not
+explicitly enable the mitigation.
+
+
+.. _taa_default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+The kernel's default action for vulnerable processors is:
+
+  - Deploy TSX disable mitigation (tsx_async_abort=full tsx=off).
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst
index 0873685bab0f..89abc5057349 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst
@@ -17,14 +17,12 @@ etc.
    kernel-parameters
    devices
 
-This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and provides an overview of the
-possible mitigations along with guidance for selecting mitigations if they
-are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
+This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and their mitigations.
 
 .. toctree::
    :maxdepth: 1
 
-   l1tf
+   hw-vuln/index
 
 Here is a set of documents aimed at users who are trying to track down
 problems and bugs in particular.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 92eb1f42240d..20553b627020 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@
 			the GPE dispatcher.
 			This facility can be used to prevent such uncontrolled
 			GPE floodings.
-			Format: <int>
+			Format: <byte>
 
 	acpi_no_auto_serialize	[HW,ACPI]
 			Disable auto-serialization of AML methods
@@ -136,6 +136,10 @@
 			dynamic table installation which will install SSDT
 			tables to /sys/firmware/acpi/tables/dynamic.
 
+	acpi_no_watchdog	[HW,ACPI,WDT]
+			Ignore the ACPI-based watchdog interface (WDAT) and let
+			a native driver control the watchdog device instead.
+
 	acpi_rsdp=	[ACPI,EFI,KEXEC]
 			Pass the RSDP address to the kernel, mostly used
 			on machines running EFI runtime service to boot the
@@ -554,7 +558,13 @@
 			loops can be debugged more effectively on production
 			systems.
 
-	clearcpuid=BITNUM [X86]
+	clocksource.max_cswd_read_retries= [KNL]
+			Number of clocksource_watchdog() retries due to
+			external delays before the clock will be marked
+			unstable.  Defaults to three retries, that is,
+			four attempts to read the clock under test.
+
+	clearcpuid=BITNUM[,BITNUM...] [X86]
 			Disable CPUID feature X for the kernel. See
 			arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h for the valid bit
 			numbers. Note the Linux specific bits are not necessarily
@@ -800,10 +810,6 @@
 
 	debugpat	[X86] Enable PAT debugging
 
-	decnet.addr=	[HW,NET]
-			Format: <area>[,<node>]
-			See also Documentation/networking/decnet.txt.
-
 	default_hugepagesz=
 			[same as hugepagesz=] The size of the default
 			HugeTLB page size. This is the size represented by
@@ -1063,7 +1069,7 @@
 			earlyprintk=serial[,0x...[,baudrate]]
 			earlyprintk=ttySn[,baudrate]
 			earlyprintk=dbgp[debugController#]
-			earlyprintk=pciserial,bus:device.function[,baudrate]
+			earlyprintk=pciserial[,force],bus:device.function[,baudrate]
 			earlyprintk=xdbc[xhciController#]
 
 			earlyprintk is useful when the kernel crashes before
@@ -1095,6 +1101,10 @@
 
 			The sclp output can only be used on s390.
 
+			The optional "force" to "pciserial" enables use of a
+			PCI device even when its classcode is not of the
+			UART class.
+
 	edac_report=	[HW,EDAC] Control how to report EDAC event
 			Format: {"on" | "off" | "force"}
 			on: enable EDAC to report H/W event. May be overridden
@@ -1280,6 +1290,26 @@
 			Format: off | on
 			default: on
 
+	gather_data_sampling=
+			[X86,INTEL] Control the Gather Data Sampling (GDS)
+			mitigation.
+
+			Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which
+			allows unprivileged speculative access to data which was
+			previously stored in vector registers.
+
+			This issue is mitigated by default in updated microcode.
+			The mitigation may have a performance impact but can be
+			disabled. On systems without the microcode mitigation
+			disabling AVX serves as a mitigation.
+
+			force:	Disable AVX to mitigate systems without
+				microcode mitigation. No effect if the microcode
+				mitigation is present. Known to cause crashes in
+				userspace with buggy AVX enumeration.
+
+			off:    Disable GDS mitigation.
+
 	gcov_persist=	[GCOV] When non-zero (default), profiling data for
 			kernel modules is saved and remains accessible via
 			debugfs, even when the module is unloaded/reloaded.
@@ -1425,6 +1455,8 @@
 			architectures force reset to be always executed
 	i8042.unlock	[HW] Unlock (ignore) the keylock
 	i8042.kbdreset	[HW] Reset device connected to KBD port
+	i8042.probe_defer
+			[HW] Allow deferred probing upon i8042 probe errors
 
 	i810=		[HW,DRM]
 
@@ -1942,6 +1974,12 @@
 			Built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_DEFAULT_OFF=y,
 			the default is off.
 
+	kpti=		[ARM64] Control page table isolation of user
+			and kernel address spaces.
+			Default: enabled on cores which need mitigation.
+			0: force disabled
+			1: force enabled
+
 	kvm.ignore_msrs=[KVM] Ignore guest accesses to unhandled MSRs.
 			Default is 0 (don't ignore, but inject #GP)
 
@@ -1952,6 +1990,25 @@
 			KVM MMU at runtime.
 			Default is 0 (off)
 
+	kvm.nx_huge_pages=
+			[KVM] Controls the software workaround for the
+			X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT bug.
+			force	: Always deploy workaround.
+			off	: Never deploy workaround.
+			auto    : Deploy workaround based on the presence of
+				  X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT.
+
+			Default is 'auto'.
+
+			If the software workaround is enabled for the host,
+			guests do need not to enable it for nested guests.
+
+	kvm.nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio=
+			[KVM] Controls how many 4KiB pages are periodically zapped
+			back to huge pages.  0 disables the recovery, otherwise if
+			the value is N KVM will zap 1/Nth of the 4KiB pages every
+			minute.  The default is 60.
+
 	kvm-amd.nested=	[KVM,AMD] Allow nested virtualization in KVM/SVM.
 			Default is 1 (enabled)
 
@@ -1980,8 +2037,12 @@
 			Default is 1 (enabled)
 
 	kvm-intel.emulate_invalid_guest_state=
-			[KVM,Intel] Enable emulation of invalid guest states
-			Default is 0 (disabled)
+			[KVM,Intel] Disable emulation of invalid guest state.
+			Ignored if kvm-intel.enable_unrestricted_guest=1, as
+			guest state is never invalid for unrestricted guests.
+			This param doesn't apply to nested guests (L2), as KVM
+			never emulates invalid L2 guest state.
+			Default is 1 (enabled)
 
 	kvm-intel.flexpriority=
 			[KVM,Intel] Disable FlexPriority feature (TPR shadow).
@@ -2069,10 +2130,13 @@
 			off
 				Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't
 				emit any warnings.
+				It also drops the swap size and available
+				RAM limit restriction on both hypervisor and
+				bare metal.
 
 			Default is 'flush'.
 
-			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
 
 	l2cr=		[PPC]
 
@@ -2312,6 +2376,38 @@
 			Format: <first>,<last>
 			Specifies range of consoles to be captured by the MDA.
 
+	mds=		[X86,INTEL]
+			Control mitigation for the Micro-architectural Data
+			Sampling (MDS) vulnerability.
+
+			Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against CPU
+			internal buffers which can forward information to a
+			disclosure gadget under certain conditions.
+
+			In vulnerable processors, the speculatively
+			forwarded data can be used in a cache side channel
+			attack, to access data to which the attacker does
+			not have direct access.
+
+			This parameter controls the MDS mitigation. The
+			options are:
+
+			full       - Enable MDS mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+			full,nosmt - Enable MDS mitigation and disable
+				     SMT on vulnerable CPUs
+			off        - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation
+
+			On TAA-affected machines, mds=off can be prevented by
+			an active TAA mitigation as both vulnerabilities are
+			mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable
+			this mitigation, you need to specify tsx_async_abort=off
+			too.
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			mds=full.
+
+			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
+
 	mem=nn[KMG]	[KNL,BOOT] Force usage of a specific amount of memory
 			Amount of memory to be used when the kernel is not able
 			to see the whole system memory or for test.
@@ -2469,6 +2565,56 @@
 			in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
+	mitigations=
+			[X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] Control optional mitigations for
+			CPU vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			arch-independent options, each of which is an
+			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
+
+			off
+				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
+				improves system performance, but it may also
+				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+				Equivalent to: gather_data_sampling=off [X86]
+					       kpti=0 [ARM64]
+					       kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
+					       l1tf=off [X86]
+					       mds=off [X86]
+					       mmio_stale_data=off [X86]
+					       no_entry_flush [PPC]
+					       no_uaccess_flush [PPC]
+					       nobp=0 [S390]
+					       nopti [X86,PPC]
+					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
+					       nospectre_v1 [X86]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
+					       tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
+
+				Exceptions:
+					       This does not have any effect on
+					       kvm.nx_huge_pages when
+					       kvm.nx_huge_pages=force.
+
+			auto (default)
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
+				enabled, even if it's vulnerable.  This is for
+				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
+				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
+				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
+				Equivalent to: (default behavior)
+
+			auto,nosmt
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
+				if needed.  This is for users who always want to
+				be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+				Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
+					       mds=full,nosmt [X86]
+					       tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt [X86]
+					       mmio_stale_data=full,nosmt [X86]
+
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
 			parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for
@@ -2477,6 +2623,40 @@
 			log everything. Information is printed at KERN_DEBUG
 			so loglevel=8 may also need to be specified.
 
+	mmio_stale_data=
+			[X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the Processor
+			MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
+
+			Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of
+			vulnerabilities that may expose data after an MMIO
+			operation. Exposed data could originate or end in
+			the same CPU buffers as affected by MDS and TAA.
+			Therefore, similar to MDS and TAA, the mitigation
+			is to clear the affected CPU buffers.
+
+			This parameter controls the mitigation. The
+			options are:
+
+			full       - Enable mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+
+			full,nosmt - Enable mitigation and disable SMT on
+				     vulnerable CPUs.
+
+			off        - Unconditionally disable mitigation
+
+			On MDS or TAA affected machines,
+			mmio_stale_data=off can be prevented by an active
+			MDS or TAA mitigation as these vulnerabilities are
+			mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to
+			disable this mitigation, you need to specify
+			mds=off and tsx_async_abort=off too.
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			mmio_stale_data=full.
+
+			For details see:
+			Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
+
 	module.sig_enforce
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is set, this means that
 			modules without (valid) signatures will fail to load.
@@ -2757,6 +2937,8 @@
 
 	noefi		Disable EFI runtime services support.
 
+	no_entry_flush  [PPC] Don't flush the L1-D cache when entering the kernel.
+
 	noexec		[IA-64]
 
 	noexec		[X86]
@@ -2794,18 +2976,21 @@
 			nosmt=force: Force disable SMT, cannot be undone
 				     via the sysfs control file.
 
-	nospectre_v1	[PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1 (bounds
-			check bypass). With this option data leaks are possible
-			in the system.
+	nospectre_v1	[X66, PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
+			(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks
+			are possible in the system.
 
-	nospectre_v2	[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
-			(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
-			allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
-			to spectre_v2=off.
+	nospectre_v2	[X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E,ARM64] Disable all mitigations for
+			the Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch prediction)
+			vulnerability. System may allow data leaks with this
+			option.
 
 	nospec_store_bypass_disable
 			[HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability
 
+	no_uaccess_flush
+	                [PPC] Don't flush the L1-D cache after accessing user data.
+
 	noxsave		[BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save
 			and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to
 			enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
@@ -3529,6 +3714,12 @@
 			fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
 			by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU.
 
+	random.trust_bootloader={on,off}
+			[KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of a
+			seed passed by the bootloader (if available) to
+			fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
+			by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
+
 	ras=option[,option,...]	[KNL] RAS-specific options
 
 		cec_disable	[X86]
@@ -3880,6 +4071,13 @@
 			Run specified binary instead of /init from the ramdisk,
 			used for early userspace startup. See initrd.
 
+	rdrand=		[X86]
+			force - Override the decision by the kernel to hide the
+				advertisement of RDRAND support (this affects
+				certain AMD processors because of buggy BIOS
+				support, specifically around the suspend/resume
+				path).
+
 	rdt=		[HW,X86,RDT]
 			Turn on/off individual RDT features. List is:
 			cmt, mbmtotal, mbmlocal, l3cat, l3cdp, l2cat, l2cdp,
@@ -3951,6 +4149,18 @@
 
 	retain_initrd	[RAM] Keep initrd memory after extraction
 
+	retbleed=	[X86] Control mitigation of RETBleed (Arbitrary
+			Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions)
+			vulnerability.
+
+			off         - unconditionally disable
+			auto        - automatically select a migitation
+
+			Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run
+			time according to the CPU.
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to retbleed=auto.
+
 	rfkill.default_state=
 		0	"airplane mode".  All wifi, bluetooth, wimax, gps, fm,
 			etc. communication is blocked by default.
@@ -4165,9 +4375,13 @@
 
 	spectre_v2=	[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
+			The default operation protects the kernel from
+			user space attacks.
 
-			on   - unconditionally enable
-			off  - unconditionally disable
+			on   - unconditionally enable, implies
+			       spectre_v2_user=on
+			off  - unconditionally disable, implies
+			       spectre_v2_user=off
 			auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is
 			       vulnerable
 
@@ -4177,15 +4391,68 @@
 			CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
 			compiler with which the kernel was built.
 
+			Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
+			against user space to user space task attacks.
+
+			Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
+			the user space protections.
+
 			Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
 
 			retpoline	  - replace indirect branches
-			retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline
-			retpoline,amd     - AMD-specific minimal thunk
+			retpoline,generic - Retpolines
+			retpoline,lfence  - LFENCE; indirect branch
+			retpoline,amd     - alias for retpoline,lfence
+			eibrs		  - Enhanced/Auto IBRS
+			eibrs,retpoline   - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines
+			eibrs,lfence      - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE
+			ibrs		  - use IBRS to protect kernel
 
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 			spectre_v2=auto.
 
+	spectre_v2_user=
+			[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+		        (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between
+		        user space tasks
+
+			on	- Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is
+				  enforced by spectre_v2=on
+
+			off     - Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is
+				  enforced by spectre_v2=off
+
+			prctl   - Indirect branch speculation is enabled,
+				  but mitigation can be enabled via prctl
+				  per thread.  The mitigation control state
+				  is inherited on fork.
+
+			prctl,ibpb
+				- Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is
+				  controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+				  always when switching between different user
+				  space processes.
+
+			seccomp
+				- Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp
+				  threads will enable the mitigation unless
+				  they explicitly opt out.
+
+			seccomp,ibpb
+				- Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is
+				  controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+				  always when switching between different
+				  user space processes.
+
+			auto    - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
+				  the available CPU features and vulnerability.
+
+			Default mitigation:
+			If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			spectre_v2_user=auto.
+
 	spec_store_bypass_disable=
 			[HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation
 			(Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability)
@@ -4243,6 +4510,26 @@
 	spia_pedr=
 	spia_peddr=
 
+	srbds=		[X86,INTEL]
+			Control the Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+			(SRBDS) mitigation.
+
+			Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an MDS-like
+			exploit which can leak bits from the random
+			number generator.
+
+			By default, this issue is mitigated by
+			microcode.  However, the microcode fix can cause
+			the RDRAND and RDSEED instructions to become
+			much slower.  Among other effects, this will
+			result in reduced throughput from /dev/urandom.
+
+			The microcode mitigation can be disabled with
+			the following option:
+
+			off:    Disable mitigation and remove
+				performance impact to RDRAND and RDSEED
+
 	srcutree.counter_wrap_check [KNL]
 			Specifies how frequently to check for
 			grace-period sequence counter wrap for the
@@ -4561,6 +4848,76 @@
 			marks the TSC unconditionally unstable at bootup and
 			avoids any further wobbles once the TSC watchdog notices.
 
+	tsx=		[X86] Control Transactional Synchronization
+			Extensions (TSX) feature in Intel processors that
+			support TSX control.
+
+			This parameter controls the TSX feature. The options are:
+
+			on	- Enable TSX on the system. Although there are
+				mitigations for all known security vulnerabilities,
+				TSX has been known to be an accelerator for
+				several previous speculation-related CVEs, and
+				so there may be unknown	security risks associated
+				with leaving it enabled.
+
+			off	- Disable TSX on the system. (Note that this
+				option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are
+				not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have
+				MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1 and which get
+				the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode
+				update. This new MSR allows for the reliable
+				deactivation of the TSX functionality.)
+
+			auto	- Disable TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present,
+				  otherwise enable TSX on the system.
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to tsx=off.
+
+			See Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
+			for more details.
+
+	tsx_async_abort= [X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the TSX Async
+			Abort (TAA) vulnerability.
+
+			Similar to Micro-architectural Data Sampling (MDS)
+			certain CPUs that support Transactional
+			Synchronization Extensions (TSX) are vulnerable to an
+			exploit against CPU internal buffers which can forward
+			information to a disclosure gadget under certain
+			conditions.
+
+			In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded
+			data can be used in a cache side channel attack, to
+			access data to which the attacker does not have direct
+			access.
+
+			This parameter controls the TAA mitigation.  The
+			options are:
+
+			full       - Enable TAA mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+				     if TSX is enabled.
+
+			full,nosmt - Enable TAA mitigation and disable SMT on
+				     vulnerable CPUs. If TSX is disabled, SMT
+				     is not disabled because CPU is not
+				     vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
+			off        - Unconditionally disable TAA mitigation
+
+			On MDS-affected machines, tsx_async_abort=off can be
+			prevented by an active MDS mitigation as both vulnerabilities
+			are mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable
+			this mitigation, you need to specify mds=off too.
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			tsx_async_abort=full.  On CPUs which are MDS affected
+			and deploy MDS mitigation, TAA mitigation is not
+			required and doesn't provide any additional
+			mitigation.
+
+			For details see:
+			Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
+
 	turbografx.map[2|3]=	[HW,JOY]
 			TurboGraFX parallel port interface
 			Format:
@@ -4683,6 +5040,8 @@
 					prevent spurious wakeup);
 				n = USB_QUIRK_DELAY_CTRL_MSG (Device needs a
 					pause after every control message);
+				o = USB_QUIRK_HUB_SLOW_RESET (Hub needs extra
+					delay after resetting its port);
 			Example: quirks=0781:5580:bk,0a5c:5834:gij
 
 	usbhid.mousepoll=
@@ -4707,13 +5066,13 @@
 			Flags is a set of characters, each corresponding
 			to a common usb-storage quirk flag as follows:
 				a = SANE_SENSE (collect more than 18 bytes
-					of sense data);
+					of sense data, not on uas);
 				b = BAD_SENSE (don't collect more than 18
-					bytes of sense data);
+					bytes of sense data, not on uas);
 				c = FIX_CAPACITY (decrease the reported
 					device capacity by one sector);
 				d = NO_READ_DISC_INFO (don't use
-					READ_DISC_INFO command);
+					READ_DISC_INFO command, not on uas);
 				e = NO_READ_CAPACITY_16 (don't use
 					READ_CAPACITY_16 command);
 				f = NO_REPORT_OPCODES (don't use report opcodes
@@ -4727,18 +5086,20 @@
 					device);
 				j = NO_REPORT_LUNS (don't use report luns
 					command, uas only);
+				k = NO_SAME (do not use WRITE_SAME, uas only)
 				l = NOT_LOCKABLE (don't try to lock and
-					unlock ejectable media);
+					unlock ejectable media, not on uas);
 				m = MAX_SECTORS_64 (don't transfer more
-					than 64 sectors = 32 KB at a time);
+					than 64 sectors = 32 KB at a time,
+					not on uas);
 				n = INITIAL_READ10 (force a retry of the
-					initial READ(10) command);
+					initial READ(10) command, not on uas);
 				o = CAPACITY_OK (accept the capacity
-					reported by the device);
+					reported by the device, not on uas);
 				p = WRITE_CACHE (the device cache is ON
-					by default);
+					by default, not on uas);
 				r = IGNORE_RESIDUE (the device reports
-					bogus residue values);
+					bogus residue values, not on uas);
 				s = SINGLE_LUN (the device has only one
 					Logical Unit);
 				t = NO_ATA_1X (don't allow ATA(12) and ATA(16)
@@ -4747,7 +5108,8 @@
 				w = NO_WP_DETECT (don't test whether the
 					medium is write-protected).
 				y = ALWAYS_SYNC (issue a SYNCHRONIZE_CACHE
-					even if the device claims no cache)
+					even if the device claims no cache,
+					not on uas)
 			Example: quirks=0419:aaf5:rl,0421:0433:rc
 
 	user_debug=	[KNL,ARM]
@@ -4855,12 +5217,6 @@
 			emulate     [default] Vsyscalls turn into traps and are
 			            emulated reasonably safely.
 
-			native      Vsyscalls are native syscall instructions.
-			            This is a little bit faster than trapping
-			            and makes a few dynamic recompilers work
-			            better than they would in emulation mode.
-			            It also makes exploits much easier to write.
-
 			none        Vsyscalls don't work at all.  This makes
 			            them quite hard to use for exploits but
 			            might break your system.
@@ -4992,6 +5348,10 @@
 				the unplug protocol
 			never -- do not unplug even if version check succeeds
 
+	xen_legacy_crash	[X86,XEN]
+			Crash from Xen panic notifier, without executing late
+			panic() code such as dumping handler.
+
 	xen_nopvspin	[X86,XEN]
 			Disables the ticketlock slowpath using Xen PV
 			optimizations.
@@ -5006,6 +5366,21 @@
 			with /sys/devices/system/xen_memory/xen_memory0/scrub_pages.
 			Default value controlled with CONFIG_XEN_SCRUB_PAGES_DEFAULT.
 
+	xen.balloon_boot_timeout= [XEN]
+			The time (in seconds) to wait before giving up to boot
+			in case initial ballooning fails to free enough memory.
+			Applies only when running as HVM or PVH guest and
+			started with less memory configured than allowed at
+			max. Default is 180.
+
+	xen.event_eoi_delay=	[XEN]
+			How long to delay EOI handling in case of event
+			storms (jiffies). Default is 10.
+
+	xen.event_loop_timeout=	[XEN]
+			After which time (jiffies) the event handling loop
+			should start to delay EOI handling. Default is 2.
+
 	xirc2ps_cs=	[NET,PCMCIA]
 			Format:
 			<irq>,<irq_mask>,<io>,<full_duplex>,<do_sound>,<lockup_hack>[,<irq2>[,<irq3>[,<irq4>]]]
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst
index 30491d91e93d..67161e1b0f0b 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst
@@ -26,49 +26,58 @@ information is helpful.  Any exploit code is very helpful and will not
 be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been
 made public.
 
-Disclosure
-----------
-
-The goal of the Linux kernel security team is to work with the bug
-submitter to understand and fix the bug.  We prefer to publish the fix as
-soon as possible, but try to avoid public discussion of the bug itself
-and leave that to others.
-
-Publishing the fix may be delayed when the bug or the fix is not yet
-fully understood, the solution is not well-tested or for vendor
-coordination.  However, we expect these delays to be short, measurable in
-days, not weeks or months.  A release date is negotiated by the security
-team working with the bug submitter as well as vendors.  However, the
-kernel security team holds the final say when setting a timeframe.  The
-timeframe varies from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known bug)
-to a few weeks.  As a basic default policy, we expect report date to
-release date to be on the order of 7 days.
-
-Coordination
-------------
-
-Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege
-escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private
-<linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> mailing list so that distribution vendors
-are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the
-upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and
-will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update
-publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate,
-the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can
-include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix
-the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki:
-<http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists>
+Disclosure and embargoed information
+------------------------------------
+
+The security list is not a disclosure channel.  For that, see Coordination
+below.
+
+Once a robust fix has been developed, the release process starts.  Fixes
+for publicly known bugs are released immediately.
+
+Although our preference is to release fixes for publicly undisclosed bugs
+as soon as they become available, this may be postponed at the request of
+the reporter or an affected party for up to 7 calendar days from the start
+of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days
+if it is agreed that the criticality of the bug requires more time.  The
+only valid reason for deferring the publication of a fix is to accommodate
+the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts which require release
+coordination.
+
+Whilst embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in
+order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside
+the fix or on any other disclosure channel without the permission of the
+reporter.  This includes but is not limited to the original bug report
+and followup discussions (if any), exploits, CVE information or the
+identity of the reporter.
+
+In other words our only interest is in getting bugs fixed.  All other
+information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions
+of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been
+lifted, in perpetuity.
+
+Coordination with other groups
+------------------------------
+
+The kernel security team strongly recommends that reporters of potential
+security issues NEVER contact the "linux-distros" mailing list until
+AFTER discussing it with the kernel security team.  Do not Cc: both
+lists at once.  You may contact the linux-distros mailing list after a
+fix has been agreed on and you fully understand the requirements that
+doing so will impose on you and the kernel community.
+
+The different lists have different goals and the linux-distros rules do
+not contribute to actually fixing any potential security problems.
 
 CVE assignment
 --------------
 
-The security team does not normally assign CVEs, nor do we require them
-for reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and
-may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier
-assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private
-linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known
-before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit
-message, though.
+The security team does not assign CVEs, nor do we require them for
+reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and may
+delay the bug handling.  If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier
+assigned, they should find one by themselves, for example by contacting
+MITRE directly.  However under no circumstances will a patch inclusion
+be delayed to wait for a CVE identifier to arrive.
 
 Non-disclosure agreements
 -------------------------
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/arm/kernel_mode_neon.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/arm/kernel_mode_neon.txt
index 525452726d31..b9e060c5b61e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/arm/kernel_mode_neon.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/arm/kernel_mode_neon.txt
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ TL;DR summary
 * Use only NEON instructions, or VFP instructions that don't rely on support
   code
 * Isolate your NEON code in a separate compilation unit, and compile it with
-  '-mfpu=neon -mfloat-abi=softfp'
+  '-march=armv7-a -mfpu=neon -mfloat-abi=softfp'
 * Put kernel_neon_begin() and kernel_neon_end() calls around the calls into your
   NEON code
 * Don't sleep in your NEON code, and be aware that it will be executed with
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ instructions appearing in unexpected places if no special care is taken.
 Therefore, the recommended and only supported way of using NEON/VFP in the
 kernel is by adhering to the following rules:
 * isolate the NEON code in a separate compilation unit and compile it with
-  '-mfpu=neon -mfloat-abi=softfp';
+  '-march=armv7-a -mfpu=neon -mfloat-abi=softfp';
 * issue the calls to kernel_neon_begin(), kernel_neon_end() as well as the calls
   into the unit containing the NEON code from a compilation unit which is *not*
   built with the GCC flag '-mfpu=neon' set.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.txt
index d6aff2c5e9e2..6feaffe90e22 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.txt
@@ -178,3 +178,7 @@ HWCAP_ILRCPC
 HWCAP_FLAGM
 
     Functionality implied by ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1.TS == 0b0001.
+
+HWCAP_SSBS
+
+    Functionality implied by ID_AA64PFR1_EL1.SSBS == 0b0010.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt
index 3b2f2dd82225..5329e3e00e04 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ stable kernels.
 
 | Implementor    | Component       | Erratum ID      | Kconfig                     |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| Allwinner      | A64/R18         | UNKNOWN1        | SUN50I_ERRATUM_UNKNOWN1     |
+|                |                 |                 |                             |
 | ARM            | Cortex-A53      | #826319         | ARM64_ERRATUM_826319        |
 | ARM            | Cortex-A53      | #827319         | ARM64_ERRATUM_827319        |
 | ARM            | Cortex-A53      | #824069         | ARM64_ERRATUM_824069        |
@@ -53,9 +55,13 @@ stable kernels.
 | ARM            | Cortex-A57      | #832075         | ARM64_ERRATUM_832075        |
 | ARM            | Cortex-A57      | #852523         | N/A                         |
 | ARM            | Cortex-A57      | #834220         | ARM64_ERRATUM_834220        |
+| ARM            | Cortex-A57      | #1742098        | ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098       |
 | ARM            | Cortex-A72      | #853709         | N/A                         |
+| ARM            | Cortex-A72      | #1655431        | ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098       |
 | ARM            | Cortex-A73      | #858921         | ARM64_ERRATUM_858921        |
 | ARM            | Cortex-A55      | #1024718        | ARM64_ERRATUM_1024718       |
+| ARM            | Cortex-A76      | #1463225        | ARM64_ERRATUM_1463225       |
+| ARM            | Neoverse-N1     | #1542419        | ARM64_ERRATUM_1542419       |
 | ARM            | MMU-500         | #841119,#826419 | N/A                         |
 |                |                 |                 |                             |
 | Cavium         | ThunderX ITS    | #22375, #24313  | CAVIUM_ERRATUM_22375        |
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/atomic_bitops.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/atomic_bitops.txt
index be70b32c95d9..bc3fac8e1db3 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/atomic_bitops.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/atomic_bitops.txt
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Like with atomic_t, the rule of thumb is:
  - RMW operations that have a return value are fully ordered.
 
  - RMW operations that are conditional are unordered on FAILURE,
-   otherwise the above rules apply. In the case of test_and_{}_bit() operations,
+   otherwise the above rules apply. In the case of test_and_set_bit_lock(),
    if the bit in memory is unchanged by the operation then it is deemed to have
    failed.
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/atomic_t.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/atomic_t.txt
index 913396ac5824..ed0d814df7e0 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/atomic_t.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/atomic_t.txt
@@ -177,6 +177,9 @@ These helper barriers exist because architectures have varying implicit
 ordering on their SMP atomic primitives. For example our TSO architectures
 provide full ordered atomics and these barriers are no-ops.
 
+NOTE: when the atomic RmW ops are fully ordered, they should also imply a
+compiler barrier.
+
 Thus:
 
   atomic_fetch_add();
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/conf.py linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/conf.py
index b691af4831fa..f3cf0111bbd2 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/conf.py
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/conf.py
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ needs_sphinx = '1.3'
 extensions = ['kerneldoc', 'rstFlatTable', 'kernel_include', 'cdomain', 'kfigure', 'sphinx.ext.ifconfig']
 
 # The name of the math extension changed on Sphinx 1.4
-if major == 1 and minor > 3:
+if (major == 1 and minor > 3) or (major > 1):
     extensions.append("sphinx.ext.imgmath")
 else:
     extensions.append("sphinx.ext.pngmath")
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ finally:
 #
 # This is also used if you do content translation via gettext catalogs.
 # Usually you set "language" from the command line for these cases.
-language = None
+language = 'en'
 
 # There are two options for replacing |today|: either, you set today to some
 # non-false value, then it is used:
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/dev-tools/gdb-kernel-debugging.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/dev-tools/gdb-kernel-debugging.rst
index 19df79286f00..afe4bc206486 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/dev-tools/gdb-kernel-debugging.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/dev-tools/gdb-kernel-debugging.rst
@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ Setup
   this mode. In this case, you should build the kernel with
   CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE disabled if the architecture supports KASLR.
 
+- Build the gdb scripts (required on kernels v5.1 and above)::
+
+    make scripts_gdb
+
 - Enable the gdb stub of QEMU/KVM, either
 
     - at VM startup time by appending "-s" to the QEMU command line
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/device-mapper/dm-integrity.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/device-mapper/dm-integrity.txt
index 297251b0d2d5..bf6af2ade0a6 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/device-mapper/dm-integrity.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/device-mapper/dm-integrity.txt
@@ -146,6 +146,13 @@ block_size:number
 	Supported values are 512, 1024, 2048 and 4096 bytes.  If not
 	specified the default block size is 512 bytes.
 
+legacy_recalculate
+	Allow recalculating of volumes with HMAC keys. This is disabled by
+	default for security reasons - an attacker could modify the volume,
+	set recalc_sector to zero, and the kernel would not detect the
+	modification.
+
+
 The journal mode (D/J), buffer_sectors, journal_watermark, commit_time can
 be changed when reloading the target (load an inactive table and swap the
 tables with suspend and resume). The other arguments should not be changed
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/bus/ti-sysc.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/bus/ti-sysc.txt
index 91dc2333af01..85a23f551f02 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/bus/ti-sysc.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/bus/ti-sysc.txt
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ Required standard properties:
 		"ti,sysc-omap3-sham"
 		"ti,sysc-omap-aes"
 		"ti,sysc-mcasp"
+		"ti,sysc-dra7-mcasp"
 		"ti,sysc-usb-host-fs"
 		"ti,sysc-dra7-mcan"
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/renesas,rcar-usb2-clock-sel.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/renesas,rcar-usb2-clock-sel.txt
index e96e085271c1..83f6c6a7c41c 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/renesas,rcar-usb2-clock-sel.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/renesas,rcar-usb2-clock-sel.txt
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Required properties:
 Example (R-Car H3):
 
 	usb2_clksel: clock-controller@e6590630 {
-		compatible = "renesas,r8a77950-rcar-usb2-clock-sel",
+		compatible = "renesas,r8a7795-rcar-usb2-clock-sel",
 			     "renesas,rcar-gen3-usb2-clock-sel";
 		reg = <0 0xe6590630 0 0x02>;
 		clocks = <&cpg CPG_MOD 703>, <&usb_extal>, <&usb_xtal>;
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/mediatek/mediatek,dpi.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/mediatek/mediatek,dpi.txt
index b6a7e7397b8b..b944fe067188 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/mediatek/mediatek,dpi.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/mediatek/mediatek,dpi.txt
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ Required properties:
   Documentation/devicetree/bindings/graph.txt. This port should be connected
   to the input port of an attached HDMI or LVDS encoder chip.
 
+Optional properties:
+- pinctrl-names: Contain "default" and "sleep".
+
 Example:
 
 dpi0: dpi@1401d000 {
@@ -26,6 +29,9 @@ dpi0: dpi@1401d000 {
 		 <&mmsys CLK_MM_DPI_ENGINE>,
 		 <&apmixedsys CLK_APMIXED_TVDPLL>;
 	clock-names = "pixel", "engine", "pll";
+	pinctrl-names = "default", "sleep";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&dpi_pin_func>;
+	pinctrl-1 = <&dpi_pin_idle>;
 
 	port {
 		dpi0_out: endpoint {
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/panel/armadeus,st0700-adapt.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/panel/armadeus,st0700-adapt.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a30d63db3c8f
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/panel/armadeus,st0700-adapt.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+Armadeus ST0700 Adapt. A Santek ST0700I5Y-RBSLW 7.0" WVGA (800x480) TFT with
+an adapter board.
+
+Required properties:
+- compatible: "armadeus,st0700-adapt"
+- power-supply: see panel-common.txt
+
+Optional properties:
+- backlight: see panel-common.txt
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/dma/moxa,moxart-dma.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/dma/moxa,moxart-dma.txt
index 8a9f3559335b..7e14e26676ec 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/dma/moxa,moxart-dma.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/dma/moxa,moxart-dma.txt
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ Example:
 Use specific request line passing from dma
 For example, MMC request line is 5
 
-	sdhci: sdhci@98e00000 {
-		compatible = "moxa,moxart-sdhci";
+	mmc: mmc@98e00000 {
+		compatible = "moxa,moxart-mmc";
 		reg = <0x98e00000 0x5C>;
 		interrupts = <5 0>;
 		clocks = <&clk_apb>;
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/eeprom/at24.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/eeprom/at24.txt
index aededdbc262b..f9a7c984274c 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/eeprom/at24.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/eeprom/at24.txt
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ Required properties:
                 "atmel,24c256",
                 "atmel,24c512",
                 "atmel,24c1024",
+                "atmel,24c2048",
 
                 If <manufacturer> is not "atmel", then a fallback must be used
                 with the same <model> and "atmel" as manufacturer.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/gpio/gpio-altera.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/gpio/gpio-altera.txt
index 146e554b3c67..2a80e272cd66 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/gpio/gpio-altera.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/gpio/gpio-altera.txt
@@ -9,8 +9,9 @@ Required properties:
   - The second cell is reserved and is currently unused.
 - gpio-controller : Marks the device node as a GPIO controller.
 - interrupt-controller: Mark the device node as an interrupt controller
-- #interrupt-cells : Should be 1. The interrupt type is fixed in the hardware.
+- #interrupt-cells : Should be 2. The interrupt type is fixed in the hardware.
   - The first cell is the GPIO offset number within the GPIO controller.
+  - The second cell is the interrupt trigger type and level flags.
 - interrupts: Specify the interrupt.
 - altr,interrupt-type: Specifies the interrupt trigger type the GPIO
   hardware is synthesized. This field is required if the Altera GPIO controller
@@ -38,6 +39,6 @@ gpio_altr: gpio@ff200000 {
 	altr,interrupt-type = <IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING>;
 	#gpio-cells = <2>;
 	gpio-controller;
-	#interrupt-cells = <1>;
+	#interrupt-cells = <2>;
 	interrupt-controller;
 };
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/adc/samsung,exynos-adc.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/adc/samsung,exynos-adc.txt
index 6c49db7f8ad2..e1fe02f3e3e9 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/adc/samsung,exynos-adc.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/adc/samsung,exynos-adc.txt
@@ -11,11 +11,13 @@ New driver handles the following
 
 Required properties:
 - compatible:		Must be "samsung,exynos-adc-v1"
-				for exynos4412/5250 and s5pv210 controllers.
+				for Exynos5250 controllers.
 			Must be "samsung,exynos-adc-v2" for
 				future controllers.
 			Must be "samsung,exynos3250-adc" for
 				controllers compatible with ADC of Exynos3250.
+			Must be "samsung,exynos4212-adc" for
+				controllers compatible with ADC of Exynos4212 and Exynos4412.
 			Must be "samsung,exynos7-adc" for
 				the ADC in Exynos7 and compatibles
 			Must be "samsung,s3c2410-adc" for
@@ -28,6 +30,8 @@ Required properties:
 				the ADC in s3c2443 and compatibles
 			Must be "samsung,s3c6410-adc" for
 				the ADC in s3c6410 and compatibles
+			Must be "samsung,s5pv210-adc" for
+				the ADC in s5pv210 and compatibles
 - reg:			List of ADC register address range
 			- The base address and range of ADC register
 			- The base address and range of ADC_PHY register (every
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/multiplexer/io-channel-mux.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/multiplexer/io-channel-mux.txt
index c82794002595..89647d714387 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/multiplexer/io-channel-mux.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/multiplexer/io-channel-mux.txt
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ controller state. The mux controller state is described in
 
 Example:
 	mux: mux-controller {
-		compatible = "mux-gpio";
+		compatible = "gpio-mux";
 		#mux-control-cells = <0>;
 
 		mux-gpios = <&pioA 0 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>,
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/media/i2c/adv748x.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/media/i2c/adv748x.txt
index 21ffb5ed8183..54d1d3bc1869 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/media/i2c/adv748x.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/media/i2c/adv748x.txt
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Example:
 			};
 		};
 
-		port@10 {
+		port@a {
 			reg = <10>;
 
 			adv7482_txa: endpoint {
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ Example:
 			};
 		};
 
-		port@11 {
+		port@b {
 			reg = <11>;
 
 			adv7482_txb: endpoint {
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/mmc/mmc.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/mmc/mmc.txt
index f5a0923b34ca..c269dbe384fe 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/mmc/mmc.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/mmc/mmc.txt
@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ Optional properties:
   be referred to mmc-pwrseq-simple.txt. But now it's reused as a tunable delay
   waiting for I/O signalling and card power supply to be stable, regardless of
   whether pwrseq-simple is used. Default to 10ms if no available.
+- supports-cqe : The presence of this property indicates that the corresponding
+  MMC host controller supports HW command queue feature.
+- disable-cqe-dcmd: This property indicates that the MMC controller's command
+  queue engine (CQE) does not support direct commands (DCMDs).
 
 *NOTE* on CD and WP polarity. To use common for all SD/MMC host controllers line
 polarity properties, we have to fix the meaning of the "normal" and "inverted"
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/mtd/gpmc-nand.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/mtd/gpmc-nand.txt
index c059ab74ed88..a4a75fa79524 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/mtd/gpmc-nand.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/mtd/gpmc-nand.txt
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ on various other factors also like;
 	so the device should have enough free bytes available its OOB/Spare
 	area to accommodate ECC for entire page. In general following expression
 	helps in determining if given device can accommodate ECC syndrome:
-	"2 + (PAGESIZE / 512) * ECC_BYTES" >= OOBSIZE"
+	"2 + (PAGESIZE / 512) * ECC_BYTES" <= OOBSIZE"
 	where
 		OOBSIZE		number of bytes in OOB/spare area
 		PAGESIZE	number of bytes in main-area of device page
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/brcm,unimac-mdio.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/brcm,unimac-mdio.txt
index 4648948f7c3b..e15589f47787 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/brcm,unimac-mdio.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/brcm,unimac-mdio.txt
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ Optional properties:
 - interrupt-names: must be "mdio_done_error" when there is a share interrupt fed
   to this hardware block, or must be "mdio_done" for the first interrupt and
   "mdio_error" for the second when there are separate interrupts
+- clocks: A reference to the clock supplying the MDIO bus controller
+- clock-frequency: the MDIO bus clock that must be output by the MDIO bus
+  hardware, if absent, the default hardware values are used
 
 Child nodes of this MDIO bus controller node are standard Ethernet PHY device
 nodes as described in Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/phy.txt
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/btusb.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/btusb.txt
index 37d67926dd6d..d883a35641d1 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/btusb.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/btusb.txt
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Following example uses irq pin number 3 of gpio0 for out of band wake-on-bt:
 	compatible = "usb1286,204e";
 	reg = <1>;
 	interrupt-parent = <&gpio0>;
-	interrupt-name = "wakeup";
+	interrupt-names = "wakeup";
 	interrupts = <3 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW>;
     };
 };
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/holt_hi311x.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/holt_hi311x.txt
index 903a78da65be..3a9926f99937 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/holt_hi311x.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/holt_hi311x.txt
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Example:
 		reg = <1>;
 		clocks = <&clk32m>;
 		interrupt-parent = <&gpio4>;
-		interrupts = <13 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING>;
+		interrupts = <13 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 		vdd-supply = <&reg5v0>;
 		xceiver-supply = <&reg5v0>;
 	};
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251x.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251x.txt
index 188c8bd4eb67..5a0111d4de58 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251x.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251x.txt
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ Required properties:
  - compatible: Should be one of the following:
    - "microchip,mcp2510" for MCP2510.
    - "microchip,mcp2515" for MCP2515.
+   - "microchip,mcp25625" for MCP25625.
  - reg: SPI chip select.
  - clocks: The clock feeding the CAN controller.
  - interrupts: Should contain IRQ line for the CAN controller.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/fsl-fman.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/fsl-fman.txt
index 299c0dcd67db..1316f0aec0cf 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/fsl-fman.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/fsl-fman.txt
@@ -110,6 +110,13 @@ PROPERTIES
 		Usage: required
 		Definition: See soc/fsl/qman.txt and soc/fsl/bman.txt
 
+- fsl,erratum-a050385
+		Usage: optional
+		Value type: boolean
+		Definition: A boolean property. Indicates the presence of the
+		erratum A050385 which indicates that DMA transactions that are
+		split can result in a FMan lock.
+
 =============================================================================
 FMan MURAM Node
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/marvell-orion-mdio.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/marvell-orion-mdio.txt
index 42cd81090a2c..3f3cfc1d8d4d 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/marvell-orion-mdio.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/marvell-orion-mdio.txt
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Required properties:
 
 Optional properties:
 - interrupts: interrupt line number for the SMI error/done interrupt
-- clocks: phandle for up to three required clocks for the MDIO instance
+- clocks: phandle for up to four required clocks for the MDIO instance
 
 The child nodes of the MDIO driver are the individual PHY devices
 connected to this MDIO bus. They must have a "reg" property given the
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/nxp-nci.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/nxp-nci.txt
index cfaf88998918..9e4dc510a40a 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/nxp-nci.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/nxp-nci.txt
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Example (for ARM-based BeagleBone with NPC100 NFC controller on I2C2):
 		clock-frequency = <100000>;
 
 		interrupt-parent = <&gpio1>;
-		interrupts = <29 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+		interrupts = <29 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 
 		enable-gpios = <&gpio0 30 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 		firmware-gpios = <&gpio0 31 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/pn544.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/pn544.txt
index 92f399ec22b8..2bd82562ce8e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/pn544.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/pn544.txt
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Example (for ARM-based BeagleBone with PN544 on I2C2):
 		clock-frequency = <400000>;
 
 		interrupt-parent = <&gpio1>;
-		interrupts = <17 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+		interrupts = <17 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 
 		enable-gpios = <&gpio3 21 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 		firmware-gpios = <&gpio3 19 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pinctrl/marvell,armada-37xx-pinctrl.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pinctrl/marvell,armada-37xx-pinctrl.txt
index c7c088d2dd50..fb8ec9b0f8c7 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pinctrl/marvell,armada-37xx-pinctrl.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pinctrl/marvell,armada-37xx-pinctrl.txt
@@ -43,26 +43,26 @@ group emmc_nb
 
 group pwm0
  - pin 11 (GPIO1-11)
- - functions pwm, gpio
+ - functions pwm, led, gpio
 
 group pwm1
  - pin 12
- - functions pwm, gpio
+ - functions pwm, led, gpio
 
 group pwm2
  - pin 13
- - functions pwm, gpio
+ - functions pwm, led, gpio
 
 group pwm3
  - pin 14
- - functions pwm, gpio
+ - functions pwm, led, gpio
 
 group pmic1
- - pin 17
+ - pin 7
  - functions pmic, gpio
 
 group pmic0
- - pin 16
+ - pin 6
  - functions pmic, gpio
 
 group i2c2
@@ -112,17 +112,25 @@ group usb2_drvvbus1
  - functions drvbus, gpio
 
 group sdio_sb
- - pins 60-64
+ - pins 60-65
  - functions sdio, gpio
 
 group rgmii
- - pins 42-55
+ - pins 42-53
  - functions mii, gpio
 
 group pcie1
- - pins 39-40
+ - pins 39
+ - functions pcie, gpio
+
+group pcie1_clkreq
+ - pins 40
  - functions pcie, gpio
 
+group smi
+ - pins 54-55
+ - functions smi, gpio
+
 group ptp
  - pins 56-58
  - functions ptp, gpio
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/samsung,s5m8767.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/samsung,s5m8767.txt
index 093edda0c8df..6cd83d920155 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/samsung,s5m8767.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/samsung,s5m8767.txt
@@ -13,6 +13,14 @@ common regulator binding documented in:
 
 
 Required properties of the main device node (the parent!):
+ - s5m8767,pmic-buck-ds-gpios: GPIO specifiers for three host gpio's used
+   for selecting GPIO DVS lines. It is one-to-one mapped to dvs gpio lines.
+
+ [1] If either of the 's5m8767,pmic-buck[2/3/4]-uses-gpio-dvs' optional
+     property is specified, then all the eight voltage values for the
+     's5m8767,pmic-buck[2/3/4]-dvs-voltage' should be specified.
+
+Optional properties of the main device node (the parent!):
  - s5m8767,pmic-buck2-dvs-voltage: A set of 8 voltage values in micro-volt (uV)
    units for buck2 when changing voltage using gpio dvs. Refer to [1] below
    for additional information.
@@ -25,26 +33,13 @@ Required properties of the main device node (the parent!):
    units for buck4 when changing voltage using gpio dvs. Refer to [1] below
    for additional information.
 
- - s5m8767,pmic-buck-ds-gpios: GPIO specifiers for three host gpio's used
-   for selecting GPIO DVS lines. It is one-to-one mapped to dvs gpio lines.
-
- [1] If none of the 's5m8767,pmic-buck[2/3/4]-uses-gpio-dvs' optional
-     property is specified, the 's5m8767,pmic-buck[2/3/4]-dvs-voltage'
-     property should specify atleast one voltage level (which would be a
-     safe operating voltage).
-
-     If either of the 's5m8767,pmic-buck[2/3/4]-uses-gpio-dvs' optional
-     property is specified, then all the eight voltage values for the
-     's5m8767,pmic-buck[2/3/4]-dvs-voltage' should be specified.
-
-Optional properties of the main device node (the parent!):
  - s5m8767,pmic-buck2-uses-gpio-dvs: 'buck2' can be controlled by gpio dvs.
  - s5m8767,pmic-buck3-uses-gpio-dvs: 'buck3' can be controlled by gpio dvs.
  - s5m8767,pmic-buck4-uses-gpio-dvs: 'buck4' can be controlled by gpio dvs.
 
 Additional properties required if either of the optional properties are used:
 
- - s5m8767,pmic-buck234-default-dvs-idx: Default voltage setting selected from
+ - s5m8767,pmic-buck-default-dvs-idx: Default voltage setting selected from
    the possible 8 options selectable by the dvs gpios. The value of this
    property should be between 0 and 7. If not specified or if out of range, the
    default value of this property is set to 0.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rng/omap3_rom_rng.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rng/omap3_rom_rng.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f315c9723bd2
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rng/omap3_rom_rng.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+OMAP ROM RNG driver binding
+
+Secure SoCs may provide RNG via secure ROM calls like Nokia N900 does. The
+implementation can depend on the SoC secure ROM used.
+
+- compatible:
+	Usage: required
+	Value type: <string>
+	Definition: must be "nokia,n900-rom-rng"
+
+- clocks:
+	Usage: required
+	Value type: <prop-encoded-array>
+	Definition: reference to the the RNG interface clock
+
+- clock-names:
+	Usage: required
+	Value type: <stringlist>
+	Definition: must be "ick"
+
+Example:
+
+	rom_rng: rng {
+		compatible = "nokia,n900-rom-rng";
+		clocks = <&rng_ick>;
+		clock-names = "ick";
+	};
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rtc/abracon,abx80x.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rtc/abracon,abx80x.txt
index be789685a1c2..18b892d010d8 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rtc/abracon,abx80x.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rtc/abracon,abx80x.txt
@@ -27,4 +27,4 @@ and valid to enable charging:
 
  - "abracon,tc-diode": should be "standard" (0.6V) or "schottky" (0.3V)
  - "abracon,tc-resistor": should be <0>, <3>, <6> or <11>. 0 disables the output
-                          resistor, the other values are in ohm.
+                          resistor, the other values are in kOhm.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/wm8994.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/wm8994.txt
index 68cccc4653ba..367b58ce1bb9 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/wm8994.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/wm8994.txt
@@ -14,9 +14,15 @@ Required properties:
   - #gpio-cells : Must be 2. The first cell is the pin number and the
     second cell is used to specify optional parameters (currently unused).
 
-  - AVDD2-supply, DBVDD1-supply, DBVDD2-supply, DBVDD3-supply, CPVDD-supply,
-    SPKVDD1-supply, SPKVDD2-supply : power supplies for the device, as covered
-    in Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/regulator.txt
+  - power supplies for the device, as covered in
+    Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/regulator.txt, depending
+    on compatible:
+    - for wlf,wm1811 and wlf,wm8958:
+      AVDD1-supply, AVDD2-supply, DBVDD1-supply, DBVDD2-supply, DBVDD3-supply,
+      DCVDD-supply, CPVDD-supply, SPKVDD1-supply, SPKVDD2-supply
+    - for wlf,wm8994:
+      AVDD1-supply, AVDD2-supply, DBVDD-supply, DCVDD-supply, CPVDD-supply,
+      SPKVDD1-supply, SPKVDD2-supply
 
 Optional properties:
 
@@ -73,11 +79,11 @@ wm8994: codec@1a {
 
 	lineout1-se;
 
+	AVDD1-supply = <&regulator>;
 	AVDD2-supply = <&regulator>;
 	CPVDD-supply = <&regulator>;
-	DBVDD1-supply = <&regulator>;
-	DBVDD2-supply = <&regulator>;
-	DBVDD3-supply = <&regulator>;
+	DBVDD-supply = <&regulator>;
+	DCVDD-supply = <&regulator>;
 	SPKVDD1-supply = <&regulator>;
 	SPKVDD2-supply = <&regulator>;
 };
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/spi/spi-uniphier.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/spi/spi-uniphier.txt
index 504a4ecfc7b1..b04e66a52de5 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/spi/spi-uniphier.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/spi/spi-uniphier.txt
@@ -5,18 +5,20 @@ UniPhier SoCs have SCSSI which supports SPI single channel.
 Required properties:
  - compatible: should be "socionext,uniphier-scssi"
  - reg: address and length of the spi master registers
- - #address-cells: must be <1>, see spi-bus.txt
- - #size-cells: must be <0>, see spi-bus.txt
- - clocks: A phandle to the clock for the device.
- - resets: A phandle to the reset control for the device.
+ - interrupts: a single interrupt specifier
+ - pinctrl-names: should be "default"
+ - pinctrl-0: pin control state for the default mode
+ - clocks: a phandle to the clock for the device
+ - resets: a phandle to the reset control for the device
 
 Example:
 
 spi0: spi@54006000 {
 	compatible = "socionext,uniphier-scssi";
 	reg = <0x54006000 0x100>;
-	#address-cells = <1>;
-	#size-cells = <0>;
+	interrupts = <0 39 4>;
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&pinctrl_spi0>;
 	clocks = <&peri_clk 11>;
 	resets = <&peri_rst 11>;
 };
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/usb/dwc3.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/usb/dwc3.txt
index 3e4c38b806ac..ae46c0ac9f11 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/usb/dwc3.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/usb/dwc3.txt
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ Optional properties:
 			from P0 to P1/P2/P3 without delay.
  - snps,dis-tx-ipgap-linecheck-quirk: when set, disable u2mac linestate check
 			during HS transmit.
+ - snps,parkmode-disable-ss-quirk: when set, all SuperSpeed bus instances in
+			park mode are disabled.
  - snps,dis_metastability_quirk: when set, disable metastability workaround.
 			CAUTION: use only if you are absolutely sure of it.
  - snps,is-utmi-l1-suspend: true when DWC3 asserts output signal
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/device_link.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/device_link.rst
index d6763272e747..e8b0a8fd1ae0 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/device_link.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/device_link.rst
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ suspend/resume and shutdown ordering.
 
 Device links allow representation of such dependencies in the driver core.
 
-In its standard form, a device link combines *both* dependency types:
-It guarantees correct suspend/resume and shutdown ordering between a
+In its standard or *managed* form, a device link combines *both* dependency
+types:  It guarantees correct suspend/resume and shutdown ordering between a
 "supplier" device and its "consumer" devices, and it guarantees driver
 presence on the supplier.  The consumer devices are not probed before the
 supplier is bound to a driver, and they're unbound before the supplier
@@ -59,18 +59,24 @@ device ``->probe`` callback or a boot-time PCI quirk.
 
 Another example for an inconsistent state would be a device link that
 represents a driver presence dependency, yet is added from the consumer's
-``->probe`` callback while the supplier hasn't probed yet:  Had the driver
-core known about the device link earlier, it wouldn't have probed the
+``->probe`` callback while the supplier hasn't started to probe yet:  Had the
+driver core known about the device link earlier, it wouldn't have probed the
 consumer in the first place.  The onus is thus on the consumer to check
 presence of the supplier after adding the link, and defer probing on
-non-presence.
-
-If a device link is added in the ``->probe`` callback of the supplier or
-consumer driver, it is typically deleted in its ``->remove`` callback for
-symmetry.  That way, if the driver is compiled as a module, the device
-link is added on module load and orderly deleted on unload.  The same
-restrictions that apply to device link addition (e.g. exclusion of a
-parallel suspend/resume transition) apply equally to deletion.
+non-presence.  [Note that it is valid to create a link from the consumer's
+``->probe`` callback while the supplier is still probing, but the consumer must
+know that the supplier is functional already at the link creation time (that is
+the case, for instance, if the consumer has just acquired some resources that
+would not have been available had the supplier not been functional then).]
+
+If a device link with ``DL_FLAG_STATELESS`` set (i.e. a stateless device link)
+is added in the ``->probe`` callback of the supplier or consumer driver, it is
+typically deleted in its ``->remove`` callback for symmetry.  That way, if the
+driver is compiled as a module, the device link is added on module load and
+orderly deleted on unload.  The same restrictions that apply to device link
+addition (e.g. exclusion of a parallel suspend/resume transition) apply equally
+to deletion.  Device links managed by the driver core are deleted automatically
+by it.
 
 Several flags may be specified on device link addition, two of which
 have already been mentioned above:  ``DL_FLAG_STATELESS`` to express that no
@@ -83,22 +89,37 @@ link is added from the consumer's ``->probe`` callback:  ``DL_FLAG_RPM_ACTIVE``
 can be specified to runtime resume the supplier upon addition of the
 device link.  ``DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_CONSUMER`` causes the device link to be
 automatically purged when the consumer fails to probe or later unbinds.
-This obviates the need to explicitly delete the link in the ``->remove``
-callback or in the error path of the ``->probe`` callback.
 
 Similarly, when the device link is added from supplier's ``->probe`` callback,
 ``DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_SUPPLIER`` causes the device link to be automatically
 purged when the supplier fails to probe or later unbinds.
 
+If neither ``DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_CONSUMER`` nor ``DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_SUPPLIER``
+is set, ``DL_FLAG_AUTOPROBE_CONSUMER`` can be used to request the driver core
+to probe for a driver for the consumer driver on the link automatically after
+a driver has been bound to the supplier device.
+
+Note, however, that any combinations of ``DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_CONSUMER``,
+``DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_SUPPLIER`` or ``DL_FLAG_AUTOPROBE_CONSUMER`` with
+``DL_FLAG_STATELESS`` are invalid and cannot be used.
+
 Limitations
 ===========
 
-Driver authors should be aware that a driver presence dependency (i.e. when
-``DL_FLAG_STATELESS`` is not specified on link addition) may cause probing of
-the consumer to be deferred indefinitely.  This can become a problem if the
-consumer is required to probe before a certain initcall level is reached.
-Worse, if the supplier driver is blacklisted or missing, the consumer will
-never be probed.
+Driver authors should be aware that a driver presence dependency for managed
+device links (i.e. when ``DL_FLAG_STATELESS`` is not specified on link addition)
+may cause probing of the consumer to be deferred indefinitely.  This can become
+a problem if the consumer is required to probe before a certain initcall level
+is reached.  Worse, if the supplier driver is blacklisted or missing, the
+consumer will never be probed.
+
+Moreover, managed device links cannot be deleted directly.  They are deleted
+by the driver core when they are not necessary any more in accordance with the
+``DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_CONSUMER`` and ``DL_FLAG_AUTOREMOVE_SUPPLIER`` flags.
+However, stateless device links (i.e. device links with ``DL_FLAG_STATELESS``
+set) are expected to be removed by whoever called :c:func:`device_link_add()`
+to add them with the help of either :c:func:`device_link_del()` or
+:c:func:`device_link_remove()`.
 
 Sometimes drivers depend on optional resources.  They are able to operate
 in a degraded mode (reduced feature set or performance) when those resources
@@ -282,4 +303,4 @@ API
 ===
 
 .. kernel-doc:: drivers/base/core.c
-   :functions: device_link_add device_link_del
+   :functions: device_link_add device_link_del device_link_remove
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/libata.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/libata.rst
index 70e180e6b93d..9f3e5dc31184 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/libata.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/libata.rst
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ High-level taskfile hooks
 
 ::
 
-    void (*qc_prep) (struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+    enum ata_completion_errors (*qc_prep) (struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
     int (*qc_issue) (struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/mtdnand.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/mtdnand.rst
index c55a6034c397..5470a3d6bd9e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/mtdnand.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/mtdnand.rst
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ necessary information about the device.
         this->eccmode = NAND_ECC_SOFT;
 
         /* Scan to find existence of the device */
-        if (nand_scan (board_mtd, 1)) {
+        if (nand_scan (this, 1)) {
             err = -ENXIO;
             goto out_ior;
         }
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ unregisters the partitions in the MTD layer.
     static void __exit board_cleanup (void)
     {
         /* Release resources, unregister device */
-        nand_release (board_mtd);
+        nand_release (mtd_to_nand(board_mtd));
 
         /* unmap physical address */
         iounmap(baseaddr);
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/spi.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/spi.rst
index f64cb666498a..f28887045049 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/spi.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/spi.rst
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ hardware, which may be as simple as a set of GPIO pins or as complex as
 a pair of FIFOs connected to dual DMA engines on the other side of the
 SPI shift register (maximizing throughput). Such drivers bridge between
 whatever bus they sit on (often the platform bus) and SPI, and expose
-the SPI side of their device as a :c:type:`struct spi_master
-<spi_master>`. SPI devices are children of that master,
+the SPI side of their device as a :c:type:`struct spi_controller
+<spi_controller>`. SPI devices are children of that master,
 represented as a :c:type:`struct spi_device <spi_device>` and
 manufactured from :c:type:`struct spi_board_info
 <spi_board_info>` descriptors which are usually provided by
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/usb/power-management.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/usb/power-management.rst
index 79beb807996b..4a74cf6f2797 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/usb/power-management.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/driver-api/usb/power-management.rst
@@ -370,11 +370,15 @@ autosuspend the interface's device.  When the usage counter is = 0
 then the interface is considered to be idle, and the kernel may
 autosuspend the device.
 
-Drivers need not be concerned about balancing changes to the usage
-counter; the USB core will undo any remaining "get"s when a driver
-is unbound from its interface.  As a corollary, drivers must not call
-any of the ``usb_autopm_*`` functions after their ``disconnect``
-routine has returned.
+Drivers must be careful to balance their overall changes to the usage
+counter.  Unbalanced "get"s will remain in effect when a driver is
+unbound from its interface, preventing the device from going into
+runtime suspend should the interface be bound to a driver again.  On
+the other hand, drivers are allowed to achieve this balance by calling
+the ``usb_autopm_*`` functions even after their ``disconnect`` routine
+has returned -- say from within a work-queue routine -- provided they
+retain an active reference to the interface (via ``usb_get_intf`` and
+``usb_put_intf``).
 
 Drivers using the async routines are responsible for their own
 synchronization and mutual exclusion.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/fault-injection/fault-injection.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/fault-injection/fault-injection.txt
index 4d1b7b4ccfaf..b2b86147bafe 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/fault-injection/fault-injection.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/fault-injection/fault-injection.txt
@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ configuration of fault-injection capabilities.
 
 - /sys/kernel/debug/fail*/times:
 
-	specifies how many times failures may happen at most.
-	A value of -1 means "no limit".
+	specifies how many times failures may happen at most. A value of -1
+	means "no limit".
 
 - /sys/kernel/debug/fail*/space:
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/Locking linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/Locking
index efea228ccd8a..da300708404d 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/Locking
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/Locking
@@ -404,7 +404,6 @@ prototypes:
 	int (*compat_ioctl) (struct block_device *, fmode_t, unsigned, unsigned long);
 	int (*direct_access) (struct block_device *, sector_t, void **,
 				unsigned long *);
-	int (*media_changed) (struct gendisk *);
 	void (*unlock_native_capacity) (struct gendisk *);
 	int (*revalidate_disk) (struct gendisk *);
 	int (*getgeo)(struct block_device *, struct hd_geometry *);
@@ -417,13 +416,12 @@ release:		yes
 ioctl:			no
 compat_ioctl:		no
 direct_access:		no
-media_changed:		no
 unlock_native_capacity:	no
 revalidate_disk:	no
 getgeo:			no
 swap_slot_free_notify:	no	(see below)
 
-media_changed, unlock_native_capacity and revalidate_disk are called only from
+unlock_native_capacity and revalidate_disk are called only from
 check_disk_change().
 
 swap_slot_free_notify is called with swap_lock and sometimes the page lock
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/affs.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/affs.txt
index 71b63c2b9841..a8f1a58e3692 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/affs.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/affs.txt
@@ -93,13 +93,15 @@ The Amiga protection flags RWEDRWEDHSPARWED are handled as follows:
 
   - R maps to r for user, group and others. On directories, R implies x.
 
-  - If both W and D are allowed, w will be set.
+  - W maps to w.
 
   - E maps to x.
 
-  - H and P are always retained and ignored under Linux.
+  - D is ignored.
 
-  - A is always reset when a file is written to.
+  - H, S and P are always retained and ignored under Linux.
+
+  - A is cleared when a file is written to.
 
 User id and group id will be used unless set[gu]id are given as mount
 options. Since most of the Amiga file systems are single user systems
@@ -111,11 +113,13 @@ Linux -> Amiga:
 
 The Linux rwxrwxrwx file mode is handled as follows:
 
-  - r permission will set R for user, group and others.
+  - r permission will allow R for user, group and others.
+
+  - w permission will allow W for user, group and others.
 
-  - w permission will set W and D for user, group and others.
+  - x permission of the user will allow E for plain files.
 
-  - x permission of the user will set E for plain files.
+  - D will be allowed for user, group and others.
 
   - All other flags (suid, sgid, ...) are ignored and will
     not be retained.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
index 48b424de85bb..5b667ee1242a 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
@@ -191,21 +191,11 @@ Currently, the following pairs of encryption modes are supported:
 
 - AES-256-XTS for contents and AES-256-CTS-CBC for filenames
 - AES-128-CBC for contents and AES-128-CTS-CBC for filenames
-- Speck128/256-XTS for contents and Speck128/256-CTS-CBC for filenames
 
 It is strongly recommended to use AES-256-XTS for contents encryption.
 AES-128-CBC was added only for low-powered embedded devices with
 crypto accelerators such as CAAM or CESA that do not support XTS.
 
-Similarly, Speck128/256 support was only added for older or low-end
-CPUs which cannot do AES fast enough -- especially ARM CPUs which have
-NEON instructions but not the Cryptography Extensions -- and for which
-it would not otherwise be feasible to use encryption at all.  It is
-not recommended to use Speck on CPUs that have AES instructions.
-Speck support is only available if it has been enabled in the crypto
-API via CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK.  Also, on ARM platforms, to get
-acceptable performance CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK_NEON must be enabled.
-
 New encryption modes can be added relatively easily, without changes
 to individual filesystems.  However, authenticated encryption (AE)
 modes are not currently supported because of the difficulty of dealing
@@ -436,10 +426,18 @@ astute users may notice some differences in behavior:
 - Unencrypted files, or files encrypted with a different encryption
   policy (i.e. different key, modes, or flags), cannot be renamed or
   linked into an encrypted directory; see `Encryption policy
-  enforcement`_.  Attempts to do so will fail with EPERM.  However,
+  enforcement`_.  Attempts to do so will fail with EXDEV.  However,
   encrypted files can be renamed within an encrypted directory, or
   into an unencrypted directory.
 
+  Note: "moving" an unencrypted file into an encrypted directory, e.g.
+  with the `mv` program, is implemented in userspace by a copy
+  followed by a delete.  Be aware that the original unencrypted data
+  may remain recoverable from free space on the disk; prefer to keep
+  all files encrypted from the very beginning.  The `shred` program
+  may be used to overwrite the source files but isn't guaranteed to be
+  effective on all filesystems and storage devices.
+
 - Direct I/O is not supported on encrypted files.  Attempts to use
   direct I/O on such files will fall back to buffered I/O.
 
@@ -526,7 +524,7 @@ not be encrypted.
 Except for those special files, it is forbidden to have unencrypted
 files, or files encrypted with a different encryption policy, in an
 encrypted directory tree.  Attempts to link or rename such a file into
-an encrypted directory will fail with EPERM.  This is also enforced
+an encrypted directory will fail with EXDEV.  This is also enforced
 during ->lookup() to provide limited protection against offline
 attacks that try to disable or downgrade encryption in known locations
 where applications may later write sensitive data.  It is recommended
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/mandatory-locking.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/mandatory-locking.txt
index 0979d1d2ca8b..a251ca33164a 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/mandatory-locking.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/mandatory-locking.txt
@@ -169,3 +169,13 @@ havoc if they lock crucial files. The way around it is to change the file
 permissions (remove the setgid bit) before trying to read or write to it.
 Of course, that might be a bit tricky if the system is hung :-(
 
+7. The "mand" mount option
+--------------------------
+Mandatory locking is disabled on all filesystems by default, and must be
+administratively enabled by mounting with "-o mand". That mount option
+is only allowed if the mounting task has the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability.
+
+Since kernel v4.5, it is possible to disable mandatory locking
+altogether by setting CONFIG_MANDATORY_FILE_LOCKING to "n". A kernel
+with this disabled will reject attempts to mount filesystems with the
+"mand" mount option with the error status EPERM.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
index 51c136c821bf..d7dc9c818b83 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
@@ -286,6 +286,12 @@ pointed by REDIRECT. This should not be possible on local system as setting
 "trusted." xattrs will require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. But it should be possible
 for untrusted layers like from a pen drive.
 
+Note: redirect_dir={off|nofollow|follow(*)} conflicts with metacopy=on, and
+results in an error.
+
+(*) redirect_dir=follow only conflicts with metacopy=on if upperdir=... is
+given.
+
 Sharing and copying layers
 --------------------------
 
@@ -296,7 +302,7 @@ beneath or above the path of another overlay lower layer path.
 
 Using an upper layer path and/or a workdir path that are already used by
 another overlay mount is not allowed and may fail with EBUSY.  Using
-partially overlapping paths is not allowed but will not fail with EBUSY.
+partially overlapping paths is not allowed and may fail with EBUSY.
 If files are accessed from two overlayfs mounts which share or overlap the
 upper layer and/or workdir path the behavior of the overlay is undefined,
 though it will not result in a crash or deadlock.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/porting linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/porting
index 7b7b845c490a..041b0ded8b44 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/porting
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/porting
@@ -622,3 +622,15 @@ in your dentry operations instead.
 	alloc_file_clone(file, flags, ops) does not affect any caller's references.
 	On success you get a new struct file sharing the mount/dentry with the
 	original, on failure - ERR_PTR().
+--
+[mandatory]
+	DCACHE_RCUACCESS is gone; having an RCU delay on dentry freeing is the
+	default.  DCACHE_NORCU opts out, and only d_alloc_pseudo() has any
+	business doing so.
+--
+[mandatory]
+
+	[should've been added in 2016] stale comment in finish_open()
+	nonwithstanding, failure exits in ->atomic_open() instances should
+	*NOT* fput() the file, no matter what.  Everything is handled by the
+	caller.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
index 22b4b00dee31..0d0ecc7df260 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
@@ -425,6 +425,7 @@ SwapPss:               0 kB
 KernelPageSize:        4 kB
 MMUPageSize:           4 kB
 Locked:                0 kB
+THPeligible:           0
 VmFlags: rd ex mr mw me dw
 
 the first of these lines shows the same information as is displayed for the
@@ -462,6 +463,8 @@ replaced by copy-on-write) part of the underlying shmem object out on swap.
 "SwapPss" shows proportional swap share of this mapping. Unlike "Swap", this
 does not take into account swapped out page of underlying shmem objects.
 "Locked" indicates whether the mapping is locked in memory or not.
+"THPeligible" indicates whether the mapping is eligible for THP pages - 1 if
+true, 0 otherwise.
 
 "VmFlags" field deserves a separate description. This member represents the kernel
 flags associated with the particular virtual memory area in two letter encoded
@@ -496,7 +499,9 @@ manner. The codes are the following:
 
 Note that there is no guarantee that every flag and associated mnemonic will
 be present in all further kernel releases. Things get changed, the flags may
-be vanished or the reverse -- new added.
+be vanished or the reverse -- new added. Interpretation of their meaning
+might change in future as well. So each consumer of these flags has to
+follow each specific kernel version for the exact semantic.
 
 This file is only present if the CONFIG_MMU kernel configuration option is
 enabled.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/seq_file.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/seq_file.txt
index d412b236a9d6..7cf7143921a1 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/seq_file.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/seq_file.txt
@@ -192,6 +192,12 @@ between the calls to start() and stop(), so holding a lock during that time
 is a reasonable thing to do. The seq_file code will also avoid taking any
 other locks while the iterator is active.
 
+The iterater value returned by start() or next() is guaranteed to be
+passed to a subsequent next() or stop() call.  This allows resources
+such as locks that were taken to be reliably released.  There is *no*
+guarantee that the iterator will be passed to show(), though in practice
+it often will be.
+
 
 Formatted output
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/sysfs.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/sysfs.txt
index a1426cabcef1..2e38fafc1b63 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/sysfs.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/filesystems/sysfs.txt
@@ -211,12 +211,10 @@ Other notes:
   is 4096. 
 
 - show() methods should return the number of bytes printed into the
-  buffer. This is the return value of scnprintf().
+  buffer.
 
-- show() must not use snprintf() when formatting the value to be
-  returned to user space. If you can guarantee that an overflow
-  will never happen you can use sprintf() otherwise you must use
-  scnprintf().
+- show() should only use sysfs_emit() or sysfs_emit_at() when formatting
+  the value to be returned to user space.
 
 - store() should return the number of bytes used from the buffer. If the
   entire buffer has been used, just return the count argument.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/hid/uhid.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/hid/uhid.txt
index c8656dd029a9..958fff945304 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/hid/uhid.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/hid/uhid.txt
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ them but you should handle them according to your needs.
   UHID_OUTPUT:
   This is sent if the HID device driver wants to send raw data to the I/O
   device on the interrupt channel. You should read the payload and forward it to
-  the device. The payload is of type "struct uhid_data_req".
+  the device. The payload is of type "struct uhid_output_req".
   This may be received even though you haven't received UHID_OPEN, yet.
 
   UHID_GET_REPORT:
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/i2c/busses/i2c-i801 linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/i2c/busses/i2c-i801
index d1ee484a787d..ee9984f35868 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/i2c/busses/i2c-i801
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/i2c/busses/i2c-i801
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ Supported adapters:
   * Intel Cannon Lake (PCH)
   * Intel Cedar Fork (PCH)
   * Intel Ice Lake (PCH)
+  * Intel Comet Lake (PCH)
    Datasheets: Publicly available at the Intel website
 
 On Intel Patsburg and later chipsets, both the normal host SMBus controller
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/index.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/index.rst
index 5db7e87c7cb1..1cdc139adb40 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/index.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/index.rst
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ implementation.
    :maxdepth: 2
 
    sh/index
+   x86/index
 
 Filesystem Documentation
 ------------------------
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/input/joydev/joystick.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/input/joydev/joystick.rst
index 9746fd76cc58..f38c330c028e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/input/joydev/joystick.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/input/joydev/joystick.rst
@@ -517,6 +517,7 @@ All I-Force devices are supported by the iforce module. This includes:
 * AVB Mag Turbo Force
 * AVB Top Shot Pegasus
 * AVB Top Shot Force Feedback Racing Wheel
+* Boeder Force Feedback Wheel
 * Logitech WingMan Force
 * Logitech WingMan Force Wheel
 * Guillemot Race Leader Force Feedback
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt
index 13a7c999c04a..7ab4d71ec83d 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt
@@ -290,7 +290,6 @@ Code  Seq#(hex)	Include File		Comments
 0x89	00-06	arch/x86/include/asm/sockios.h
 0x89	0B-DF	linux/sockios.h
 0x89	E0-EF	linux/sockios.h		SIOCPROTOPRIVATE range
-0x89	E0-EF	linux/dn.h		PROTOPRIVATE range
 0x89	F0-FF	linux/sockios.h		SIOCDEVPRIVATE range
 0x8B	all	linux/wireless.h
 0x8C	00-3F				WiNRADiO driver
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/kbuild/llvm.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/kbuild/llvm.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c776b6eee969
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/kbuild/llvm.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+==============================
+Building Linux with Clang/LLVM
+==============================
+
+This document covers how to build the Linux kernel with Clang and LLVM
+utilities.
+
+About
+-----
+
+The Linux kernel has always traditionally been compiled with GNU toolchains
+such as GCC and binutils. Ongoing work has allowed for `Clang
+<https://clang.llvm.org/>`_ and `LLVM <https://llvm.org/>`_ utilities to be
+used as viable substitutes. Distributions such as `Android
+<https://www.android.com/>`_, `ChromeOS
+<https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os>`_, and `OpenMandriva
+<https://www.openmandriva.org/>`_ use Clang built kernels.  `LLVM is a
+collection of toolchain components implemented in terms of C++ objects
+<https://www.aosabook.org/en/llvm.html>`_. Clang is a front-end to LLVM that
+supports C and the GNU C extensions required by the kernel, and is pronounced
+"klang," not "see-lang."
+
+Clang
+-----
+
+The compiler used can be swapped out via `CC=` command line argument to `make`.
+`CC=` should be set when selecting a config and during a build.
+
+	make CC=clang defconfig
+
+	make CC=clang
+
+Cross Compiling
+---------------
+
+A single Clang compiler binary will typically contain all supported backends,
+which can help simplify cross compiling.
+
+	ARCH=arm64 CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-linux-gnu- make CC=clang
+
+`CROSS_COMPILE` is not used to prefix the Clang compiler binary, instead
+`CROSS_COMPILE` is used to set a command line flag: `--target <triple>`. For
+example:
+
+	clang --target aarch64-linux-gnu foo.c
+
+LLVM Utilities
+--------------
+
+LLVM has substitutes for GNU binutils utilities. Kbuild supports `LLVM=1`
+to enable them.
+
+	make LLVM=1
+
+They can be enabled individually. The full list of the parameters:
+
+	make CC=clang LD=ld.lld AR=llvm-ar NM=llvm-nm STRIP=llvm-strip \\
+	  OBJCOPY=llvm-objcopy OBJDUMP=llvm-objdump OBJSIZE=llvm-size \\
+	  READELF=llvm-readelf HOSTCC=clang HOSTCXX=clang++ HOSTAR=llvm-ar \\
+	  HOSTLD=ld.lld
+
+Currently, the integrated assembler is disabled by default. You can pass
+`LLVM_IAS=1` to enable it.
+
+Getting Help
+------------
+
+- `Website <https://clangbuiltlinux.github.io/>`_
+- `Mailing List <https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/clang-built-linux>`_: <clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com>
+- `Issue Tracker <https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues>`_
+- IRC: #clangbuiltlinux on chat.freenode.net
+- `Telegram <https://t.me/ClangBuiltLinux>`_: @ClangBuiltLinux
+- `Wiki <https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/wiki>`_
+- `Beginner Bugs <https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues?q=is%3Aopen+is%3Aissue+label%3A%22good+first+issue%22>`_
+
+Getting LLVM
+-------------
+
+- http://releases.llvm.org/download.html
+- https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project
+- https://llvm.org/docs/GettingStarted.html
+- https://llvm.org/docs/CMake.html
+- https://apt.llvm.org/
+- https://www.archlinux.org/packages/extra/x86_64/llvm/
+- https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/tc-build
+- https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/wiki/Building-Clang-from-source
+- https://android.googlesource.com/platform/prebuilts/clang/host/linux-x86/
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/cec/cec-ioc-receive.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/cec/cec-ioc-receive.rst
index e964074cd15b..b25e48afaa08 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/cec/cec-ioc-receive.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/cec/cec-ioc-receive.rst
@@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ CEC_RECEIVE, CEC_TRANSMIT - Receive or transmit a CEC message
 Synopsis
 ========
 
-.. c:function:: int ioctl( int fd, CEC_RECEIVE, struct cec_msg *argp )
+.. c:function:: int ioctl( int fd, CEC_RECEIVE, struct cec_msg \*argp )
     :name: CEC_RECEIVE
 
-.. c:function:: int ioctl( int fd, CEC_TRANSMIT, struct cec_msg *argp )
+.. c:function:: int ioctl( int fd, CEC_TRANSMIT, struct cec_msg \*argp )
     :name: CEC_TRANSMIT
 
 Arguments
@@ -272,6 +272,19 @@ View On' messages from initiator 0xf ('Unregistered') to destination 0 ('TV').
       - The transmit failed after one or more retries. This status bit is
 	mutually exclusive with :ref:`CEC_TX_STATUS_OK <CEC-TX-STATUS-OK>`.
 	Other bits can still be set to explain which failures were seen.
+    * .. _`CEC-TX-STATUS-ABORTED`:
+
+      - ``CEC_TX_STATUS_ABORTED``
+      - 0x40
+      - The transmit was aborted due to an HDMI disconnect, or the adapter
+        was unconfigured, or a transmit was interrupted, or the driver
+	returned an error when attempting to start a transmit.
+    * .. _`CEC-TX-STATUS-TIMEOUT`:
+
+      - ``CEC_TX_STATUS_TIMEOUT``
+      - 0x80
+      - The transmit timed out. This should not normally happen and this
+	indicates a driver problem.
 
 
 .. tabularcolumns:: |p{5.6cm}|p{0.9cm}|p{11.0cm}|
@@ -300,6 +313,14 @@ View On' messages from initiator 0xf ('Unregistered') to destination 0 ('TV').
       - The message was received successfully but the reply was
 	``CEC_MSG_FEATURE_ABORT``. This status is only set if this message
 	was the reply to an earlier transmitted message.
+    * .. _`CEC-RX-STATUS-ABORTED`:
+
+      - ``CEC_RX_STATUS_ABORTED``
+      - 0x08
+      - The wait for a reply to an earlier transmitted message was aborted
+        because the HDMI cable was disconnected, the adapter was unconfigured
+	or the :ref:`CEC_TRANSMIT <CEC_RECEIVE>` that waited for a
+	reply was interrupted.
 
 
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/biblio.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/biblio.rst
index 1cedcfc04327..386d6cf83e9c 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/biblio.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/biblio.rst
@@ -226,16 +226,6 @@ xvYCC
 
 :author:    International Electrotechnical Commission (http://www.iec.ch)
 
-.. _adobergb:
-
-AdobeRGB
-========
-
-
-:title:     Adobe© RGB (1998) Color Image Encoding Version 2005-05
-
-:author:    Adobe Systems Incorporated (http://www.adobe.com)
-
 .. _oprgb:
 
 opRGB
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/colorspaces-defs.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/colorspaces-defs.rst
index 410907fe9415..16e46bec8093 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/colorspaces-defs.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/colorspaces-defs.rst
@@ -29,8 +29,7 @@ whole range, 0-255, dividing the angular value by 1.41. The enum
 :c:type:`v4l2_hsv_encoding` specifies which encoding is used.
 
 .. note:: The default R'G'B' quantization is full range for all
-   colorspaces except for BT.2020 which uses limited range R'G'B'
-   quantization.
+   colorspaces. HSV formats are always full range.
 
 .. tabularcolumns:: |p{6.0cm}|p{11.5cm}|
 
@@ -51,8 +50,8 @@ whole range, 0-255, dividing the angular value by 1.41. The enum
       - See :ref:`col-rec709`.
     * - ``V4L2_COLORSPACE_SRGB``
       - See :ref:`col-srgb`.
-    * - ``V4L2_COLORSPACE_ADOBERGB``
-      - See :ref:`col-adobergb`.
+    * - ``V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB``
+      - See :ref:`col-oprgb`.
     * - ``V4L2_COLORSPACE_BT2020``
       - See :ref:`col-bt2020`.
     * - ``V4L2_COLORSPACE_DCI_P3``
@@ -90,8 +89,8 @@ whole range, 0-255, dividing the angular value by 1.41. The enum
       - Use the Rec. 709 transfer function.
     * - ``V4L2_XFER_FUNC_SRGB``
       - Use the sRGB transfer function.
-    * - ``V4L2_XFER_FUNC_ADOBERGB``
-      - Use the AdobeRGB transfer function.
+    * - ``V4L2_XFER_FUNC_OPRGB``
+      - Use the opRGB transfer function.
     * - ``V4L2_XFER_FUNC_SMPTE240M``
       - Use the SMPTE 240M transfer function.
     * - ``V4L2_XFER_FUNC_NONE``
@@ -162,8 +161,8 @@ whole range, 0-255, dividing the angular value by 1.41. The enum
       - Details
     * - ``V4L2_QUANTIZATION_DEFAULT``
       - Use the default quantization encoding as defined by the
-	colorspace. This is always full range for R'G'B' (except for the
-	BT.2020 colorspace) and HSV. It is usually limited range for Y'CbCr.
+	colorspace. This is always full range for R'G'B' and HSV.
+	It is usually limited range for Y'CbCr.
     * - ``V4L2_QUANTIZATION_FULL_RANGE``
       - Use the full range quantization encoding. I.e. the range [0…1] is
 	mapped to [0…255] (with possible clipping to [1…254] to avoid the
@@ -173,4 +172,4 @@ whole range, 0-255, dividing the angular value by 1.41. The enum
     * - ``V4L2_QUANTIZATION_LIM_RANGE``
       - Use the limited range quantization encoding. I.e. the range [0…1]
 	is mapped to [16…235]. Cb and Cr are mapped from [-0.5…0.5] to
-	[16…240].
+	[16…240]. Limited Range cannot be used with HSV.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/colorspaces-details.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/colorspaces-details.rst
index b5d551b9cc8f..ca7176cae8dd 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/colorspaces-details.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/colorspaces-details.rst
@@ -290,15 +290,14 @@ Y' is clamped to the range [0…1] and Cb and Cr are clamped to the range
 170M/BT.601. The Y'CbCr quantization is limited range.
 
 
-.. _col-adobergb:
+.. _col-oprgb:
 
-Colorspace Adobe RGB (V4L2_COLORSPACE_ADOBERGB)
+Colorspace opRGB (V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB)
 ===============================================
 
-The :ref:`adobergb` standard defines the colorspace used by computer
-graphics that use the AdobeRGB colorspace. This is also known as the
-:ref:`oprgb` standard. The default transfer function is
-``V4L2_XFER_FUNC_ADOBERGB``. The default Y'CbCr encoding is
+The :ref:`oprgb` standard defines the colorspace used by computer
+graphics that use the opRGB colorspace. The default transfer function is
+``V4L2_XFER_FUNC_OPRGB``. The default Y'CbCr encoding is
 ``V4L2_YCBCR_ENC_601``. The default Y'CbCr quantization is limited
 range.
 
@@ -312,7 +311,7 @@ The chromaticities of the primary colors and the white reference are:
 
 .. tabularcolumns:: |p{4.4cm}|p{4.4cm}|p{8.7cm}|
 
-.. flat-table:: Adobe RGB Chromaticities
+.. flat-table:: opRGB Chromaticities
     :header-rows:  1
     :stub-columns: 0
     :widths:       1 1 2
@@ -371,9 +370,8 @@ Colorspace BT.2020 (V4L2_COLORSPACE_BT2020)
 The :ref:`itu2020` standard defines the colorspace used by Ultra-high
 definition television (UHDTV). The default transfer function is
 ``V4L2_XFER_FUNC_709``. The default Y'CbCr encoding is
-``V4L2_YCBCR_ENC_BT2020``. The default R'G'B' quantization is limited
-range (!), and so is the default Y'CbCr quantization. The chromaticities
-of the primary colors and the white reference are:
+``V4L2_YCBCR_ENC_BT2020``. The default Y'CbCr quantization is limited range.
+The chromaticities of the primary colors and the white reference are:
 
 
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/subdev-formats.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/subdev-formats.rst
index 8e73fcfc6900..cc2ad8af51ea 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/subdev-formats.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/subdev-formats.rst
@@ -7565,3 +7565,30 @@ formats.
       - 0x5001
       - Interleaved raw UYVY and JPEG image format with embedded meta-data
 	used by Samsung S3C73MX camera sensors.
+
+.. _v4l2-mbus-metadata-fmts:
+
+Metadata Formats
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+This section lists all metadata formats.
+
+The following table lists the existing metadata formats.
+
+.. tabularcolumns:: |p{8.0cm}|p{1.4cm}|p{7.7cm}|
+
+.. flat-table:: Metadata formats
+    :header-rows:  1
+    :stub-columns: 0
+
+    * - Identifier
+      - Code
+      - Comments
+    * .. _MEDIA-BUS-FMT-METADATA-FIXED:
+
+      - MEDIA_BUS_FMT_METADATA_FIXED
+      - 0x7001
+      - This format should be used when the same driver handles
+	both sides of the link and the bus format is a fixed
+	metadata format that is not configurable from userspace.
+	Width and height will be set to 0 for this format.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/media/videodev2.h.rst.exceptions linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/media/videodev2.h.rst.exceptions
index ca9f0edc579e..e420a39f1ebf 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/media/videodev2.h.rst.exceptions
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/media/videodev2.h.rst.exceptions
@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ replace symbol V4L2_MEMORY_USERPTR :c:type:`v4l2_memory`
 # Documented enum v4l2_colorspace
 replace symbol V4L2_COLORSPACE_470_SYSTEM_BG :c:type:`v4l2_colorspace`
 replace symbol V4L2_COLORSPACE_470_SYSTEM_M :c:type:`v4l2_colorspace`
-replace symbol V4L2_COLORSPACE_ADOBERGB :c:type:`v4l2_colorspace`
+replace symbol V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB :c:type:`v4l2_colorspace`
+replace define V4L2_COLORSPACE_ADOBERGB :c:type:`v4l2_colorspace`
 replace symbol V4L2_COLORSPACE_BT2020 :c:type:`v4l2_colorspace`
 replace symbol V4L2_COLORSPACE_DCI_P3 :c:type:`v4l2_colorspace`
 replace symbol V4L2_COLORSPACE_DEFAULT :c:type:`v4l2_colorspace`
@@ -69,7 +70,8 @@ replace symbol V4L2_COLORSPACE_SRGB :c:type:`v4l2_colorspace`
 
 # Documented enum v4l2_xfer_func
 replace symbol V4L2_XFER_FUNC_709 :c:type:`v4l2_xfer_func`
-replace symbol V4L2_XFER_FUNC_ADOBERGB :c:type:`v4l2_xfer_func`
+replace symbol V4L2_XFER_FUNC_OPRGB :c:type:`v4l2_xfer_func`
+replace define V4L2_XFER_FUNC_ADOBERGB :c:type:`v4l2_xfer_func`
 replace symbol V4L2_XFER_FUNC_DCI_P3 :c:type:`v4l2_xfer_func`
 replace symbol V4L2_XFER_FUNC_DEFAULT :c:type:`v4l2_xfer_func`
 replace symbol V4L2_XFER_FUNC_NONE :c:type:`v4l2_xfer_func`
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/networking/00-INDEX linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/networking/00-INDEX
index 02a323c43261..2a9dbac38b4e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/networking/00-INDEX
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/networking/00-INDEX
@@ -94,8 +94,8 @@ gianfar.txt
 	- Gianfar Ethernet Driver.
 i40e.txt
 	- README for the Intel Ethernet Controller XL710 Driver (i40e).
-i40evf.txt
-	- Short note on the Driver for the Intel(R) XL710 X710 Virtual Function
+iavf.txt
+	- README for the Intel Ethernet Adaptive Virtual Function Driver (iavf).
 ieee802154.txt
 	- Linux IEEE 802.15.4 implementation, API and drivers
 igb.txt
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/networking/bonding.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/networking/bonding.txt
index d3e5dd26db12..4035a495c060 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/networking/bonding.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/networking/bonding.txt
@@ -191,11 +191,12 @@ ad_actor_sys_prio
 ad_actor_system
 
 	In an AD system, this specifies the mac-address for the actor in
-	protocol packet exchanges (LACPDUs). The value cannot be NULL or
-	multicast. It is preferred to have the local-admin bit set for this
-	mac but driver does not enforce it. If the value is not given then
-	system defaults to using the masters' mac address as actors' system
-	address.
+	protocol packet exchanges (LACPDUs). The value cannot be a multicast
+	address. If the all-zeroes MAC is specified, bonding will internally
+	use the MAC of the bond itself. It is preferred to have the
+	local-admin bit set for this mac but driver does not enforce it. If
+	the value is not given then system defaults to using the masters'
+	mac address as actors' system address.
 
 	This parameter has effect only in 802.3ad mode and is available through
 	SysFs interface.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/networking/decnet.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/networking/decnet.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index e12a4900cf72..000000000000
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/networking/decnet.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,232 +0,0 @@
-                    Linux DECnet Networking Layer Information
-                   ===========================================
-
-1) Other documentation....
-
-   o Project Home Pages
-       http://www.chygwyn.com/                      	    - Kernel info
-       http://linux-decnet.sourceforge.net/                - Userland tools
-       http://www.sourceforge.net/projects/linux-decnet/   - Status page
-
-2) Configuring the kernel
-
-Be sure to turn on the following options:
-
-    CONFIG_DECNET (obviously)
-    CONFIG_PROC_FS (to see what's going on)
-    CONFIG_SYSCTL (for easy configuration)
-
-if you want to try out router support (not properly debugged yet)
-you'll need the following options as well...
-
-    CONFIG_DECNET_ROUTER (to be able to add/delete routes)
-    CONFIG_NETFILTER (will be required for the DECnet routing daemon)
-
-    CONFIG_DECNET_ROUTE_FWMARK is optional
-
-Don't turn on SIOCGIFCONF support for DECnet unless you are really sure
-that you need it, in general you won't and it can cause ifconfig to
-malfunction.
-
-Run time configuration has changed slightly from the 2.4 system. If you
-want to configure an endnode, then the simplified procedure is as follows:
-
- o Set the MAC address on your ethernet card before starting _any_ other
-   network protocols.
-
-As soon as your network card is brought into the UP state, DECnet should
-start working. If you need something more complicated or are unsure how
-to set the MAC address, see the next section. Also all configurations which
-worked with 2.4 will work under 2.5 with no change.
-
-3) Command line options
-
-You can set a DECnet address on the kernel command line for compatibility
-with the 2.4 configuration procedure, but in general it's not needed any more.
-If you do st a DECnet address on the command line, it has only one purpose
-which is that its added to the addresses on the loopback device.
-
-With 2.4 kernels, DECnet would only recognise addresses as local if they
-were added to the loopback device. In 2.5, any local interface address
-can be used to loop back to the local machine. Of course this does not
-prevent you adding further addresses to the loopback device if you
-want to.
-
-N.B. Since the address list of an interface determines the addresses for
-which "hello" messages are sent, if you don't set an address on the loopback
-interface then you won't see any entries in /proc/net/neigh for the local
-host until such time as you start a connection. This doesn't affect the
-operation of the local communications in any other way though.
-
-The kernel command line takes options looking like the following:
-
-    decnet.addr=1,2
-
-the two numbers are the node address 1,2 = 1.2 For 2.2.xx kernels
-and early 2.3.xx kernels, you must use a comma when specifying the
-DECnet address like this. For more recent 2.3.xx kernels, you may
-use almost any character except space, although a `.` would be the most
-obvious choice :-)
-
-There used to be a third number specifying the node type. This option
-has gone away in favour of a per interface node type. This is now set
-using /proc/sys/net/decnet/conf/<dev>/forwarding. This file can be
-set with a single digit, 0=EndNode, 1=L1 Router and  2=L2 Router.
-
-There are also equivalent options for modules. The node address can
-also be set through the /proc/sys/net/decnet/ files, as can other system
-parameters.
-
-Currently the only supported devices are ethernet and ip_gre. The
-ethernet address of your ethernet card has to be set according to the DECnet
-address of the node in order for it to be autoconfigured (and then appear in
-/proc/net/decnet_dev). There is a utility available at the above
-FTP sites called dn2ethaddr which can compute the correct ethernet
-address to use. The address can be set by ifconfig either before or
-at the time the device is brought up. If you are using RedHat you can
-add the line:
-
-    MACADDR=AA:00:04:00:03:04
-
-or something similar, to /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-eth0 or
-wherever your network card's configuration lives. Setting the MAC address
-of your ethernet card to an address starting with "hi-ord" will cause a
-DECnet address which matches to be added to the interface (which you can
-verify with iproute2).
-
-The default device for routing can be set through the /proc filesystem
-by setting /proc/sys/net/decnet/default_device to the
-device you want DECnet to route packets out of when no specific route
-is available. Usually this will be eth0, for example:
-
-    echo -n "eth0" >/proc/sys/net/decnet/default_device
-
-If you don't set the default device, then it will default to the first
-ethernet card which has been autoconfigured as described above. You can
-confirm that by looking in the default_device file of course.
-
-There is a list of what the other files under /proc/sys/net/decnet/ do
-on the kernel patch web site (shown above).
-
-4) Run time kernel configuration
-
-This is either done through the sysctl/proc interface (see the kernel web
-pages for details on what the various options do) or through the iproute2
-package in the same way as IPv4/6 configuration is performed.
-
-Documentation for iproute2 is included with the package, although there is
-as yet no specific section on DECnet, most of the features apply to both
-IP and DECnet, albeit with DECnet addresses instead of IP addresses and
-a reduced functionality.
-
-If you want to configure a DECnet router you'll need the iproute2 package
-since its the _only_ way to add and delete routes currently. Eventually
-there will be a routing daemon to send and receive routing messages for
-each interface and update the kernel routing tables accordingly. The
-routing daemon will use netfilter to listen to routing packets, and
-rtnetlink to update the kernels routing tables. 
-
-The DECnet raw socket layer has been removed since it was there purely
-for use by the routing daemon which will now use netfilter (a much cleaner
-and more generic solution) instead.
-
-5) How can I tell if its working ?
-
-Here is a quick guide of what to look for in order to know if your DECnet
-kernel subsystem is working.
-
-   - Is the node address set (see /proc/sys/net/decnet/node_address)
-   - Is the node of the correct type 
-                             (see /proc/sys/net/decnet/conf/<dev>/forwarding)
-   - Is the Ethernet MAC address of each Ethernet card set to match
-     the DECnet address. If in doubt use the dn2ethaddr utility available
-     at the ftp archive.
-   - If the previous two steps are satisfied, and the Ethernet card is up,
-     you should find that it is listed in /proc/net/decnet_dev and also
-     that it appears as a directory in /proc/sys/net/decnet/conf/. The
-     loopback device (lo) should also appear and is required to communicate
-     within a node.
-   - If you have any DECnet routers on your network, they should appear
-     in /proc/net/decnet_neigh, otherwise this file will only contain the
-     entry for the node itself (if it doesn't check to see if lo is up).
-   - If you want to send to any node which is not listed in the
-     /proc/net/decnet_neigh file, you'll need to set the default device
-     to point to an Ethernet card with connection to a router. This is
-     again done with the /proc/sys/net/decnet/default_device file.
-   - Try starting a simple server and client, like the dnping/dnmirror
-     over the loopback interface. With luck they should communicate.
-     For this step and those after, you'll need the DECnet library
-     which can be obtained from the above ftp sites as well as the
-     actual utilities themselves.
-   - If this seems to work, then try talking to a node on your local
-     network, and see if you can obtain the same results.
-   - At this point you are on your own... :-)
-
-6) How to send a bug report
-
-If you've found a bug and want to report it, then there are several things
-you can do to help me work out exactly what it is that is wrong. Useful
-information (_most_ of which _is_ _essential_) includes:
-
- - What kernel version are you running ?
- - What version of the patch are you running ?
- - How far though the above set of tests can you get ?
- - What is in the /proc/decnet* files and /proc/sys/net/decnet/* files ?
- - Which services are you running ?
- - Which client caused the problem ?
- - How much data was being transferred ?
- - Was the network congested ?
- - How can the problem be reproduced ?
- - Can you use tcpdump to get a trace ? (N.B. Most (all?) versions of 
-   tcpdump don't understand how to dump DECnet properly, so including
-   the hex listing of the packet contents is _essential_, usually the -x flag.
-   You may also need to increase the length grabbed with the -s flag. The
-   -e flag also provides very useful information (ethernet MAC addresses))
-
-7) MAC FAQ
-
-A quick FAQ on ethernet MAC addresses to explain how Linux and DECnet
-interact and how to get the best performance from your hardware. 
-
-Ethernet cards are designed to normally only pass received network frames 
-to a host computer when they are addressed to it, or to the broadcast address.
-
-Linux has an interface which allows the setting of extra addresses for
-an ethernet card to listen to. If the ethernet card supports it, the
-filtering operation will be done in hardware, if not the extra unwanted packets
-received will be discarded by the host computer. In the latter case,
-significant processor time and bus bandwidth can be used up on a busy
-network (see the NAPI documentation for a longer explanation of these
-effects).
-
-DECnet makes use of this interface to allow running DECnet on an ethernet 
-card which has already been configured using TCP/IP (presumably using the 
-built in MAC address of the card, as usual) and/or to allow multiple DECnet
-addresses on each physical interface. If you do this, be aware that if your
-ethernet card doesn't support perfect hashing in its MAC address filter
-then your computer will be doing more work than required. Some cards
-will simply set themselves into promiscuous mode in order to receive
-packets from the DECnet specified addresses. So if you have one of these
-cards its better to set the MAC address of the card as described above
-to gain the best efficiency. Better still is to use a card which supports
-NAPI as well.
-
-
-8) Mailing list
-
-If you are keen to get involved in development, or want to ask questions
-about configuration, or even just report bugs, then there is a mailing
-list that you can join, details are at:
-
-http://sourceforge.net/mail/?group_id=4993
-
-9) Legal Info
-
-The Linux DECnet project team have placed their code under the GPL. The
-software is provided "as is" and without warranty express or implied.
-DECnet is a trademark of Compaq. This software is not a product of
-Compaq. We acknowledge the help of people at Compaq in providing extra
-documentation above and beyond what was previously publicly available.
-
-Steve Whitehouse <SteveW@ACM.org>
-
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/networking/i40evf.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/networking/iavf.txt
similarity index 72%
rename from Documentation/networking/i40evf.txt
rename to Documentation/networking/iavf.txt
index e9b3035b95d0..cc902a2369d6 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/networking/i40evf.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/networking/iavf.txt
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Linux* Base Driver for Intel(R) Network Connection
 ==================================================
 
 Intel Ethernet Adaptive Virtual Function Linux driver.
-Copyright(c) 2013-2017 Intel Corporation.
+Copyright(c) 2013-2018 Intel Corporation.
 
 Contents
 ========
@@ -11,20 +11,21 @@ Contents
 - Known Issues/Troubleshooting
 - Support
 
-This file describes the i40evf Linux* Base Driver.
+This file describes the iavf Linux* Base Driver. This driver
+was formerly called i40evf.
 
-The i40evf driver supports the below mentioned virtual function
+The iavf driver supports the below mentioned virtual function
 devices and can only be activated on kernels running the i40e or
 newer Physical Function (PF) driver compiled with CONFIG_PCI_IOV.
-The i40evf driver requires CONFIG_PCI_MSI to be enabled.
+The iavf driver requires CONFIG_PCI_MSI to be enabled.
 
-The guest OS loading the i40evf driver must support MSI-X interrupts.
+The guest OS loading the iavf driver must support MSI-X interrupts.
 
 Supported Hardware
 ==================
 Intel XL710 X710 Virtual Function
-Intel Ethernet Adaptive Virtual Function
 Intel X722 Virtual Function
+Intel Ethernet Adaptive Virtual Function
 
 Identifying Your Adapter
 ========================
@@ -32,7 +33,8 @@ Identifying Your Adapter
 For more information on how to identify your adapter, go to the
 Adapter & Driver ID Guide at:
 
-    http://support.intel.com/support/go/network/adapter/idguide.htm
+    https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/support/articles/000005584/network-and-i-o/ethernet-products.html
+
 
 Known Issues/Troubleshooting
 ============================
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
index 960de8fe3f40..eb24b8137226 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
@@ -250,6 +250,14 @@ tcp_base_mss - INTEGER
 	Path MTU discovery (MTU probing).  If MTU probing is enabled,
 	this is the initial MSS used by the connection.
 
+tcp_min_snd_mss - INTEGER
+	TCP SYN and SYNACK messages usually advertise an ADVMSS option,
+	as described in RFC 1122 and RFC 6691.
+	If this ADVMSS option is smaller than tcp_min_snd_mss,
+	it is silently capped to tcp_min_snd_mss.
+
+	Default : 48 (at least 8 bytes of payload per segment)
+
 tcp_congestion_control - STRING
 	Set the congestion control algorithm to be used for new
 	connections. The algorithm "reno" is always available, but
@@ -410,6 +418,7 @@ tcp_min_rtt_wlen - INTEGER
 	minimum RTT when it is moved to a longer path (e.g., due to traffic
 	engineering). A longer window makes the filter more resistant to RTT
 	inflations such as transient congestion. The unit is seconds.
+	Possible values: 0 - 86400 (1 day)
 	Default: 300
 
 tcp_moderate_rcvbuf - BOOLEAN
@@ -801,7 +810,7 @@ cipso_cache_enable - BOOLEAN
 cipso_cache_bucket_size - INTEGER
 	The CIPSO label cache consists of a fixed size hash table with each
 	hash bucket containing a number of cache entries.  This variable limits
-	the number of entries in each hash bucket; the larger the value the
+	the number of entries in each hash bucket; the larger the value is, the
 	more CIPSO label mappings that can be cached.  When the number of
 	entries in a given hash bucket reaches this limit adding new entries
 	causes the oldest entry in the bucket to be removed to make room.
@@ -878,7 +887,7 @@ ip_nonlocal_bind - BOOLEAN
 	which can be quite useful - but may break some applications.
 	Default: 0
 
-ip_dynaddr - BOOLEAN
+ip_dynaddr - INTEGER
 	If set non-zero, enables support for dynamic addresses.
 	If set to a non-zero value larger than 1, a kernel log
 	message will be printed when dynamic address rewriting
@@ -925,12 +934,14 @@ icmp_ratelimit - INTEGER
 icmp_msgs_per_sec - INTEGER
 	Limit maximal number of ICMP packets sent per second from this host.
 	Only messages whose type matches icmp_ratemask (see below) are
-	controlled by this limit.
+	controlled by this limit. For security reasons, the precise count
+	of messages per second is randomized.
 	Default: 1000
 
 icmp_msgs_burst - INTEGER
 	icmp_msgs_per_sec controls number of ICMP packets sent per second,
 	while icmp_msgs_burst controls the burst size of these packets.
+	For security reasons, the precise burst size is randomized.
 	Default: 50
 
 icmp_ratemask - INTEGER
@@ -2159,7 +2170,14 @@ sctp_rmem - vector of 3 INTEGERs: min, default, max
 	Default: 4K
 
 sctp_wmem  - vector of 3 INTEGERs: min, default, max
-	Currently this tunable has no effect.
+	Only the first value ("min") is used, "default" and "max" are
+	ignored.
+
+	min: Minimum size of send buffer that can be used by SCTP sockets.
+	It is guaranteed to each SCTP socket (but not association) even
+	under moderate memory pressure.
+
+	Default: 4K
 
 addr_scope_policy - INTEGER
 	Control IPv4 address scoping - draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/networking/ipvs-sysctl.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/networking/ipvs-sysctl.txt
index 056898685d40..fc531c29a2e8 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/networking/ipvs-sysctl.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/networking/ipvs-sysctl.txt
@@ -30,8 +30,7 @@ conn_reuse_mode - INTEGER
 
 	0: disable any special handling on port reuse. The new
 	connection will be delivered to the same real server that was
-	servicing the previous connection. This will effectively
-	disable expire_nodest_conn.
+	servicing the previous connection.
 
 	bit 1: enable rescheduling of new connections when it is safe.
 	That is, whenever expire_nodest_conn and for TCP sockets, when
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/networking/nf_flowtable.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/networking/nf_flowtable.txt
index 54128c50d508..b01c91893481 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/networking/nf_flowtable.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/networking/nf_flowtable.txt
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ flowtable and add one rule to your forward chain.
 
         table inet x {
 		flowtable f {
-			hook ingress priority 0 devices = { eth0, eth1 };
+			hook ingress priority 0; devices = { eth0, eth1 };
 		}
                 chain y {
                         type filter hook forward priority 0; policy accept;
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/process/code-of-conduct-interpretation.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/process/code-of-conduct-interpretation.rst
index e899f14a4ba2..43da2cc2e3b9 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/process/code-of-conduct-interpretation.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/process/code-of-conduct-interpretation.rst
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ the Technical Advisory Board (TAB) or other maintainers if you're
 uncertain how to handle situations that come up.  It will not be
 considered a violation report unless you want it to be.  If you are
 uncertain about approaching the TAB or any other maintainers, please
-reach out to our conflict mediator, Mishi Choudhary <mishi@linux.com>.
+reach out to our conflict mediator, Joanna Lee <jlee@linuxfoundation.org>.
 
 In the end, "be kind to each other" is really what the end goal is for
 everybody.  We know everyone is human and we all fail at times, but the
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst
index 0de6f6145cc6..e5561d78bb63 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst
@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ Procedure for submitting patches to the -stable tree
  - If the patch covers files in net/ or drivers/net please follow netdev stable
    submission guidelines as described in
    :ref:`Documentation/networking/netdev-FAQ.rst <netdev-FAQ>`
+   after first checking the stable networking queue at
+   https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/bundle/davem/stable/?series=&submitter=&state=*&q=&archive=
+   to ensure the requested patch is not already queued up.
  - Security patches should not be handled (solely) by the -stable review
    process but should follow the procedures in
    :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst <securitybugs>`.
@@ -171,7 +174,16 @@ Trees
  - The finalized and tagged releases of all stable kernels can be found
    in separate branches per version at:
 
-	https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git
+	https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
+
+ - The release candidate of all stable kernel versions can be found at:
+
+        https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git/
+
+   .. warning::
+      The -stable-rc tree is a snapshot in time of the stable-queue tree and
+      will change frequently, hence will be rebased often. It should only be
+      used for testing purposes (e.g. to be consumed by CI systems).
 
 
 Review committee
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst
index c0917107b90a..3739c1ce686d 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ as you intend it to.
 
 The maintainer will thank you if you write your patch description in a
 form which can be easily pulled into Linux's source code management
-system, ``git``, as a "commit log".  See :ref:`explicit_in_reply_to`.
+system, ``git``, as a "commit log".  See :ref:`the_canonical_patch_format`.
 
 Solve only one problem per patch.  If your description starts to get
 long, that's a sign that you probably need to split up your patch.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/robust-futexes.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/robust-futexes.txt
index 6c42c75103eb..6361fb01c9c1 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/robust-futexes.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/robust-futexes.txt
@@ -218,5 +218,4 @@ All other architectures should build just fine too - but they won't have
 the new syscalls yet.
 
 Architectures need to implement the new futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic()
-inline function before writing up the syscalls (that function returns
--ENOSYS right now).
+inline function before writing up the syscalls.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/scheduler/sched-bwc.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/scheduler/sched-bwc.txt
index f6b1873f68ab..de583fbbfe42 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/scheduler/sched-bwc.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/scheduler/sched-bwc.txt
@@ -90,6 +90,51 @@ There are two ways in which a group may become throttled:
 In case b) above, even though the child may have runtime remaining it will not
 be allowed to until the parent's runtime is refreshed.
 
+CFS Bandwidth Quota Caveats
+---------------------------
+Once a slice is assigned to a cpu it does not expire.  However all but 1ms of
+the slice may be returned to the global pool if all threads on that cpu become
+unrunnable. This is configured at compile time by the min_cfs_rq_runtime
+variable. This is a performance tweak that helps prevent added contention on
+the global lock.
+
+The fact that cpu-local slices do not expire results in some interesting corner
+cases that should be understood.
+
+For cgroup cpu constrained applications that are cpu limited this is a
+relatively moot point because they will naturally consume the entirety of their
+quota as well as the entirety of each cpu-local slice in each period. As a
+result it is expected that nr_periods roughly equal nr_throttled, and that
+cpuacct.usage will increase roughly equal to cfs_quota_us in each period.
+
+For highly-threaded, non-cpu bound applications this non-expiration nuance
+allows applications to briefly burst past their quota limits by the amount of
+unused slice on each cpu that the task group is running on (typically at most
+1ms per cpu or as defined by min_cfs_rq_runtime).  This slight burst only
+applies if quota had been assigned to a cpu and then not fully used or returned
+in previous periods. This burst amount will not be transferred between cores.
+As a result, this mechanism still strictly limits the task group to quota
+average usage, albeit over a longer time window than a single period.  This
+also limits the burst ability to no more than 1ms per cpu.  This provides
+better more predictable user experience for highly threaded applications with
+small quota limits on high core count machines. It also eliminates the
+propensity to throttle these applications while simultanously using less than
+quota amounts of cpu. Another way to say this, is that by allowing the unused
+portion of a slice to remain valid across periods we have decreased the
+possibility of wastefully expiring quota on cpu-local silos that don't need a
+full slice's amount of cpu time.
+
+The interaction between cpu-bound and non-cpu-bound-interactive applications
+should also be considered, especially when single core usage hits 100%. If you
+gave each of these applications half of a cpu-core and they both got scheduled
+on the same CPU it is theoretically possible that the non-cpu bound application
+will use up to 1ms additional quota in some periods, thereby preventing the
+cpu-bound application from fully using its quota by that same amount. In these
+instances it will be up to the CFS algorithm (see sched-design-CFS.rst) to
+decide which application is chosen to run, as they will both be runnable and
+have remaining quota. This runtime discrepancy will be made up in the following
+periods when the interactive application idles.
+
 Examples
 --------
 1. Limit a group to 1 CPU worth of runtime.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/scheduler/sched-pelt.c linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/scheduler/sched-pelt.c
index e4219139386a..7238b355919c 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/scheduler/sched-pelt.c
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/scheduler/sched-pelt.c
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ void calc_runnable_avg_yN_inv(void)
 	int i;
 	unsigned int x;
 
-	printf("static const u32 runnable_avg_yN_inv[] = {");
+	/* To silence -Wunused-but-set-variable warnings. */
+	printf("static const u32 runnable_avg_yN_inv[] __maybe_unused = {");
 	for (i = 0; i < HALFLIFE; i++) {
 		x = ((1UL<<32)-1)*pow(y, i);
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sound/hd-audio/index.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sound/hd-audio/index.rst
index f8a72ffffe66..6e12de9fc34e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sound/hd-audio/index.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sound/hd-audio/index.rst
@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ HD-Audio
    models
    controls
    dp-mst
+   realtek-pc-beep
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sound/hd-audio/models.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sound/hd-audio/models.rst
index e06238131f77..5aa24f7b78ed 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sound/hd-audio/models.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sound/hd-audio/models.rst
@@ -216,8 +216,6 @@ alc298-dell-aio
     ALC298 fixups on Dell AIO machines
 alc275-dell-xps
     ALC275 fixups on Dell XPS models
-alc256-dell-xps13
-    ALC256 fixups on Dell XPS13
 lenovo-spk-noise
     Workaround for speaker noise on Lenovo machines
 lenovo-hotkey
@@ -693,7 +691,7 @@ ref
 no-jd
     BIOS setup but without jack-detection
 intel
-    Intel DG45* mobos
+    Intel D*45* mobos
 dell-m6-amic
     Dell desktops/laptops with analog mics
 dell-m6-dmic
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sound/hd-audio/realtek-pc-beep.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sound/hd-audio/realtek-pc-beep.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..be47c6f76a6e
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sound/hd-audio/realtek-pc-beep.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+===============================
+Realtek PC Beep Hidden Register
+===============================
+
+This file documents the "PC Beep Hidden Register", which is present in certain
+Realtek HDA codecs and controls a muxer and pair of passthrough mixers that can
+route audio between pins but aren't themselves exposed as HDA widgets. As far
+as I can tell, these hidden routes are designed to allow flexible PC Beep output
+for codecs that don't have mixer widgets in their output paths. Why it's easier
+to hide a mixer behind an undocumented vendor register than to just expose it
+as a widget, I have no idea.
+
+Register Description
+====================
+
+The register is accessed via processing coefficient 0x36 on NID 20h. Bits not
+identified below have no discernible effect on my machine, a Dell XPS 13 9350::
+
+  MSB                           LSB
+  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+  | |h|S|L|         | B |R|       | Known bits
+  +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
+  |0|0|1|1|  0x7  |0|0x0|1|  0x7  | Reset value
+  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+
+1Ah input select (B): 2 bits
+  When zero, expose the PC Beep line (from the internal beep generator, when
+  enabled with the Set Beep Generation verb on NID 01h, or else from the
+  external PCBEEP pin) on the 1Ah pin node. When nonzero, expose the headphone
+  jack (or possibly Line In on some machines) input instead. If PC Beep is
+  selected, the 1Ah boost control has no effect.
+
+Amplify 1Ah loopback, left (L): 1 bit
+  Amplify the left channel of 1Ah before mixing it into outputs as specified
+  by h and S bits. Does not affect the level of 1Ah exposed to other widgets.
+
+Amplify 1Ah loopback, right (R): 1 bit
+  Amplify the right channel of 1Ah before mixing it into outputs as specified
+  by h and S bits. Does not affect the level of 1Ah exposed to other widgets.
+
+Loopback 1Ah to 21h [active low] (h): 1 bit
+  When zero, mix 1Ah (possibly with amplification, depending on L and R bits)
+  into 21h (headphone jack on my machine). Mixed signal respects the mute
+  setting on 21h.
+
+Loopback 1Ah to 14h (S): 1 bit
+  When one, mix 1Ah (possibly with amplification, depending on L and R bits)
+  into 14h (internal speaker on my machine). Mixed signal **ignores** the mute
+  setting on 14h and is present whenever 14h is configured as an output.
+
+Path diagrams
+=============
+
+1Ah input selection (DIV is the PC Beep divider set on NID 01h)::
+
+  <Beep generator>   <PCBEEP pin>    <Headphone jack>
+          |                |                |
+          +--DIV--+--!DIV--+       {1Ah boost control}
+                  |                         |
+                  +--(b == 0)--+--(b != 0)--+
+                               |
+               >1Ah (Beep/Headphone Mic/Line In)<
+
+Loopback of 1Ah to 21h/14h::
+
+               <1Ah (Beep/Headphone Mic/Line In)>
+                               |
+                        {amplify if L/R}
+                               |
+                  +-----!h-----+-----S-----+
+                  |                        |
+          {21h mute control}               |
+                  |                        |
+          >21h (Headphone)<     >14h (Internal Speaker)<
+
+Background
+==========
+
+All Realtek HDA codecs have a vendor-defined widget with node ID 20h which
+provides access to a bank of registers that control various codec functions.
+Registers are read and written via the standard HDA processing coefficient
+verbs (Set/Get Coefficient Index, Set/Get Processing Coefficient). The node is
+named "Realtek Vendor Registers" in public datasheets' verb listings and,
+apart from that, is entirely undocumented.
+
+This particular register, exposed at coefficient 0x36 and named in commits from
+Realtek, is of note: unlike most registers, which seem to control detailed
+amplifier parameters not in scope of the HDA specification, it controls audio
+routing which could just as easily have been defined using standard HDA mixer
+and selector widgets.
+
+Specifically, it selects between two sources for the input pin widget with Node
+ID (NID) 1Ah: the widget's signal can come either from an audio jack (on my
+laptop, a Dell XPS 13 9350, it's the headphone jack, but comments in Realtek
+commits indicate that it might be a Line In on some machines) or from the PC
+Beep line (which is itself multiplexed between the codec's internal beep
+generator and external PCBEEP pin, depending on if the beep generator is
+enabled via verbs on NID 01h). Additionally, it can mix (with optional
+amplification) that signal onto the 21h and/or 14h output pins.
+
+The register's reset value is 0x3717, corresponding to PC Beep on 1Ah that is
+then amplified and mixed into both the headphones and the speakers. Not only
+does this violate the HDA specification, which says that "[a vendor defined
+beep input pin] connection may be maintained *only* while the Link reset
+(**RST#**) is asserted", it means that we cannot ignore the register if we care
+about the input that 1Ah would otherwise expose or if the PCBEEP trace is
+poorly shielded and picks up chassis noise (both of which are the case on my
+machine).
+
+Unfortunately, there are lots of ways to get this register configuration wrong.
+Linux, it seems, has gone through most of them. For one, the register resets
+after S3 suspend: judging by existing code, this isn't the case for all vendor
+registers, and it's led to some fixes that improve behavior on cold boot but
+don't last after suspend. Other fixes have successfully switched the 1Ah input
+away from PC Beep but have failed to disable both loopback paths. On my
+machine, this means that the headphone input is amplified and looped back to
+the headphone output, which uses the exact same pins! As you might expect, this
+causes terrible headphone noise, the character of which is controlled by the
+1Ah boost control. (If you've seen instructions online to fix XPS 13 headphone
+noise by changing "Headphone Mic Boost" in ALSA, now you know why.)
+
+The information here has been obtained through black-box reverse engineering of
+the ALC256 codec's behavior and is not guaranteed to be correct. It likely
+also applies for the ALC255, ALC257, ALC235, and ALC236, since those codecs
+seem to be close relatives of the ALC256. (They all share one initialization
+function.) Additionally, other codecs like the ALC225 and ALC285 also have this
+register, judging by existing fixups in ``patch_realtek.c``, but specific
+data (e.g. node IDs, bit positions, pin mappings) for those codecs may differ
+from what I've described here.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sound/soc/dapm.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sound/soc/dapm.rst
index 8e44107933ab..c3154ce6e1b2 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sound/soc/dapm.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sound/soc/dapm.rst
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ corresponding soft power control. In this case it is necessary to create
 a virtual widget - a widget with no control bits e.g.
 ::
 
-  SND_SOC_DAPM_MIXER("AC97 Mixer", SND_SOC_DAPM_NOPM, 0, 0, NULL, 0),
+  SND_SOC_DAPM_MIXER("AC97 Mixer", SND_SOC_NOPM, 0, 0, NULL, 0),
 
 This can be used to merge to signal paths together in software.
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/kerneldoc.py linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/kerneldoc.py
index 9d0a7f08f93b..1159405cb920 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/kerneldoc.py
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/kerneldoc.py
@@ -37,7 +37,19 @@ import glob
 from docutils import nodes, statemachine
 from docutils.statemachine import ViewList
 from docutils.parsers.rst import directives, Directive
-from sphinx.ext.autodoc import AutodocReporter
+
+#
+# AutodocReporter is only good up to Sphinx 1.7
+#
+import sphinx
+
+Use_SSI = sphinx.__version__[:3] >= '1.7'
+if Use_SSI:
+    from sphinx.util.docutils import switch_source_input
+else:
+    from sphinx.ext.autodoc import AutodocReporter
+
+import kernellog
 
 __version__  = '1.0'
 
@@ -90,7 +102,8 @@ class KernelDocDirective(Directive):
         cmd += [filename]
 
         try:
-            env.app.verbose('calling kernel-doc \'%s\'' % (" ".join(cmd)))
+            kernellog.verbose(env.app,
+                              'calling kernel-doc \'%s\'' % (" ".join(cmd)))
 
             p = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)
             out, err = p.communicate()
@@ -100,7 +113,8 @@ class KernelDocDirective(Directive):
             if p.returncode != 0:
                 sys.stderr.write(err)
 
-                env.app.warn('kernel-doc \'%s\' failed with return code %d' % (" ".join(cmd), p.returncode))
+                kernellog.warn(env.app,
+                               'kernel-doc \'%s\' failed with return code %d' % (" ".join(cmd), p.returncode))
                 return [nodes.error(None, nodes.paragraph(text = "kernel-doc missing"))]
             elif env.config.kerneldoc_verbosity > 0:
                 sys.stderr.write(err)
@@ -121,20 +135,28 @@ class KernelDocDirective(Directive):
                     lineoffset += 1
 
             node = nodes.section()
-            buf = self.state.memo.title_styles, self.state.memo.section_level, self.state.memo.reporter
+            self.do_parse(result, node)
+
+            return node.children
+
+        except Exception as e:  # pylint: disable=W0703
+            kernellog.warn(env.app, 'kernel-doc \'%s\' processing failed with: %s' %
+                           (" ".join(cmd), str(e)))
+            return [nodes.error(None, nodes.paragraph(text = "kernel-doc missing"))]
+
+    def do_parse(self, result, node):
+        if Use_SSI:
+            with switch_source_input(self.state, result):
+                self.state.nested_parse(result, 0, node, match_titles=1)
+        else:
+            save = self.state.memo.title_styles, self.state.memo.section_level, self.state.memo.reporter
             self.state.memo.reporter = AutodocReporter(result, self.state.memo.reporter)
             self.state.memo.title_styles, self.state.memo.section_level = [], 0
             try:
                 self.state.nested_parse(result, 0, node, match_titles=1)
             finally:
-                self.state.memo.title_styles, self.state.memo.section_level, self.state.memo.reporter = buf
+                self.state.memo.title_styles, self.state.memo.section_level, self.state.memo.reporter = save
 
-            return node.children
-
-        except Exception as e:  # pylint: disable=W0703
-            env.app.warn('kernel-doc \'%s\' processing failed with: %s' %
-                         (" ".join(cmd), str(e)))
-            return [nodes.error(None, nodes.paragraph(text = "kernel-doc missing"))]
 
 def setup(app):
     app.add_config_value('kerneldoc_bin', None, 'env')
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/kernellog.py linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/kernellog.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..af924f51a7dc
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/kernellog.py
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Sphinx has deprecated its older logging interface, but the replacement
+# only goes back to 1.6.  So here's a wrapper layer to keep around for
+# as long as we support 1.4.
+#
+import sphinx
+
+if sphinx.__version__[:3] >= '1.6':
+    UseLogging = True
+    from sphinx.util import logging
+    logger = logging.getLogger('kerneldoc')
+else:
+    UseLogging = False
+
+def warn(app, message):
+    if UseLogging:
+        logger.warning(message)
+    else:
+        app.warn(message)
+
+def verbose(app, message):
+    if UseLogging:
+        logger.verbose(message)
+    else:
+        app.verbose(message)
+
+
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/kfigure.py linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/kfigure.py
index b97228d2cc0e..fbfe6693bb60 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/kfigure.py
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/kfigure.py
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ import sphinx
 from sphinx.util.nodes import clean_astext
 from six import iteritems
 
+import kernellog
+
 PY3 = sys.version_info[0] == 3
 
 if PY3:
@@ -171,20 +173,20 @@ def setupTools(app):
     This function is called once, when the builder is initiated.
     """
     global dot_cmd, convert_cmd   # pylint: disable=W0603
-    app.verbose("kfigure: check installed tools ...")
+    kernellog.verbose(app, "kfigure: check installed tools ...")
 
     dot_cmd = which('dot')
     convert_cmd = which('convert')
 
     if dot_cmd:
-        app.verbose("use dot(1) from: " + dot_cmd)
+        kernellog.verbose(app, "use dot(1) from: " + dot_cmd)
     else:
-        app.warn("dot(1) not found, for better output quality install "
-                 "graphviz from http://www.graphviz.org")
+        kernellog.warn(app, "dot(1) not found, for better output quality install "
+                       "graphviz from http://www.graphviz.org")
     if convert_cmd:
-        app.verbose("use convert(1) from: " + convert_cmd)
+        kernellog.verbose(app, "use convert(1) from: " + convert_cmd)
     else:
-        app.warn(
+        kernellog.warn(app,
             "convert(1) not found, for SVG to PDF conversion install "
             "ImageMagick (https://www.imagemagick.org)")
 
@@ -220,12 +222,13 @@ def convert_image(img_node, translator, src_fname=None):
 
     # in kernel builds, use 'make SPHINXOPTS=-v' to see verbose messages
 
-    app.verbose('assert best format for: ' + img_node['uri'])
+    kernellog.verbose(app, 'assert best format for: ' + img_node['uri'])
 
     if in_ext == '.dot':
 
         if not dot_cmd:
-            app.verbose("dot from graphviz not available / include DOT raw.")
+            kernellog.verbose(app,
+                              "dot from graphviz not available / include DOT raw.")
             img_node.replace_self(file2literal(src_fname))
 
         elif translator.builder.format == 'latex':
@@ -252,7 +255,8 @@ def convert_image(img_node, translator, src_fname=None):
 
         if translator.builder.format == 'latex':
             if convert_cmd is None:
-                app.verbose("no SVG to PDF conversion available / include SVG raw.")
+                kernellog.verbose(app,
+                                  "no SVG to PDF conversion available / include SVG raw.")
                 img_node.replace_self(file2literal(src_fname))
             else:
                 dst_fname = path.join(translator.builder.outdir, fname + '.pdf')
@@ -265,18 +269,19 @@ def convert_image(img_node, translator, src_fname=None):
         _name = dst_fname[len(translator.builder.outdir) + 1:]
 
         if isNewer(dst_fname, src_fname):
-            app.verbose("convert: {out}/%s already exists and is newer" % _name)
+            kernellog.verbose(app,
+                              "convert: {out}/%s already exists and is newer" % _name)
 
         else:
             ok = False
             mkdir(path.dirname(dst_fname))
 
             if in_ext == '.dot':
-                app.verbose('convert DOT to: {out}/' + _name)
+                kernellog.verbose(app, 'convert DOT to: {out}/' + _name)
                 ok = dot2format(app, src_fname, dst_fname)
 
             elif in_ext == '.svg':
-                app.verbose('convert SVG to: {out}/' + _name)
+                kernellog.verbose(app, 'convert SVG to: {out}/' + _name)
                 ok = svg2pdf(app, src_fname, dst_fname)
 
             if not ok:
@@ -305,7 +310,8 @@ def dot2format(app, dot_fname, out_fname):
     with open(out_fname, "w") as out:
         exit_code = subprocess.call(cmd, stdout = out)
         if exit_code != 0:
-            app.warn("Error #%d when calling: %s" % (exit_code, " ".join(cmd)))
+            kernellog.warn(app,
+                          "Error #%d when calling: %s" % (exit_code, " ".join(cmd)))
     return bool(exit_code == 0)
 
 def svg2pdf(app, svg_fname, pdf_fname):
@@ -322,7 +328,7 @@ def svg2pdf(app, svg_fname, pdf_fname):
     # use stdout and stderr from parent
     exit_code = subprocess.call(cmd)
     if exit_code != 0:
-        app.warn("Error #%d when calling: %s" % (exit_code, " ".join(cmd)))
+        kernellog.warn(app, "Error #%d when calling: %s" % (exit_code, " ".join(cmd)))
     return bool(exit_code == 0)
 
 
@@ -415,15 +421,15 @@ def visit_kernel_render(self, node):
     app = self.builder.app
     srclang = node.get('srclang')
 
-    app.verbose('visit kernel-render node lang: "%s"' % (srclang))
+    kernellog.verbose(app, 'visit kernel-render node lang: "%s"' % (srclang))
 
     tmp_ext = RENDER_MARKUP_EXT.get(srclang, None)
     if tmp_ext is None:
-        app.warn('kernel-render: "%s" unknown / include raw.' % (srclang))
+        kernellog.warn(app, 'kernel-render: "%s" unknown / include raw.' % (srclang))
         return
 
     if not dot_cmd and tmp_ext == '.dot':
-        app.verbose("dot from graphviz not available / include raw.")
+        kernellog.verbose(app, "dot from graphviz not available / include raw.")
         return
 
     literal_block = node[0]
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/load_config.py linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/load_config.py
index 301a21aa4f63..4c9cdcb71c2c 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/load_config.py
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/load_config.py
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 
 import os
 import sys
-from sphinx.util.pycompat import execfile_
+from sphinx.util.osutil import fs_encoding
 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 def loadConfig(namespace):
@@ -25,7 +25,9 @@ def loadConfig(namespace):
             sys.stdout.write("load additional sphinx-config: %s\n" % config_file)
             config = namespace.copy()
             config['__file__'] = config_file
-            execfile_(config_file, config)
+            with open(config_file, 'rb') as f:
+                code = compile(f.read(), fs_encoding, 'exec')
+                exec(code, config)
             del config['__file__']
             namespace.update(config)
         else:
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/parse-headers.pl linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/parse-headers.pl
index c518050ffc3f..0dcf369ab904 100755
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/parse-headers.pl
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sphinx/parse-headers.pl
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/usr/bin/perl
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
 use strict;
 use Text::Tabs;
 use Getopt::Long;
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 37a679501ddc..c8d3dbda3c1e 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
 - msgmnb
 - msgmni
 - nmi_watchdog
+- oops_limit
 - osrelease
 - ostype
 - overflowgid
@@ -94,7 +95,9 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
 - sysctl_writes_strict
 - tainted
 - threads-max
+- unprivileged_bpf_disabled
 - unknown_nmi_panic
+- warn_limit
 - watchdog
 - watchdog_thresh
 - version
@@ -554,6 +557,15 @@ scanned for a given scan.
 
 ==============================================================
 
+oops_limit:
+
+Number of kernel oopses after which the kernel should panic when
+``panic_on_oops`` is not set. Setting this to 0 disables checking
+the count. Setting this to  1 has the same effect as setting
+``panic_on_oops=1``. The default value is 10000.
+
+==============================================================
+
 osrelease, ostype & version:
 
 # cat osrelease
@@ -820,9 +832,40 @@ The kernel command line parameter printk.devkmsg= overrides this and is
 a one-time setting until next reboot: once set, it cannot be changed by
 this sysctl interface anymore.
 
-==============================================================
+pty
+===
+
+See Documentation/filesystems/devpts.rst.
+
+
+random
+======
+
+This is a directory, with the following entries:
+
+* ``boot_id``: a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and
+  unvarying after that;
+
+* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
+  thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
+
+* ``entropy_avail``: the pool's entropy count, in bits;
+
+* ``poolsize``: the entropy pool size, in bits;
+
+* ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum
+  number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is
+  writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect
+  on any RNG behavior;
 
-randomize_va_space:
+* ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this
+  (as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random``
+  are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but
+  writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior.
+
+
+randomize_va_space
+==================
 
 This option can be used to select the type of process address
 space randomization that is used in the system, for architectures
@@ -1041,6 +1084,26 @@ available RAM pages threads-max is reduced accordingly.
 
 ==============================================================
 
+unprivileged_bpf_disabled:
+
+Writing 1 to this entry will disable unprivileged calls to bpf();
+once disabled, calling bpf() without CAP_SYS_ADMIN will return
+-EPERM. Once set to 1, this can't be cleared from the running kernel
+anymore.
+
+Writing 2 to this entry will also disable unprivileged calls to bpf(),
+however, an admin can still change this setting later on, if needed, by
+writing 0 or 1 to this entry.
+
+If BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF is enabled in the kernel config, then this
+entry will default to 2 instead of 0.
+
+  0 - Unprivileged calls to bpf() are enabled
+  1 - Unprivileged calls to bpf() are disabled without recovery
+  2 - Unprivileged calls to bpf() are disabled
+
+==============================================================
+
 unknown_nmi_panic:
 
 The value in this file affects behavior of handling NMI. When the
@@ -1052,6 +1115,15 @@ example.  If a system hangs up, try pressing the NMI switch.
 
 ==============================================================
 
+warn_limit:
+
+Number of kernel warnings after which the kernel should panic when
+``panic_on_warn`` is not set. Setting this to 0 disables checking
+the warning count. Setting this to 1 has the same effect as setting
+``panic_on_warn=1``. The default value is 0.
+
+==============================================================
+
 watchdog:
 
 This parameter can be used to disable or enable the soft lockup detector
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sysctl/net.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sysctl/net.txt
index 9ecde517728c..57e08f16b4e3 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/sysctl/net.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/sysctl/net.txt
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ Table : Subdirectories in /proc/sys/net
  ethernet  Ethernet protocol   rose       X.25 PLP layer
  ipv4      IP version 4        x25        X.25 protocol
  ipx       IPX                 token-ring IBM token ring
- bridge    Bridging            decnet     DEC net
  ipv6      IP version 6        tipc       TIPC
 ..............................................................................
 
@@ -92,6 +91,14 @@ Values :
 	0 - disable JIT kallsyms export (default value)
 	1 - enable JIT kallsyms export for privileged users only
 
+bpf_jit_limit
+-------------
+
+This enforces a global limit for memory allocations to the BPF JIT
+compiler in order to reject unprivileged JIT requests once it has
+been surpassed. bpf_jit_limit contains the value of the global limit
+in bytes.
+
 dev_weight
 --------------
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/target/tcm_mod_builder.py linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/target/tcm_mod_builder.py
index 94bf6944bb1e..7e79ff6b09e0 100755
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/target/tcm_mod_builder.py
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/target/tcm_mod_builder.py
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/usr/bin/python
+#!/usr/bin/env python
 # The TCM v4 multi-protocol fabric module generation script for drivers/target/$NEW_MOD
 #
 # Copyright (c) 2010 Rising Tide Systems
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/trace/histogram.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/trace/histogram.rst
index 5ac724baea7d..d2849713d37b 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/trace/histogram.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/trace/histogram.rst
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Documentation written by Tom Zanussi
   will use the event's kernel stacktrace as the key.  The keywords
   'keys' or 'key' can be used to specify keys, and the keywords
   'values', 'vals', or 'val' can be used to specify values.  Compound
-  keys consisting of up to two fields can be specified by the 'keys'
+  keys consisting of up to three fields can be specified by the 'keys'
   keyword.  Hashing a compound key produces a unique entry in the
   table for each unique combination of component keys, and can be
   useful for providing more fine-grained summaries of event data.
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ Documentation written by Tom Zanussi
                                 with the event, in nanoseconds.  May be
 			        modified by .usecs to have timestamps
 			        interpreted as microseconds.
-    cpu                    int  the cpu on which the event occurred.
+    common_cpu             int  the cpu on which the event occurred.
     ====================== ==== =======================================
 
 Extended error information
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/trace/postprocess/decode_msr.py linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/trace/postprocess/decode_msr.py
index 0ab40e0db580..aa9cc7abd5c2 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/trace/postprocess/decode_msr.py
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/trace/postprocess/decode_msr.py
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/usr/bin/python
+#!/usr/bin/env python
 # add symbolic names to read_msr / write_msr in trace
 # decode_msr msr-index.h < trace
 import sys
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/trace/postprocess/trace-pagealloc-postprocess.pl linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/trace/postprocess/trace-pagealloc-postprocess.pl
index 0a120aae33ce..b9b7d80c2f9d 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/trace/postprocess/trace-pagealloc-postprocess.pl
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/trace/postprocess/trace-pagealloc-postprocess.pl
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/usr/bin/perl
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
 # This is a POC (proof of concept or piece of crap, take your pick) for reading the
 # text representation of trace output related to page allocation. It makes an attempt
 # to extract some high-level information on what is going on. The accuracy of the parser
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/trace/postprocess/trace-vmscan-postprocess.pl linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/trace/postprocess/trace-vmscan-postprocess.pl
index 66bfd8396877..9efcf5ed8cb5 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/trace/postprocess/trace-vmscan-postprocess.pl
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/trace/postprocess/trace-vmscan-postprocess.pl
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/usr/bin/perl
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
 # This is a POC for reading the text representation of trace output related to
 # page reclaim. It makes an attempt to extract some high-level information on
 # what is going on. The accuracy of the parser may vary
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/usb/rio.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/usb/rio.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index aee715af7db7..000000000000
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/usb/rio.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-Copyright (C) 1999, 2000 Bruce Tenison
-Portions Copyright (C) 1999, 2000 David Nelson
-Thanks to David Nelson for guidance and the usage of the scanner.txt
-and scanner.c files to model our driver and this informative file.
-
-Mar. 2, 2000
-
-CHANGES
-
-- Initial Revision
-
-
-OVERVIEW
-
-This README will address issues regarding how to configure the kernel
-to access a RIO 500 mp3 player.  
-Before I explain how to use this to access the Rio500 please be warned:
-
-W A R N I N G:
---------------
-
-Please note that this software is still under development.  The authors
-are in no way responsible for any damage that may occur, no matter how
-inconsequential.
-
-It seems that the Rio has a problem when sending .mp3 with low batteries.
-I suggest when the batteries are low and you want to transfer stuff that you
-replace it with a fresh one. In my case, what happened is I lost two 16kb
-blocks (they are no longer usable to store information to it). But I don't
-know if that's normal or not; it could simply be a problem with the flash 
-memory.
-
-In an extreme case, I left my Rio playing overnight and the batteries wore 
-down to nothing and appear to have corrupted the flash memory. My RIO 
-needed to be replaced as a result.  Diamond tech support is aware of the 
-problem.  Do NOT allow your batteries to wear down to nothing before 
-changing them.  It appears RIO 500 firmware does not handle low battery 
-power well at all. 
-
-On systems with OHCI controllers, the kernel OHCI code appears to have 
-power on problems with some chipsets.  If you are having problems 
-connecting to your RIO 500, try turning it on first and then plugging it 
-into the USB cable.  
-
-Contact information:
---------------------
-
-   The main page for the project is hosted at sourceforge.net in the following
-   URL: <http://rio500.sourceforge.net>. You can also go to the project's
-   sourceforge home page at: <http://sourceforge.net/projects/rio500/>.
-   There is also a mailing list: rio500-users@lists.sourceforge.net
-
-Authors:
--------
-
-Most of the code was written by Cesar Miquel <miquel@df.uba.ar>. Keith 
-Clayton <kclayton@jps.net> is incharge of the PPC port and making sure
-things work there. Bruce Tenison <btenison@dibbs.net> is adding support
-for .fon files and also does testing. The program will mostly sure be
-re-written and Pete Ikusz along with the rest will re-design it. I would
-also like to thank Tri Nguyen <tmn_3022000@hotmail.com> who provided use 
-with some important information regarding the communication with the Rio.
-
-ADDITIONAL INFORMATION and Userspace tools
-
-http://rio500.sourceforge.net/
-
-
-REQUIREMENTS
-
-A host with a USB port.  Ideally, either a UHCI (Intel) or OHCI
-(Compaq and others) hardware port should work.
-
-A Linux development kernel (2.3.x) with USB support enabled or a
-backported version to linux-2.2.x.  See http://www.linux-usb.org for
-more information on accomplishing this.
-
-A Linux kernel with RIO 500 support enabled.
-
-'lspci' which is only needed to determine the type of USB hardware
-available in your machine.
-
-CONFIGURATION
-
-Using `lspci -v`, determine the type of USB hardware available.
-
-  If you see something like:
-
-    USB Controller: ......
-    Flags: .....
-    I/O ports at ....
-
-  Then you have a UHCI based controller.
-
-  If you see something like:
-
-     USB Controller: .....
-     Flags: ....
-     Memory at .....
-
-  Then you have a OHCI based controller.
-
-Using `make menuconfig` or your preferred method for configuring the
-kernel, select 'Support for USB', 'OHCI/UHCI' depending on your
-hardware (determined from the steps above), 'USB Diamond Rio500 support', and
-'Preliminary USB device filesystem'.  Compile and install the modules
-(you may need to execute `depmod -a` to update the module
-dependencies).
-
-Add a device for the USB rio500:
-  `mknod /dev/usb/rio500 c 180 64`
-
-Set appropriate permissions for /dev/usb/rio500 (don't forget about
-group and world permissions).  Both read and write permissions are
-required for proper operation.
-
-Load the appropriate modules (if compiled as modules):
-
-  OHCI:
-    modprobe usbcore
-    modprobe usb-ohci
-    modprobe rio500
-
-  UHCI:
-    modprobe usbcore
-    modprobe usb-uhci  (or uhci)
-    modprobe rio500
-
-That's it.  The Rio500 Utils at: http://rio500.sourceforge.net should
-be able to access the rio500.
-
-BUGS
-
-If you encounter any problems feel free to drop me an email.
-
-Bruce Tenison
-btenison@dibbs.net
-
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
index 32f3d55c54b7..0fda8f614110 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is
 available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
 misfeature will fail.
 
+.. _set_spec_ctrl:
+
 PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
 -----------------------
 
@@ -92,3 +94,12 @@ Speculation misfeature controls
    * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
    * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
    * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+
+- PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH: Indirect Branch Speculation in User Processes
+                        (Mitigate Spectre V2 style attacks against user processes)
+
+  Invocations:
+   * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
index 647f94128a85..d2f265a9dc0d 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ of a virtual machine.  The ioctls belong to three classes
 
  - VM ioctls: These query and set attributes that affect an entire virtual
    machine, for example memory layout.  In addition a VM ioctl is used to
-   create virtual cpus (vcpus).
+   create virtual cpus (vcpus) and devices.
 
    Only run VM ioctls from the same process (address space) that was used
    to create the VM.
@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ of a virtual machine.  The ioctls belong to three classes
    Only run vcpu ioctls from the same thread that was used to create the
    vcpu.
 
+ - device ioctls: These query and set attributes that control the operation
+   of a single device.
+
+   device ioctls must be issued from the same process (address space) that
+   was used to create the VM.
 
 2. File descriptors
 -------------------
@@ -32,10 +37,11 @@ The kvm API is centered around file descriptors.  An initial
 open("/dev/kvm") obtains a handle to the kvm subsystem; this handle
 can be used to issue system ioctls.  A KVM_CREATE_VM ioctl on this
 handle will create a VM file descriptor which can be used to issue VM
-ioctls.  A KVM_CREATE_VCPU ioctl on a VM fd will create a virtual cpu
-and return a file descriptor pointing to it.  Finally, ioctls on a vcpu
-fd can be used to control the vcpu, including the important task of
-actually running guest code.
+ioctls.  A KVM_CREATE_VCPU or KVM_CREATE_DEVICE ioctl on a VM fd will
+create a virtual cpu or device and return a file descriptor pointing to
+the new resource.  Finally, ioctls on a vcpu or device fd can be used
+to control the vcpu or device.  For vcpus, this includes the important
+task of actually running guest code.
 
 In general file descriptors can be migrated among processes by means
 of fork() and the SCM_RIGHTS facility of unix domain socket.  These
@@ -3993,9 +3999,11 @@ EOI was received.
 #define KVM_EXIT_HYPERV_SYNIC          1
 #define KVM_EXIT_HYPERV_HCALL          2
 			__u32 type;
+			__u32 pad1;
 			union {
 				struct {
 					__u32 msr;
+					__u32 pad2;
 					__u64 control;
 					__u64 evt_page;
 					__u64 msg_page;
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/virtual/kvm/locking.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/virtual/kvm/locking.txt
index 1bb8bcaf8497..635cd6eaf714 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/virtual/kvm/locking.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/virtual/kvm/locking.txt
@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ The acquisition orders for mutexes are as follows:
 
 On x86, vcpu->mutex is taken outside kvm->arch.hyperv.hv_lock.
 
-For spinlocks, kvm_lock is taken outside kvm->mmu_lock.
-
 Everything else is a leaf: no other lock is taken inside the critical
 sections.
 
@@ -169,7 +167,7 @@ which time it will be set using the Dirty tracking mechanism described above.
 ------------
 
 Name:		kvm_lock
-Type:		spinlock_t
+Type:		mutex
 Arch:		any
 Protects:	- vm_list
 
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt
index e507a9e0421e..851a8abcadce 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt
@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ Shadow pages contain the following information:
     shadow pages) so role.quadrant takes values in the range 0..3.  Each
     quadrant maps 1GB virtual address space.
   role.access:
-    Inherited guest access permissions in the form uwx.  Note execute
-    permission is positive, not negative.
+    Inherited guest access permissions from the parent ptes in the form uwx.
+    Note execute permission is positive, not negative.
   role.invalid:
     The page is invalid and should not be used.  It is a root page that is
     currently pinned (by a cpu hardware register pointing to it); once it is
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/vm/slub.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/vm/slub.rst
index 3a775fd64e2d..3602959d5f92 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/vm/slub.rst
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/vm/slub.rst
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ SLUB Debug output
 Here is a sample of slub debug output::
 
  ====================================================================
- BUG kmalloc-8: Redzone overwritten
+ BUG kmalloc-8: Right Redzone overwritten
  --------------------------------------------------------------------
 
  INFO: 0xc90f6d28-0xc90f6d2b. First byte 0x00 instead of 0xcc
@@ -162,10 +162,10 @@ Here is a sample of slub debug output::
  INFO: Object 0xc90f6d20 @offset=3360 fp=0xc90f6d58
  INFO: Allocated in get_modalias+0x61/0xf5 age=53 cpu=1 pid=554
 
- Bytes b4 0xc90f6d10:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ........ZZZZZZZZ
-   Object 0xc90f6d20:  31 30 31 39 2e 30 30 35                         1019.005
-  Redzone 0xc90f6d28:  00 cc cc cc                                     .
-  Padding 0xc90f6d50:  5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a                         ZZZZZZZZ
+ Bytes b4 (0xc90f6d10): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ........ZZZZZZZZ
+ Object   (0xc90f6d20): 31 30 31 39 2e 30 30 35                         1019.005
+ Redzone  (0xc90f6d28): 00 cc cc cc                                     .
+ Padding  (0xc90f6d50): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a                         ZZZZZZZZ
 
    [<c010523d>] dump_trace+0x63/0x1eb
    [<c01053df>] show_trace_log_lvl+0x1a/0x2f
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/x86/conf.py linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/x86/conf.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..33c5c3142e20
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/x86/conf.py
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# -*- coding: utf-8; mode: python -*-
+
+project = "X86 architecture specific documentation"
+
+tags.add("subproject")
+
+latex_documents = [
+    ('index', 'x86.tex', project,
+     'The kernel development community', 'manual'),
+]
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/x86/index.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/x86/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0780d55c5aa8
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/x86/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+==========================
+x86 architecture specifics
+==========================
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 1
+
+   mds
+   tsx_async_abort
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/x86/mds.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5d4330be200f
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) mitigation
+=================================================
+
+.. _mds:
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a family of side channel attacks
+on internal buffers in Intel CPUs. The variants are:
+
+ - Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) (CVE-2018-12126)
+ - Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (MFBDS) (CVE-2018-12130)
+ - Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (MLPDS) (CVE-2018-12127)
+ - Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory (MDSUM) (CVE-2019-11091)
+
+MSBDS leaks Store Buffer Entries which can be speculatively forwarded to a
+dependent load (store-to-load forwarding) as an optimization. The forward
+can also happen to a faulting or assisting load operation for a different
+memory address, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Store
+buffers are partitioned between Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is
+not possible. But if a thread enters or exits a sleep state the store
+buffer is repartitioned which can expose data from one thread to the other.
+
+MFBDS leaks Fill Buffer Entries. Fill buffers are used internally to manage
+L1 miss situations and to hold data which is returned or sent in response
+to a memory or I/O operation. Fill buffers can forward data to a load
+operation and also write data to the cache. When the fill buffer is
+deallocated it can retain the stale data of the preceding operations which
+can then be forwarded to a faulting or assisting load operation, which can
+be exploited under certain conditions. Fill buffers are shared between
+Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible.
+
+MLPDS leaks Load Port Data. Load ports are used to perform load operations
+from memory or I/O. The received data is then forwarded to the register
+file or a subsequent operation. In some implementations the Load Port can
+contain stale data from a previous operation which can be forwarded to
+faulting or assisting loads under certain conditions, which again can be
+exploited eventually. Load ports are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross
+thread leakage is possible.
+
+MDSUM is a special case of MSBDS, MFBDS and MLPDS. An uncacheable load from
+memory that takes a fault or assist can leave data in a microarchitectural
+structure that may later be observed using one of the same methods used by
+MSBDS, MFBDS or MLPDS.
+
+Exposure assumptions
+--------------------
+
+It is assumed that attack code resides in user space or in a guest with one
+exception. The rationale behind this assumption is that the code construct
+needed for exploiting MDS requires:
+
+ - to control the load to trigger a fault or assist
+
+ - to have a disclosure gadget which exposes the speculatively accessed
+   data for consumption through a side channel.
+
+ - to control the pointer through which the disclosure gadget exposes the
+   data
+
+The existence of such a construct in the kernel cannot be excluded with
+100% certainty, but the complexity involved makes it extremly unlikely.
+
+There is one exception, which is untrusted BPF. The functionality of
+untrusted BPF is limited, but it needs to be thoroughly investigated
+whether it can be used to create such a construct.
+
+
+Mitigation strategy
+-------------------
+
+All variants have the same mitigation strategy at least for the single CPU
+thread case (SMT off): Force the CPU to clear the affected buffers.
+
+This is achieved by using the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW
+instruction in combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears
+the affected CPU buffers when the VERW instruction is executed.
+
+For virtualization there are two ways to achieve CPU buffer
+clearing. Either the modified VERW instruction or via the L1D Flush
+command. The latter is issued when L1TF mitigation is enabled so the extra
+VERW can be avoided. If the CPU is not affected by L1TF then VERW needs to
+be issued.
+
+If the VERW instruction with the supplied segment selector argument is
+executed on a CPU without the microcode update there is no side effect
+other than a small number of pointlessly wasted CPU cycles.
+
+This does not protect against cross Hyper-Thread attacks except for MSBDS
+which is only exploitable cross Hyper-thread when one of the Hyper-Threads
+enters a C-state.
+
+The kernel provides a function to invoke the buffer clearing:
+
+    mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
+
+The mitigation is invoked on kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state
+(idle) transitions.
+
+As a special quirk to address virtualization scenarios where the host has
+the microcode updated, but the hypervisor does not (yet) expose the
+MD_CLEAR CPUID bit to guests, the kernel issues the VERW instruction in the
+hope that it might actually clear the buffers. The state is reflected
+accordingly.
+
+According to current knowledge additional mitigations inside the kernel
+itself are not required because the necessary gadgets to expose the leaked
+data cannot be controlled in a way which allows exploitation from malicious
+user space or VM guests.
+
+Kernel internal mitigation modes
+--------------------------------
+
+ ======= ============================================================
+ off      Mitigation is disabled. Either the CPU is not affected or
+          mds=off is supplied on the kernel command line
+
+ full     Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is
+          advertised in CPUID.
+
+ vmwerv	  Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is not
+	  advertised in CPUID. That is mainly for virtualization
+	  scenarios where the host has the updated microcode but the
+	  hypervisor does not expose MD_CLEAR in CPUID. It's a best
+	  effort approach without guarantee.
+ ======= ============================================================
+
+If the CPU is affected and mds=off is not supplied on the kernel command
+line then the kernel selects the appropriate mitigation mode depending on
+the availability of the MD_CLEAR CPUID bit.
+
+Mitigation points
+-----------------
+
+1. Return to user space
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   When transitioning from kernel to user space the CPU buffers are flushed
+   on affected CPUs when the mitigation is not disabled on the kernel
+   command line. The migitation is enabled through the static key
+   mds_user_clear.
+
+   The mitigation is invoked in prepare_exit_to_usermode() which covers
+   all but one of the kernel to user space transitions.  The exception
+   is when we return from a Non Maskable Interrupt (NMI), which is
+   handled directly in do_nmi().
+
+   (The reason that NMI is special is that prepare_exit_to_usermode() can
+    enable IRQs.  In NMI context, NMIs are blocked, and we don't want to
+    enable IRQs with NMIs blocked.)
+
+
+2. C-State transition
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   When a CPU goes idle and enters a C-State the CPU buffers need to be
+   cleared on affected CPUs when SMT is active. This addresses the
+   repartitioning of the store buffer when one of the Hyper-Threads enters
+   a C-State.
+
+   When SMT is inactive, i.e. either the CPU does not support it or all
+   sibling threads are offline CPU buffer clearing is not required.
+
+   The idle clearing is enabled on CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS
+   and not by any other MDS variant. The other MDS variants cannot be
+   protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks because the Fill Buffer and
+   the Load Ports are shared. So on CPUs affected by other variants, the
+   idle clearing would be a window dressing exercise and is therefore not
+   activated.
+
+   The invocation is controlled by the static key mds_idle_clear which is
+   switched depending on the chosen mitigation mode and the SMT state of
+   the system.
+
+   The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent
+   that stale data from the idling CPU from spilling to the Hyper-Thread
+   sibling after the store buffer got repartitioned and all entries are
+   available to the non idle sibling.
+
+   When coming out of idle the store buffer is partitioned again so each
+   sibling has half of it available. The back from idle CPU could be then
+   speculatively exposed to contents of the sibling. The buffers are
+   flushed either on exit to user space or on VMENTER so malicious code
+   in user space or the guest cannot speculatively access them.
+
+   The mitigation is hooked into all variants of halt()/mwait(), but does
+   not cover the legacy ACPI IO-Port mechanism because the ACPI idle driver
+   has been superseded by the intel_idle driver around 2010 and is
+   preferred on all affected CPUs which are expected to gain the MD_CLEAR
+   functionality in microcode. Aside of that the IO-Port mechanism is a
+   legacy interface which is only used on older systems which are either
+   not affected or do not receive microcode updates anymore.
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..583ddc185ba2
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+TSX Async Abort (TAA) mitigation
+================================
+
+.. _tsx_async_abort:
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel attack on internal buffers in some
+Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data Sampling (MDS).  In this
+case certain loads may speculatively pass invalid data to dependent operations
+when an asynchronous abort condition is pending in a Transactional
+Synchronization Extensions (TSX) transaction.  This includes loads with no
+fault or assist condition. Such loads may speculatively expose stale data from
+the same uarch data structures as in MDS, with same scope of exposure i.e.
+same-thread and cross-thread. This issue affects all current processors that
+support TSX.
+
+Mitigation strategy
+-------------------
+
+a) TSX disable - one of the mitigations is to disable TSX. A new MSR
+IA32_TSX_CTRL will be available in future and current processors after
+microcode update which can be used to disable TSX. In addition, it
+controls the enumeration of the TSX feature bits (RTM and HLE) in CPUID.
+
+b) Clear CPU buffers - similar to MDS, clearing the CPU buffers mitigates this
+vulnerability. More details on this approach can be found in
+:ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst <mds>`.
+
+Kernel internal mitigation modes
+--------------------------------
+
+ =============    ============================================================
+ off              Mitigation is disabled. Either the CPU is not affected or
+                  tsx_async_abort=off is supplied on the kernel command line.
+
+ tsx disabled     Mitigation is enabled. TSX feature is disabled by default at
+                  bootup on processors that support TSX control.
+
+ verw             Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is
+                  advertised in CPUID.
+
+ ucode needed     Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is not
+                  advertised in CPUID. That is mainly for virtualization
+                  scenarios where the host has the updated microcode but the
+                  hypervisor does not expose MD_CLEAR in CPUID. It's a best
+                  effort approach without guarantee.
+ =============    ============================================================
+
+If the CPU is affected and the "tsx_async_abort" kernel command line parameter is
+not provided then the kernel selects an appropriate mitigation depending on the
+status of RTM and MD_CLEAR CPUID bits.
+
+Below tables indicate the impact of tsx=on|off|auto cmdline options on state of
+TAA mitigation, VERW behavior and TSX feature for various combinations of
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits.
+
+1. "tsx=off"
+
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits     Result with cmdline tsx=off
+----------------------------------  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+TAA_NO     MDS_NO     TSX_CTRL_MSR  TSX state     VERW can clear  TAA mitigation       TAA mitigation
+                                    after bootup  CPU buffers     tsx_async_abort=off  tsx_async_abort=full
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+    0          0           0         HW default         Yes           Same as MDS           Same as MDS
+    0          0           1        Invalid case   Invalid case       Invalid case          Invalid case
+    0          1           0         HW default         No         Need ucode update     Need ucode update
+    0          1           1          Disabled          Yes           TSX disabled          TSX disabled
+    1          X           1          Disabled           X             None needed           None needed
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+
+2. "tsx=on"
+
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits     Result with cmdline tsx=on
+----------------------------------  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+TAA_NO     MDS_NO     TSX_CTRL_MSR  TSX state     VERW can clear  TAA mitigation       TAA mitigation
+                                    after bootup  CPU buffers     tsx_async_abort=off  tsx_async_abort=full
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+    0          0           0         HW default        Yes            Same as MDS          Same as MDS
+    0          0           1        Invalid case   Invalid case       Invalid case         Invalid case
+    0          1           0         HW default        No          Need ucode update     Need ucode update
+    0          1           1          Enabled          Yes               None              Same as MDS
+    1          X           1          Enabled          X              None needed          None needed
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+
+3. "tsx=auto"
+
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits     Result with cmdline tsx=auto
+----------------------------------  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+TAA_NO     MDS_NO     TSX_CTRL_MSR  TSX state     VERW can clear  TAA mitigation       TAA mitigation
+                                    after bootup  CPU buffers     tsx_async_abort=off  tsx_async_abort=full
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+    0          0           0         HW default    Yes                Same as MDS           Same as MDS
+    0          0           1        Invalid case  Invalid case        Invalid case          Invalid case
+    0          1           0         HW default    No              Need ucode update     Need ucode update
+    0          1           1          Disabled      Yes               TSX disabled          TSX disabled
+    1          X           1          Enabled       X                 None needed           None needed
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+
+In the tables, TSX_CTRL_MSR is a new bit in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES that
+indicates whether MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is supported.
+
+There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR:
+
+      Bit 0: When set it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM)
+             sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the
+             XBEGIN instruction).
+
+      Bit 1: When set it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature
+             (i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and
+             CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0).
diff --git linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
index 5432a96d31ff..05ef53d83a41 100644
--- linux-libre-4.19-gnu1/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
+++ linux-libre-4.19.314-gnu1/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
@@ -4,8 +4,9 @@ Virtual memory map with 4 level page tables:
 0000000000000000 - 00007fffffffffff (=47 bits) user space, different per mm
 hole caused by [47:63] sign extension
 ffff800000000000 - ffff87ffffffffff (=43 bits) guard hole, reserved for hypervisor
-ffff880000000000 - ffffc7ffffffffff (=64 TB) direct mapping of all phys. memory
-ffffc80000000000 - ffffc8ffffffffff (=40 bits) hole
+ffff880000000000 - ffff887fffffffff (=39 bits) LDT remap for PTI
+ffff888000000000 - ffffc87fffffffff (=64 TB) direct mapping of all phys. memory
+ffffc88000000000 - ffffc8ffffffffff (=39 bits) hole
 ffffc90000000000 - ffffe8ffffffffff (=45 bits) vmalloc/ioremap space
 ffffe90000000000 - ffffe9ffffffffff (=40 bits) hole
 ffffea0000000000 - ffffeaffffffffff (=40 bits) virtual memory map (1TB)
@@ -30,8 +31,9 @@ Virtual memory map with 5 level page tables:
 0000000000000000 - 00ffffffffffffff (=56 bits) user space, different per mm
 hole caused by [56:63] sign extension
 ff00000000000000 - ff0fffffffffffff (=52 bits) guard hole, reserved for hypervisor
-ff10000000000000 - ff8fffffffffffff (=55 bits) direct mapping of all phys. memory
-ff90000000000000 - ff9fffffffffffff (=52 bits) LDT remap for PTI
+ff10000000000000 - ff10ffffffffffff (=48 bits) LDT remap for PTI
+ff11000000000000 - ff90ffffffffffff (=55 bits) direct mapping of all phys. memory
+ff91000000000000 - ff9fffffffffffff (=3840 TB) hole
 ffa0000000000000 - ffd1ffffffffffff (=54 bits) vmalloc/ioremap space (12800 TB)
 ffd2000000000000 - ffd3ffffffffffff (=49 bits) hole
 ffd4000000000000 - ffd5ffffffffffff (=49 bits)